From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: by sourceware.org (Postfix, from userid 48) id 1B5EF385697F; Thu, 17 Aug 2023 16:25:02 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 sourceware.org 1B5EF385697F DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=sourceware.org; s=default; t=1692289502; bh=YItcJBYn8yOnd8XZBqW6WLsRWrPrPI00woBwDnodJBY=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=wmQWt9WwY1s/f8+TE3wUx4RCAUCYIHffErVYpJMtp1fo72UUT2Vtnp+fAAo4t5WFc XuGiLpOfzvTCGXrSWe4bS5bjkci1MKG/OKd2zRJOkaPHPGGqytAJuRykWvjRJXxN15 JG71vRSzlbdChBo5kLxLrCaWQQcd4/p6xmEB6F1s= From: "rgoldber at redhat dot com" To: elfutils-devel@sourceware.org Subject: [Bug debuginfod/28204] extend webapi / verification with forthcoming signed-contents archives Date: Thu, 17 Aug 2023 16:25:01 +0000 X-Bugzilla-Reason: CC X-Bugzilla-Type: changed X-Bugzilla-Watch-Reason: None X-Bugzilla-Product: elfutils X-Bugzilla-Component: debuginfod X-Bugzilla-Version: unspecified X-Bugzilla-Keywords: X-Bugzilla-Severity: normal X-Bugzilla-Who: rgoldber at redhat dot com X-Bugzilla-Status: ASSIGNED X-Bugzilla-Resolution: X-Bugzilla-Priority: P2 X-Bugzilla-Assigned-To: rgoldber at redhat dot com X-Bugzilla-Target-Milestone: --- X-Bugzilla-Flags: X-Bugzilla-Changed-Fields: Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Bugzilla-URL: http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/ Auto-Submitted: auto-generated MIME-Version: 1.0 List-Id: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=3D28204 --- Comment #21 from Ryan Goldberg --- (In reply to Mark Wielaard from comment #20) > But isn't the idea of checking the IMA signatures that you don't have to > trust the server providing the debuginfo files as the distro intended the= m? But this will allow for the case of a trusted server which only has some of it's RPMs per-file signed. Take for instance a server which has the RPMs for f36,37,38. The f36 files don't have signatures so using enforcing here is t= oo strict since we are ok just letting a client know that these ones are unverifiable, but we still want to be able to reject any of the invalid ones for f38 > So both are bad in some way. Which imho means that if we support some kind > of permissive mode, then it should explicitly warn for both kind of baddn= ess. In the permissive mode you'll get: * "the signature is valid" for valid sigs * "ALERT: this download is being rejected since the IMA signature could not= be verified" for invalid sigs * "the signature could not be verified" otherwise So we do warn for both kinds of bad, we just don't reject the 'unknown' bad --=20 You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.=