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From: "H.J. Lu" <hongjiu.lu@intel.com>
To: gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org
Cc: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>,
	Igor Tsimbalist <igor.v.tsimbalist@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH] i386: Mask out the CF_SET bit for -fcf-protection check
Date: Tue, 06 Feb 2018 21:09:00 -0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180206210927.GA238859@intel.com> (raw)

Since ix86_option_override_internal sets the CF_SET bit in
flag_cf_protection and it can be called more than once via pragma,
we need to mask out the CF_SET bit when checking flag_cf_protection.

OK for trunk if there is no regression?

H.J.
---
	PR target/84248
	* config/i386/i386.c (ix86_option_override_internal): Mask out
	the CF_SET bit when checking -fcf-protection.
---
 gcc/config/i386/i386.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/gcc/config/i386/i386.c b/gcc/config/i386/i386.c
index 6c612c77987..ef7ff89bcbb 100644
--- a/gcc/config/i386/i386.c
+++ b/gcc/config/i386/i386.c
@@ -4913,12 +4913,12 @@ ix86_option_override_internal (bool main_args_p,
       = build_target_option_node (opts);
 
   /* Do not support control flow instrumentation if CET is not enabled.  */
-  if (opts->x_flag_cf_protection != CF_NONE)
+  cf_protection_level cf_protection
+    = (cf_protection_level) (opts->x_flag_cf_protection & ~CF_SET);
+  if (cf_protection != CF_NONE)
     {
-      switch (flag_cf_protection)
+      switch (cf_protection)
 	{
-	case CF_NONE:
-	  break;
 	case CF_BRANCH:
 	  if (! TARGET_IBT_P (opts->x_ix86_isa_flags2))
 	    {
@@ -4953,7 +4953,7 @@ ix86_option_override_internal (bool main_args_p,
 	}
 
       opts->x_flag_cf_protection =
-	(cf_protection_level) (opts->x_flag_cf_protection | CF_SET);
+	(cf_protection_level) (cf_protection | CF_SET);
     }
 
   if (ix86_tune_features [X86_TUNE_AVOID_128FMA_CHAINS])
-- 
2.14.3

             reply	other threads:[~2018-02-06 21:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-02-06 21:09 H.J. Lu [this message]
2018-02-06 21:20 ` Tsimbalist, Igor V
2018-02-07  8:52   ` Uros Bizjak

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