[PATCH v3] x86: Prevent SIGSEGV in memcmp-sse2 when data is concurrently modified [BZ #29863]

[Noah Goldstein <goldstein.w.n@gmail.com>]

In the case of INCORRECT usage of `memcmp(a, b, N)` where `a` and `b`
are concurrently modified as `memcmp` runs, there can be a SIGSEGV
in `L(ret_nonzero_vec_end_0)` because the sequential logic
assumes that `(rdx - 32 + rax)` is a positive 32-bit integer.

To be clear, this change does not mean the usage of `memcmp` is
supported.  The program behaviour is undefined (UB) in the
presence of data races, and `memcmp` is incorrect when the values
of `a` and/or `b` are modified concurrently (data race). This UB
may manifest itself as a SIGSEGV. That being said, if we can
allow the idiomatic use cases, like those in yottadb with
opportunistic concurrency control (OCC), to execute without a
SIGSEGV, at no cost to regular use cases, then we can aim to
minimize harm to those existing users.

The fix replaces a 32-bit `addl %edx, %eax` with the 64-bit variant
`addq %rdx, %rax`. The 1-extra byte of code size from using the
64-bit instruction doesn't contribute to overall code size as the
next target is aligned and has multiple bytes of `nop` padding
before it. As well all the logic between the add and `ret` still
fits in the same fetch block, so the cost of this change is
basically zero.

The relevant sequential logic can be seen in the following
pseudo-code:
```
    /*
     * rsi = a
     * rdi = b
     * rdx = len - 32
     */
    /* cmp a[0:15] and b[0:15]. Since length is known to be [17, 32]
    in this case, this check is also assumed to cover a[0:(31 - len)]
    and b[0:(31 - len)].  */
    movups  (%rsi), %xmm0
    movups  (%rdi), %xmm1
    PCMPEQ  %xmm0, %xmm1
    pmovmskb %xmm1, %eax
    subl    %ecx, %eax
    jnz L(END_NEQ)

    /* cmp a[len-16:len-1] and b[len-16:len-1].  */
    movups  16(%rsi, %rdx), %xmm0
    movups  16(%rdi, %rdx), %xmm1
    PCMPEQ  %xmm0, %xmm1
    pmovmskb %xmm1, %eax
    subl    %ecx, %eax
    jnz L(END_NEQ2)
    ret

L(END2):
    /* Position first mismatch.  */
    bsfl    %eax, %eax

    /* The sequential version is able to assume this value is a
    positive 32-bit value because the first check included bytes in
    range a[0:(31 - len)] and b[0:(31 - len)] so `eax` must be
    greater than `31 - len` so the minimum value of `edx` + `eax` is
    `(len - 32) + (32 - len) >= 0`. In the concurrent case, however,
    `a` or `b` could have been changed so a mismatch in `eax` less or
    equal than `(31 - len)` is possible (the new low bound is `(16 -
    len)`. This can result in a negative 32-bit signed integer, which
    when zero extended to 64-bits is a random large value this out
    out of bounds. */
    addl %edx, %eax

    /* Crash here because 32-bit negative number in `eax` zero
    extends to out of bounds 64-bit offset.  */
    movzbl  16(%rdi, %rax), %ecx
    movzbl  16(%rsi, %rax), %eax
```

This fix is quite simple, just make the `addl %edx, %eax` 64 bit (i.e
`addq %rdx, %rax`). This prevents the 32-bit zero extension
and since `eax` is still a low bound of `16 - len` the `rdx + rax`
is bound by `(len - 32) - (16 - len) >= -16`. Since we have a
fixed offset of `16` in the memory access this must be in bounds.
---
 sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S b/sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S
index afd450d020..34e60e567d 100644
--- a/sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S
+++ b/sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ L(ret_nonzero_vec_end_0):
 	setg	%dl
 	leal	-1(%rdx, %rdx), %eax
 #  else
-	addl	%edx, %eax
+	addq	%rdx, %rax
 	movzbl	(VEC_SIZE * -1 + SIZE_OFFSET)(%rsi, %rax), %ecx
 	movzbl	(VEC_SIZE * -1 + SIZE_OFFSET)(%rdi, %rax), %eax
 	subl	%ecx, %eax
-- 
2.34.1