From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: by sourceware.org (Postfix, from userid 48) id DBFD6385800C; Wed, 9 Aug 2023 18:17:38 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 sourceware.org DBFD6385800C DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=sourceware.org; s=default; t=1691605058; bh=dBRzu30s3JN/OaLj+Ug0QfzheDiRH+2ss8sdqTuDnGU=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=E32sXwC4SC8B3Xw6+gozvjvW7RyfCiynHiAZjSA52XDWrHxNcY3g3txNfkIMCfiVd LLMzPmyGdz2jxM7D2zomWjUnVVrU34Oj0EaEKsl8NmU7Vb5O/FCFTMZ9Tna/Rrpv97 tZic02Au6KyRd8iHOehp1yGL4fNMzM1XtRDwfcyY= From: "rgoldber at redhat dot com" To: elfutils-devel@sourceware.org Subject: [Bug debuginfod/28204] extend webapi / verification with forthcoming signed-contents archives Date: Wed, 09 Aug 2023 18:17:36 +0000 X-Bugzilla-Reason: CC X-Bugzilla-Type: changed X-Bugzilla-Watch-Reason: None X-Bugzilla-Product: elfutils X-Bugzilla-Component: debuginfod X-Bugzilla-Version: unspecified X-Bugzilla-Keywords: X-Bugzilla-Severity: normal X-Bugzilla-Who: rgoldber at redhat dot com X-Bugzilla-Status: ASSIGNED X-Bugzilla-Resolution: X-Bugzilla-Priority: P2 X-Bugzilla-Assigned-To: rgoldber at redhat dot com X-Bugzilla-Target-Milestone: --- X-Bugzilla-Flags: X-Bugzilla-Changed-Fields: Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Bugzilla-URL: http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/ Auto-Submitted: auto-generated MIME-Version: 1.0 List-Id: https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=3D28204 --- Comment #19 from Ryan Goldberg --- (In reply to Mark Wielaard from comment #17) > Maybe prefixing or postfixing URLS with + or adding the name of the cert? I'm leaning towards a combination of this idea with my original. We can use DEBUGINFOD_IMA_POLICY to set the default ima verification response policy (possibly renaming to DEBUGINFOD_IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY) and then we can use DEBUGINFOD_URLS=3D"url1+enforcing url2 url3+ignore". This seems like a simp= le way the user can define policy at a granularity of their choice. I wrote up a q= uick test patch for this and it seems pretty straightforward. (In reply to Frank Ch. Eigler from comment #18) > > Doesn't that give a false sense of "security"? > > It still rejects some stuff, but doesn't really protect against "falsif= ying" > > files, all a server has to do is not provide an IMA=20 >=20 > Yes, but trusted servers won't just do that. It's up to the user to choose when to allow a permissive policy. Maybe not using it as the default will alleviate these concerns? A user would have to explicitly choose to 'let their guard down' when for instance using a trust= ed server > The difference between missing and invalid is that the latter is KNOWN ba= d. > An invalid signature is evidence that the file has a problem. I agree that the distinction is enough that having a 3rd mode seems like a = good bet. When using https://debuginfod.fedoraproject.org/ it doesn't feel like = an issue to me to use a file that doesn't happen to have a signature, but otoh= I wouldn't want one that I know is incorrect --=20 You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.=