From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: by sourceware.org (Postfix, from userid 48) id 64A49388700B; Tue, 7 Apr 2020 17:47:41 +0000 (GMT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 sourceware.org 64A49388700B From: "wdijkstr at arm dot com" To: glibc-bugs@sourceware.org Subject: [Bug libc/25620] Signed comparison vulnerability in the ARMv7 memcpy() (CVE-2020-6096) Date: Tue, 07 Apr 2020 17:47:40 +0000 X-Bugzilla-Reason: CC X-Bugzilla-Type: changed X-Bugzilla-Watch-Reason: None X-Bugzilla-Product: glibc X-Bugzilla-Component: libc X-Bugzilla-Version: 2.3.1 X-Bugzilla-Keywords: X-Bugzilla-Severity: normal X-Bugzilla-Who: wdijkstr at arm dot com X-Bugzilla-Status: NEW X-Bugzilla-Resolution: X-Bugzilla-Priority: P2 X-Bugzilla-Assigned-To: unassigned at sourceware dot org X-Bugzilla-Target-Milestone: --- X-Bugzilla-Flags: security+ X-Bugzilla-Changed-Fields: cc Message-ID: In-Reply-To: References: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Bugzilla-URL: http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/ Auto-Submitted: auto-generated MIME-Version: 1.0 X-BeenThere: glibc-bugs@sourceware.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Glibc-bugs mailing list List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 07 Apr 2020 17:47:41 -0000 https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=3D25620 Wilco changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CC| |wdijkstr at arm dot com --- Comment #10 from Wilco --- (In reply to Carlos O'Donell from comment #9) > (In reply to Richard Earnshaw from comment #8) > > memcpy is only defined if the regions do not overlap. If the size of = the > > copy is more than half the address space, this can never be true, so any > > copy that is mis-interpreted as a negative value must be undefined anyw= ay. >=20 > In many cases the implementation chooses what behaviour happens in the > undefined case, and it is always better if we crash early rather than to > continue to operate having copied less data than expected by the API. If = we > change the implementation to operate on unsigned values we will eventually > reach an unmapped page (likely) and crash. Crashing is the best outcome in > this case since it prevents the attack from continuing. Yes it's better to crash, but I fail to see how it would be a security issu= e. Assuming we agree values over 2GB are not used in legal programs, then it c= ould only happen if the size gets corrupted by a buffer overflow. If that's the case, an attacker could set it to whatever value they wanted anyway rather = than relying on this bug. --=20 You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.=