From: Luis Machado <luis.machado@arm.com>
To: Torbjorn SVENSSON <torbjorn.svensson@foss.st.com>,
Tomas Vanek <vanekt@fbl.cz>,
gdb-patches@sourceware.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] gdb/arm: Fix M-profile EXC_RETURN exception_domain_is_secure logic
Date: Tue, 25 Oct 2022 14:28:37 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <9e2b77da-7db0-aee3-cbd8-067f600d5344@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <48df83b6-054f-6d0b-c1e3-076eef904eb3@foss.st.com>
Hi Tomas,
On 10/22/22 09:11, Torbjorn SVENSSON via Gdb-patches wrote:
> Hi Tomas,
>
> On 2022-10-22 10:07, Tomas Vanek wrote:
>> Arm v8-M Architecture Reference Manual,
>> D1.2.95 EXC_RETURN, Exception Return Payload
>> describes ES bit:
>>
>> "ES, bit [0]
>> Exception Secure. The security domain the exception was taken to.
>> The possible values of this bit are:
>> 0 Non-secure.
>> 1 Secure"
>>
>> arm-tdep.c:3443, arm_m_exception_cache () function tests this bit:
>>
>> exception_domain_is_secure = (bit (lr, 0) == 0);
>>
>> The test is negated!
>
> Good catch! I'm not sure how I thought when I wrote this, but thanks for correcting it.
>
>>
>> Later on line 3553, the condition evaluates if an additional state
>> context is stacked:
>>
>> /* With the Security extension, the hardware saves R4..R11 too. */
>> if (tdep->have_sec_ext && secure_stack_used
>> && (!default_callee_register_stacking || exception_domain_is_secure))
>>
>> RM, B3.19 Exception entry, context stacking
>> reads:
>> RPLHM "In a PE with the Security Extension, on taking an exception,
>> the PE hardware:
>> ...
>> 2. If exception entry requires a transition from Secure state to
>> Non-secure state, the PE hardware extends the stack frame and also
>> saves additional state context."
>>
>> So we should test for !exception_domain_is_secure instead of non-negated
>> value!
>> These two bugs compensate each other so unstacking works correctly.
>>
>> But another test of exception_domain_is_secure (negated due to the
>> first bug) prevents arm_unwind_secure_frames to work as expected:
>>
>> /* Unwinding from non-secure to secure can trip security
>> measures. In order to avoid the debugger being
>> intrusive, rely on the user to configure the requested
>> mode. */
>> if (secure_stack_used && !exception_domain_is_secure
>> && !arm_unwind_secure_frames)
>>
>> Test with GNU gdb (GDB) 13.0.50.20221016-git.
>> Stopped in a non-secure handler:
>>
>> (gdb) set arm unwind-secure-frames 0
>> (gdb) bt
>> #0 HAL_SYSTICK_Callback () at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/NonSecure/Src/nsmain.c:490
>> #1 0x0804081c in SysTick_Handler ()
>> at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/NonSecure/Src/nsstm32l5xx_it.c:134
>> #2 <signal handler called>
>> #3 HAL_GPIO_ReadPin (GPIOx=0x52020800, GPIO_Pin=8192)
>> at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/Drivers/STM32L5xx_HAL_Driver/Src/stm32l5xx_hal_gpio.c:386
>> #4 0x0c000338 in SECURE_Mode () at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/Secure/Src/main.c:86
>> #5 0x080403f2 in main () at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/NonSecure/Src/nsmain.c:278
>> Backtrace stopped: previous frame inner to this frame (corrupt stack?)
>>
>> The frames #3 and #4 are secure. backtrace should stop before #3.
>>
>> Stopped in a secure handler:
>>
>> (gdb) bt
>> #0 HAL_SYSTICK_Callback () at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/Secure/Src/main.c:425
>> #1 0x0c000b6a in SysTick_Handler ()
>> at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/Secure/Src/stm32l5xx_it.c:234
>> warning: Non-secure to secure stack unwinding disabled.
>> #2 <signal handler called>
>>
>> The exception from secure to secure erroneously stops unwinding. It should
>> continue as far as the security unlimited backtrace:
>>
>> (gdb) set arm unwind-secure-frames 1
>> (gdb) si <-- used to rebuild frame cache after change of unwind-secure-frames
>
> Is there any way to make gdb rebuild the frame cache directly when doing the "set arm unwind-secure-frames"? Feels dirty to do a instruction step just to get the right trace...
> Regardless of the answer to the above question, it's not something to address in this patch.
>
I'm not sure we want to be this intrusive, but there is the "maint flush register-cache" command that flushes the register cache and forces GDB to fetch
everything on a new backtrace command.
maintenance flush register-cache -- Force gdb to flush its register and frame cache.
We could tie changes to unwind-secure-frames to flushing the cache, but my initial thought is that it is a bit too invasive.
>> 0x0c0008e6 425 if (SecureTimingDelay != 0U)
>> (gdb) bt
>> #0 0x0c0008e6 in HAL_SYSTICK_Callback () at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/Secure/Src/main.c:425
>> #1 0x0c000b6a in SysTick_Handler ()
>> at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/Secure/Src/stm32l5xx_it.c:234
>> #2 <signal handler called>
>> #3 0x0c000328 in SECURE_Mode () at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/Secure/Src/main.c:88
>> #4 0x080403f2 in main () at C:/dvl/stm32l5trustzone/GPIO_IOToggle_TrustZone/NonSecure/Src/nsmain.c:278
>>
>> Backtrace stopped: previous frame inner to this frame (corrupt stack?)
>>
>> Set exception_domain_is_secure to the value expected by its name.
>> Fix exception_domain_is_secure usage in the additional state context
>> stacking condition.
>>
>> v2: Corrected backtrace logs in commit message
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tomas Vanek <vanekt@fbl.cz>
>> ---
>> gdb/arm-tdep.c | 4 ++--
>> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/gdb/arm-tdep.c b/gdb/arm-tdep.c
>> index 55295e1..20b6f3f 100644
>> --- a/gdb/arm-tdep.c
>> +++ b/gdb/arm-tdep.c
>> @@ -3496,7 +3496,7 @@ struct frame_unwind arm_stub_unwind = {
>> {
>> secure_stack_used = (bit (lr, 6) != 0);
>> default_callee_register_stacking = (bit (lr, 5) != 0);
>> - exception_domain_is_secure = (bit (lr, 0) == 0);
>> + exception_domain_is_secure = (bit (lr, 0) != 0);
>> /* Unwinding from non-secure to secure can trip security
>> measures. In order to avoid the debugger being
>> @@ -3606,7 +3606,7 @@ struct frame_unwind arm_stub_unwind = {
>> /* With the Security extension, the hardware saves R4..R11 too. */
>> if (tdep->have_sec_ext && secure_stack_used
>> - && (!default_callee_register_stacking || exception_domain_is_secure))
>> + && (!default_callee_register_stacking || !exception_domain_is_secure))
>> {
>> /* Read R4..R11 from the integer callee registers. */
>> cache->saved_regs[4].set_addr (unwound_sp + 0x08);
>
> Kind regards,
> Torbjörn
Thanks for the patch. This LGTM. I suppose you need us to push on your behalf?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-25 13:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-22 8:07 Tomas Vanek
2022-10-22 8:07 ` Tomas Vanek
2022-10-22 8:11 ` Torbjorn SVENSSON
2022-10-25 13:28 ` Luis Machado [this message]
2022-10-26 12:04 ` Luis Machado
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