public inbox for gcc-bugs@sourceware.org
help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "cvs-commit at gcc dot gnu.org" <gcc-bugzilla@gcc.gnu.org>
To: gcc-bugs@gcc.gnu.org
Subject: [Bug analyzer/106235] RFE: -fanalyzer could complain about tainted data triggering assertion failure
Date: Sun, 13 Nov 2022 23:00:21 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bug-106235-4-1wtaT8R8KS@http.gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bug-106235-4@http.gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/>

https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=106235

--- Comment #3 from CVS Commits <cvs-commit at gcc dot gnu.org> ---
The master branch has been updated by David Malcolm <dmalcolm@gcc.gnu.org>:

https://gcc.gnu.org/g:d777b38cde91a87f2345dcd13901862a9513562a

commit r13-3947-gd777b38cde91a87f2345dcd13901862a9513562a
Author: David Malcolm <dmalcolm@redhat.com>
Date:   Sun Nov 13 17:53:23 2022 -0500

    analyzer: new warning: -Wanalyzer-tainted-assertion [PR106235]

    This patch adds a new -Wanalyzer-tainted-assertion warning to
    -fanalyzer's "taint" mode (which also requires -fanalyzer-checker=taint).

    It complains about attacker-controlled values being used in assertions,
    or in any expression affecting control flow that guards a "noreturn"
    function.  As noted in the docs part of the patch, in such cases:

      - when assertion-checking is enabled: an attacker could trigger
        a denial of service by injecting an assertion failure

      - when assertion-checking is disabled, such as by defining NDEBUG,
        an attacker could inject data that subverts the process, since it
        presumably violates a precondition that is being assumed by the code.

    For example, given:

    #include <assert.h>

    int __attribute__((tainted_args))
    test_tainted_assert (int n)
    {
      assert (n > 0);
      return n * n;
    }

    compiling with
      -fanalyzer -fanalyzer-checker=taint
    gives:

    t.c: In function 'test_tainted_assert':
    t.c:6:3: warning: use of attacked-controlled value in condition for
assertion [CWE-617] [-Wanalyzer-tainted-assertion]
        6 |   assert (n > 0);
          |   ^~~~~~
      'test_tainted_assert': event 1
        |
        |    4 | test_tainted_assert (int n)
        |      | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
        |      | |
        |      | (1) function 'test_tainted_assert' marked with
'__attribute__((tainted_args))'
        |
        +--> 'test_tainted_assert': event 2
               |
               |    4 | test_tainted_assert (int n)
               |      | ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
               |      | |
               |      | (2) entry to 'test_tainted_assert'
               |
             'test_tainted_assert': events 3-6
               |
               |/usr/include/assert.h:106:10:
               |  106 |       if (expr)                                        
                \
               |      |          ^
               |      |          |
               |      |          (3) use of attacker-controlled value for
control flow
               |      |          (4) following 'false' branch (when 'n <=
0')...
               |......
               |  109 |         __assert_fail (#expr, __FILE__, __LINE__,
__ASSERT_FUNCTION);   \
               |      |         ~~~~~~~~~~~~~
               |      |         |
               |      |         (5) ...to here
               |      |         (6) treating '__assert_fail' as an assertion
failure handler due to '__attribute__((__noreturn__))'
               |

    The testcases have various examples for BUG and BUG_ON from the
    Linux kernel; there, the diagnostic treats "panic" as an assertion
    failure handler, due to '__attribute__((__noreturn__))'.

    gcc/analyzer/ChangeLog:
            PR analyzer/106235
            * analyzer.opt (Wanalyzer-tainted-assertion): New.
            * checker-path.cc (checker_path::fixup_locations): Pass false to
            pending_diagnostic::fixup_location.
            * diagnostic-manager.cc (get_emission_location): Pass true to
            pending_diagnostic::fixup_location.
            * pending-diagnostic.cc (pending_diagnostic::fixup_location): Add
            bool param.
            * pending-diagnostic.h (pending_diagnostic::fixup_location): Add
            bool param to decl.
            * sm-taint.cc (taint_state_machine::m_tainted_control_flow): New.
            (taint_diagnostic::describe_state_change): Drop "final".
            (class tainted_assertion): New.
            (taint_state_machine::taint_state_machine): Initialize
            m_tainted_control_flow.
            (taint_state_machine::alt_get_inherited_state): Support
            comparisons being tainted, based on their arguments.
            (is_assertion_failure_handler_p): New.
            (taint_state_machine::on_stmt): Complain about calls to assertion
            failure handlers guarded by an attacker-controller conditional.
            Detect attacker-controlled gcond conditionals and gswitch index
            values.
            (taint_state_machine::check_control_flow_arg_for_taint): New.

    gcc/ChangeLog:
            PR analyzer/106235
            * doc/gcc/gcc-command-options/option-summary.rst: Add
            -Wno-analyzer-tainted-assertion.
            *
doc/gcc/gcc-command-options/options-that-control-static-analysis.rst:
            Add -Wno-analyzer-tainted-assertion.

    gcc/testsuite/ChangeLog:
            PR analyzer/106235
            * gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-assert-BUG_ON.c: New test.
            * gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-assert-macro-expansion.c: New test.
            * gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-assert.c: New test.
            * gcc.dg/analyzer/taint-assert-system-header.c: New test.
            * gcc.dg/analyzer/test-assert.h: New header.
            * gcc.dg/plugin/analyzer_gil_plugin.c
            (gil_diagnostic::fixup_location): Add bool param.

    Signed-off-by: David Malcolm <dmalcolm@redhat.com>

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-11-13 23:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-07-08 13:55 [Bug analyzer/106235] New: " dmalcolm at gcc dot gnu.org
2022-07-08 13:57 ` [Bug analyzer/106235] " dmalcolm at gcc dot gnu.org
2022-11-13 20:41 ` dmalcolm at gcc dot gnu.org
2022-11-13 23:00 ` cvs-commit at gcc dot gnu.org [this message]
2022-11-13 23:06 ` dmalcolm at gcc dot gnu.org
2022-11-28 22:19 ` pinskia at gcc dot gnu.org

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=bug-106235-4-1wtaT8R8KS@http.gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/ \
    --to=gcc-bugzilla@gcc.gnu.org \
    --cc=gcc-bugs@gcc.gnu.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for read-only IMAP folder(s) and NNTP newsgroup(s).