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From: "leo at yuriev dot ru" <sourceware-bugzilla@sourceware.org>
To: glibc-bugs@sourceware.org
Subject: [Bug libc/29444] gmon memory corruption due wrong calculation of required buffer size
Date: Wed, 08 Feb 2023 11:18:46 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <bug-29444-131-beTwT4Lwxo@http.sourceware.org/bugzilla/> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <bug-29444-131@http.sourceware.org/bugzilla/>
https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=29444
--- Comment #14 from Leo Yuriev <leo at yuriev dot ru> ---
(In reply to Siddhesh Poyarekar from comment #13)
> (In reply to Leo Yuriev from comment #12)
> > 2) By manipulating requests, the attacker achieves a function call that is
> > at the end of the monitored addresses and is usually never called.
>
> My point is that this step above needs specific knowledge of the address
> space *and* control over execution to make this happen. Without such
> control, there's no exploitation vector.
There is the effect of a "critical mass" of vulnerabilities - when exploitation
is possible only if there is a set of vulnerabilities, but not one or even two.
In my case, it took a couple more vulnerabilities in the application code to
exploit this bug. However, without this issue, exploiting is also impossible.
My point is: we cannot assume all use cases and scenarios for a widely used
library, therefore a use-after-free, off-by-one, buffer overflow, memory
corruption, using/reading uninitialized, race condition, etc... in a such
library is always a CVE.
No options.
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-02-08 11:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-08-03 17:30 [Bug libc/29444] New: " leo at yuriev dot ru
2022-08-03 17:32 ` [Bug libc/29444] " leo at yuriev dot ru
2022-08-03 20:10 ` leo at yuriev dot ru
2022-12-16 19:56 ` pinskia at gcc dot gnu.org
2023-01-30 12:38 ` leo at yuriev dot ru
2023-01-30 16:24 ` adhemerval.zanella at linaro dot org
2023-02-04 12:12 ` leo at yuriev dot ru
2023-02-06 17:43 ` leo at yuriev dot ru
2023-02-06 19:29 ` leo at yuriev dot ru
2023-02-07 6:30 ` fweimer at redhat dot com
2023-02-07 8:40 ` ismail at i10z dot com
2023-02-07 8:41 ` fweimer at redhat dot com
2023-02-07 9:32 ` leo at yuriev dot ru
2023-02-07 15:00 ` siddhesh at sourceware dot org
2023-02-07 15:57 ` leo at yuriev dot ru
2023-02-07 16:01 ` siddhesh at sourceware dot org
2023-02-08 11:18 ` leo at yuriev dot ru [this message]
2023-02-08 11:51 ` siddhesh at sourceware dot org
2023-02-08 12:03 ` leo at yuriev dot ru
2023-02-08 13:00 ` siddhesh at sourceware dot org
2023-02-09 22:05 ` carnil at debian dot org
2023-02-09 22:27 ` siddhesh at sourceware dot org
2023-02-20 13:18 ` jamborm at gcc dot gnu.org
2023-02-23 7:36 ` leo at yuriev dot ru
2023-02-23 18:13 ` dj at redhat dot com
2023-03-04 10:44 ` linzhuorong at huawei dot com
2023-03-07 4:30 ` dj at redhat dot com
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