From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: by sourceware.org (Postfix, from userid 48) id 787323858C2C; Fri, 25 Aug 2023 15:00:14 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 sourceware.org 787323858C2C DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=sourceware.org; s=default; t=1692975614; bh=VDwy8bSzazQ/3mzWHJToI/fKnNqc6tbwLy1N3OMGkcA=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=wnoDagcUF8dIB+ewZZUC1ZirJJyWNOPwkHfmtSnmzX3UBkqPVinGilPTocBkI3EnK ilyvwpQtwLglrpXadMr6cClimoobVZowglN/1n0KLo7JD7x+gHPivkMklIUwRZQSFS nG2eccD8p507SbxR0nr9nFZwMrOB77x76p7vP97Q= From: "mark at klomp dot org" To: elfutils-devel@sourceware.org Subject: [Bug debuginfod/28204] extend webapi / verification with forthcoming signed-contents archives Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2023 15:00:13 +0000 X-Bugzilla-Reason: CC X-Bugzilla-Type: changed X-Bugzilla-Watch-Reason: None X-Bugzilla-Product: elfutils X-Bugzilla-Component: debuginfod X-Bugzilla-Version: unspecified X-Bugzilla-Keywords: X-Bugzilla-Severity: normal X-Bugzilla-Who: mark at klomp dot org X-Bugzilla-Status: ASSIGNED X-Bugzilla-Resolution: X-Bugzilla-Priority: P2 X-Bugzilla-Assigned-To: rgoldber at redhat dot com X-Bugzilla-Target-Milestone: --- X-Bugzilla-Flags: X-Bugzilla-Changed-Fields: Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Bugzilla-URL: http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/ Auto-Submitted: auto-generated MIME-Version: 1.0 List-Id: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=3D28204 --- Comment #22 from Mark Wielaard --- (In reply to Ryan Goldberg from comment #21) > (In reply to Mark Wielaard from comment #20) > > But isn't the idea of checking the IMA signatures that you don't have to > > trust the server providing the debuginfo files as the distro intended t= hem? > But this will allow for the case of a trusted server which only has some = of > it's RPMs per-file signed. Take for instance a server which has the RPMs = for > f36,37,38. The f36 files don't have signatures so using enforcing here is > too strict since we are ok just letting a client know that these ones are > unverifiable, but we still want to be able to reject any of the invalid o= nes > for f38 This still feels odd. Since you cannot distinguish between non-sig f36 pack= age (okish?) and non-sig f38 packages (bad?). I think you have to either trust = or reject all non-sig packages from such a server. > > So both are bad in some way. Which imho means that if we support some k= ind > > of permissive mode, then it should explicitly warn for both kind of bad= dness. > In the permissive mode you'll get: > * "the signature is valid" for valid sigs > * "ALERT: this download is being rejected since the IMA signature could n= ot > be verified" for invalid sigs > * "the signature could not be verified" otherwise I'll look at the code to see if I understand what this means in practice. A= re those the messages presented to the user (in verbose mode? always?). And do= es this mean all three cases warn (or only the second and third)? And is it ju= st a message or does it also mean actual rejection in some cases? > So we do warn for both kinds of bad, we just don't reject the 'unknown' b= ad But how is 'unknown' bad different from invalid signature bad? I think you should assume that if there is no signature, then the signature= is by definition invalid (assume it has a signature of 00000000000000000000000000000000). --=20 You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.=