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From: "maxkamper at outlook dot com" <sourceware-bugzilla@sourceware.org>
To: glibc-bugs@sourceware.org
Subject: [Bug libc/27471] GLIBC_TUNABLES aren't parsed properly in AT_SECURE
 binaries
Date: Tue, 02 Mar 2021 05:16:49 +0000
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https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=3D27471

--- Comment #3 from Max <maxkamper at outlook dot com> ---
Indeed the only threat I can think of is when a suid binary sets uid =3D eu=
id
before invoking a child process (like sudo does), in which case the child w=
on't
ignore the SXID_ERASE tunable but will still have elevated privileges.

A (somewhat contrived) example could be a user having sudo access to a regu=
lar
binary, in which case they could, as you mentioned, use the tunables to
facilitate exploitation of said binary with elevated privileges.

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