From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from smtp-out-no.shaw.ca (smtp-out-no.shaw.ca [64.59.134.13]) by sourceware.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 33ABF385800A for ; Mon, 22 Feb 2021 23:47:05 +0000 (GMT) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 sourceware.org 33ABF385800A Authentication-Results: sourceware.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=SystematicSw.ab.ca Authentication-Results: sourceware.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=brian.inglis@systematicsw.ab.ca Received: from [192.168.1.104] ([68.147.0.90]) by shaw.ca with ESMTP id EKuslNQFl2SWTEKutlLUYJ; Mon, 22 Feb 2021 16:47:03 -0700 X-Authority-Analysis: v=2.4 cv=fdJod2cF c=1 sm=1 tr=0 ts=60344277 a=T+ovY1NZ+FAi/xYICV7Bgg==:117 a=T+ovY1NZ+FAi/xYICV7Bgg==:17 a=IkcTkHD0fZMA:10 a=vzuxeAwJZnfo9eXj1_0A:9 a=QEXdDO2ut3YA:10 a=H9mzJr2JvMoA:10 Reply-To: cygwin@cygwin.com To: cygwin@cygwin.com References: <003401d70864$cd3b3400$67b19c00$@gmail.com> <306dd40d-666d-4a27-0a2c-dc03053d2f8c@SystematicSw.ab.ca> From: Brian Inglis Organization: Systematic Software Subject: Re: CRITICAL ls MEMORY LEAK Message-ID: <1ca42c00-db0a-4999-11e1-a82828a5e074@SystematicSw.ab.ca> Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 16:47:02 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/78.7.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-CA Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-CMAE-Envelope: MS4xfBwCMGr/Flzt0FafgKxNLGb7Tgj+Xe79nH3M+bwedlx7QywlnNaXnzV0VhrqyFXj5LnVbFVjQMcS8PdjZt6NIm/XDfBPBOFmPZ5FXoVL21uLlFSNUSJP jAkqdgWocN34PfmSlq9EolHPIyvQ0gFi7QndvXeBk0rd31pvFs6Pg/AAkVHyeIqemsopDpVxJp/16kvWm5MVv0MQVcc58geTMTM= X-Spam-Status: No, score=0.8 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00, KAM_DMARC_STATUS, KAM_LAZY_DOMAIN_SECURITY, NICE_REPLY_A, RCVD_IN_BARRACUDACENTRAL, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_LOW, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H3, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_NONE, TXREP autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.2 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.2 (2018-09-13) on server2.sourceware.org X-BeenThere: cygwin@cygwin.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: General Cygwin discussions and problem reports List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 22 Feb 2021 23:47:06 -0000 On 2021-02-22 14:50, Hans-Bernhard Bröker wrote: > Am 22.02.2021 um 21:30 schrieb Brian Inglis: > >> I've often wondered if the heavy activity is due to Windows' defaults to >> writing files with F+RX perms which triggers executable virus scans? > > That could only be the case if Windows actually had an 'x' permission bit. Strictly speaking, I am not sure if *Unix* has an 'x' permission bit, but most filesystems do provide such a facility (V/FAT e.g. some /boot/ do not), as do POSIX/Solaris ACLs, and Windows NTFS, whose ACLs have execute permissions: $ icacls /? | egrep exec\|X RX - read and execute access GE - generic execute X - execute/traverse GE grants FILE_EXECUTE and STANDARD_RIGHTS_EXECUTE access rights. Access Mask Format: |31|30|29|28|27|26|25|24|23|22|21|20|19|18|17|16|15|14|13|12|11|10|9|8|7|6|5|4|3|2|1|0| |GR|GW|GE|GA|27|26|25|AS|23|22|21|20|19|18|17|16|15|14|13|12|11|10|9|8|7|6|5|4|3|2|1|0| |..generic..|reserved|..|.......standard........|...........object.specific...........| GR GENERIC_READ GW GENERIC_WRITE GE GENERIC_EXECUTE GA GENERIC_ALL AS ACCESS_SYSTEM_SECURITY access Security ACL in object security descriptor Windows also supports ACLs on system objects, and there may be similar features on SELinux. -- Take care. Thanks, Brian Inglis, Calgary, Alberta, Canada This email may be disturbing to some readers as it contains too much technical detail. Reader discretion is advised. [Data in binary units and prefixes, physical quantities in SI.]