From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: by sourceware.org (Postfix, from userid 48) id 1E9BC3846411; Fri, 7 Aug 2020 11:18:07 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 sourceware.org 1E9BC3846411 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gcc.gnu.org; s=default; t=1596799087; bh=v82pltJyxeuxatN5p7iD264CEgygW1kWyXyVwmm9uRM=; h=From:To:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=aUV/utG1wXHpiG2HNBwsfm3/W5mot5VxveMMi83OrjR2b+fDUY7rGnWZoO/DITiHs LY1VmeDK2AZhhhge6DMSJdY44Sn45PagyNp97VhT92obYxCBtuFQ3RduZXFiiPKSOn CqYR/FT5ngh6Vg6BUnmtPQwGThKixRzKV/DqFuV8= From: "cvs-commit at gcc dot gnu.org" To: gcc-bugs@gcc.gnu.org Subject: [Bug target/96191] aarch64 stack_protect_test canary leak Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2020 11:18:06 +0000 X-Bugzilla-Reason: CC X-Bugzilla-Type: changed X-Bugzilla-Watch-Reason: None X-Bugzilla-Product: gcc X-Bugzilla-Component: target X-Bugzilla-Version: 11.0 X-Bugzilla-Keywords: X-Bugzilla-Severity: normal X-Bugzilla-Who: cvs-commit at gcc dot gnu.org X-Bugzilla-Status: ASSIGNED X-Bugzilla-Resolution: X-Bugzilla-Priority: P3 X-Bugzilla-Assigned-To: rsandifo at gcc dot gnu.org X-Bugzilla-Target-Milestone: --- X-Bugzilla-Flags: X-Bugzilla-Changed-Fields: Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Bugzilla-URL: http://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/ Auto-Submitted: auto-generated MIME-Version: 1.0 X-BeenThere: gcc-bugs@gcc.gnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Gcc-bugs mailing list List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Fri, 07 Aug 2020 11:18:07 -0000 https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=3D96191 --- Comment #9 from CVS Commits --- The releases/gcc-9 branch has been updated by Richard Sandiford : https://gcc.gnu.org/g:3e40be9cc92d3fa117be7f4fab07cedeed8361a2 commit r9-8795-g3e40be9cc92d3fa117be7f4fab07cedeed8361a2 Author: Richard Sandiford Date: Fri Aug 7 12:17:37 2020 +0100 arm: Clear canary value after stack_protect_test [PR96191] The stack_protect_test patterns were leaving the canary value in the temporary register, meaning that it was often still in registers on return from the function. An attacker might therefore have been able to use it to defeat stack-smash protection for a later function. gcc/ PR target/96191 * config/arm/arm.md (arm_stack_protect_test_insn): Zero out operand 2 after use. * config/arm/thumb1.md (thumb1_stack_protect_test_insn): Likewi= se. gcc/testsuite/ * gcc.target/arm/stack-protector-1.c: New test. * gcc.target/arm/stack-protector-2.c: Likewise. (cherry picked from commit 6a3f3e08723063ea2dadb7ddf503f02972a724e2)=