From: Richard Biener <richard.guenther@gmail.com>
To: Richard Earnshaw <Richard.Earnshaw@arm.com>
Cc: GCC Patches <gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/7] Add __builtin_speculation_safe_value
Date: Thu, 26 Jul 2018 08:42:00 -0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFiYyc3XUqn4ohHY8rRDtbD77b3sLs5GSpvUvH+HM-TarHTirQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <dde03fb7-bfda-09e5-780a-dd0fa3fa75df@arm.com>
On Wed, Jul 25, 2018 at 8:03 PM Richard Earnshaw (lists)
<Richard.Earnshaw@arm.com> wrote:
>
> On 24/07/18 18:26, Richard Biener wrote:
> > So, please make resolve_overloaded_builtin return a no-op on such targets
> > which means you can remove the above warning. Maybe such targets
> > shouldn't advertise / initialize the builtins at all?
>
> So I tried to make resolve_overloaded_builtin collapse the builtin
> entirely if it's not needed by the machine, transforming
>
> x = __b_s_s_v (y);
>
> into
>
> x = y;
>
>
> but I can't see how to make any side-effects on the optional second
> argument hang around. It's somewhat obscure, but if the user does write
>
> x = __b_s_s_v (y, z++);
>
> then z++ does still need to be performed.
>
> The problem seems to be that the callers of resolve_overloaded_builtin
> expect just a simple value result - they can't, for example, deal with a
> statement list and just calling save_expr on the argument isn't enough;
> so I can't see an obvious way to force the z++ expression back into the
> token stream at this point.
>
> Any ideas? The alternative seems to be that we must keep the call until
> such time as the builtins are lowered during expansion, which pretty
> much loses all the benefits you were looking for.
Use a COMPOUND_EXPR: (z++, y). So,
if (TREE_SIDE_EFFECTS (2ndarg))
res = build2_loc (loc, COMPOUND_EXPR, type, 2ndarg, 1starg);
else
res = 2starg;
Richard.
>
> R.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-07-26 8:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-07-09 16:39 [PATCH 0/7] Mitigation against unsafe data speculation (CVE-2017-5753) Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-09 16:39 ` [PATCH 3/7] AArch64 - add speculation barrier Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-09 16:39 ` [PATCH 7/7] AArch64 - use CSDB based sequences if speculation tracking is enabled Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-09 16:39 ` [PATCH 5/7] AArch64 - disable CB[N]Z TB[N]Z when tracking speculation Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-09 16:39 ` [PATCH 2/7] Arm - add speculation_barrier pattern Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-09 16:39 ` [PATCH 4/7] AArch64 - Add new option -mtrack-speculation Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-09 16:39 ` [PATCH 1/7] Add __builtin_speculation_safe_value Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-23 14:28 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-24 17:26 ` Richard Biener
2018-07-25 9:49 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-25 10:36 ` Richard Biener
2018-07-25 12:41 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-25 13:47 ` Richard Biener
2018-07-26 10:03 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-26 12:41 ` Richard Biener
2018-07-26 13:06 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-26 13:13 ` Richard Biener
2018-07-26 23:34 ` Joseph Myers
2018-07-27 0:46 ` Paul Koning
2018-07-27 8:59 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-27 10:59 ` Joseph Myers
2018-07-25 18:03 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-26 8:42 ` Richard Biener [this message]
2018-07-09 16:39 ` [PATCH 6/7] AArch64 - new pass to add conditional-branch speculation tracking Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-11 21:01 ` Jeff Law
2018-07-23 14:33 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-24 21:31 ` Jeff Law
2018-07-09 23:13 ` [PATCH 0/7] Mitigation against unsafe data speculation (CVE-2017-5753) Jeff Law
2018-07-10 8:49 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-10 13:48 ` Bill Schmidt
2018-07-10 14:14 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-10 15:44 ` Jeff Law
2018-07-10 15:42 ` Jeff Law
2018-07-10 16:43 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-11 20:47 ` Jeff Law
2018-07-11 22:31 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-10 7:19 ` Richard Biener
2018-07-10 8:39 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-10 10:10 ` Richard Biener
2018-07-10 10:53 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-10 11:22 ` Richard Biener
2018-07-10 13:43 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-10 15:56 ` Jeff Law
2018-07-27 9:38 ` [PATCH 00/11] (v2) " Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-27 9:38 ` [PATCH 09/11] pdp11 - example of a port not needing a speculation barrier Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-27 13:27 ` Paul Koning
2018-07-27 15:19 ` Richard Biener
2018-07-27 9:38 ` [PATCH 08/11] targhooks - provide an alternative hook for targets that never execute speculatively Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-30 13:17 ` Richard Biener
2018-07-27 9:38 ` [PATCH 06/11] AArch64 - new pass to add conditional-branch speculation tracking Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-27 9:38 ` [PATCH 04/11] AArch64 - Add new option -mtrack-speculation Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-27 9:38 ` [PATCH 05/11] AArch64 - disable CB[N]Z TB[N]Z when tracking speculation Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-27 9:38 ` [PATCH 02/11] Arm - add speculation_barrier pattern Richard Earnshaw
2018-08-06 14:01 ` Christophe Lyon
2018-08-06 15:59 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-27 9:38 ` [PATCH 03/11] AArch64 - add speculation barrier Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-27 9:38 ` [PATCH 01/11] Add __builtin_speculation_safe_value Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-27 12:11 ` Nathan Sidwell
2018-07-27 12:32 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-27 12:49 ` Nathan Sidwell
2018-07-27 12:53 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-30 13:16 ` Richard Biener
2018-07-31 19:25 ` H.J. Lu
2018-07-31 20:51 ` Ian Lance Taylor via gcc-patches
2018-08-01 8:50 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-08-01 8:54 ` Jakub Jelinek
2018-08-01 9:25 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-07-27 9:38 ` [PATCH 07/11] AArch64 - use CSDB based sequences if speculation tracking is enabled Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-27 9:38 ` [PATCH 10/11] x86 - add speculation_barrier pattern Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-28 8:25 ` Uros Bizjak
2018-07-31 23:15 ` H.J. Lu
2018-07-27 9:38 ` [PATCH 11/11] rs6000 " Richard Earnshaw
2018-07-31 22:01 ` Bill Schmidt
2018-07-31 23:31 ` Segher Boessenkool
2018-07-27 19:49 ` [PATCH 00/11] (v2) Mitigation against unsafe data speculation (CVE-2017-5753) John David Anglin
2018-08-02 18:40 ` Jeff Law
2018-08-02 20:19 ` John David Anglin
2018-08-03 9:06 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-08-06 21:52 ` John David Anglin
2018-08-07 14:05 ` Richard Earnshaw (lists)
2018-08-07 14:56 ` John David Anglin
2018-08-03 17:26 ` Jeff Law
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