From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-124.mimecast.com [170.10.133.124]) by sourceware.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 38AC93856DF6 for ; Fri, 14 Apr 2023 19:45:36 +0000 (GMT) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.2 sourceware.org 38AC93856DF6 Authentication-Results: sourceware.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: sourceware.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=redhat.com DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=redhat.com; s=mimecast20190719; t=1681501535; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: in-reply-to:in-reply-to; bh=ioaIXodA6WmaUlamHsuF4PGI9ZUZBrwfEnSvKTq6/WA=; b=HniG21sfV5yYYKws6+eGlBnpwXKVKbyaND1U2UtIRdyHBPns4U7Eg3tweam4U9uWHIJW1d 5BAL4EmXRWLBxJEP9IOP8jv/xqJ11i9AdzpLlgIfBNV1mhj8M+3+A9u+/hOsKccVYsW+IL FF1FIV5ks+sWv8m6FDC9TWMzSEreRtU= Received: from mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (mx3-rdu2.redhat.com [66.187.233.73]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-526-krQqbImOPyyM4YumsI2-DA-1; Fri, 14 Apr 2023 15:45:34 -0400 X-MC-Unique: krQqbImOPyyM4YumsI2-DA-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx09.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.9]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 68EED381494D; Fri, 14 Apr 2023 19:45:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: from greed.delorie.com (unknown [10.22.8.117]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 55C21492C13; Fri, 14 Apr 2023 19:45:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: from greed.delorie.com.redhat.com (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by greed.delorie.com (8.15.2/8.15.2) with ESMTP id 33EJjXxO3066597; Fri, 14 Apr 2023 15:45:33 -0400 From: DJ Delorie To: Ian Lance Taylor Cc: binutils@sourceware.org, gdb@sourceware.org Subject: Re: RFC: Adding a SECURITY.md document to the Binutils In-Reply-To: Date: Fri, 14 Apr 2023 15:45:33 -0400 Message-ID: MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.1 on 10.11.54.9 X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.9 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,DKIM_VALID_AU,DKIM_VALID_EF,MEDICAL_SUBJECT,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE,RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_NONE,TXREP,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on server2.sourceware.org List-Id: Ian Lance Taylor via Gdb writes: > Compilers and linkers must behave in a reasonable manner when given > untrusted input. Are we confusing trusted with well-behaved? I mean, if I download a source tree from the FSF's git server, I trust it, but it may still be ill-behaved. Meanwhile, sources from a public mailing list may be well-behaved but not trusted. I'm only posting this because Carlos and I had long discussions about this before we set up the glibc pre-commit CI. This process takes random patches from the public glibc mailing list, and builds them. WHOA! That's dangerous! Yes. The patches may produce well-defined code, but are not trusted. Those builds run in a tight sandbox to mitigate any attack attempts. Security here is outside the scope of the build tools. I don't expect gcc to scan for viruses or prevent people from doing "#include ".