From: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
Mark Wielaard <mark@klomp.org>,
libc-alpha@sourceware.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/4] tst-pidfd.c: Test is UNSUPPORTED without PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS
Date: Mon, 27 Jun 2022 12:14:51 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2A731D33-0573-40E6-B781-96C3693F169C@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220627150826.f4ezg3t4k7sy7kih@wittgenstein>
> On 27 Jun 2022, at 12:08, Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Jun 27, 2022 at 11:57:02AM -0300, Adhemerval Zanella wrote:
>>
>>
>>> On 27 Jun 2022, at 11:42, Florian Weimer via Libc-alpha <libc-alpha@sourceware.org> wrote:
>>>
>>> * Christian Brauner:
>>>
>>>> On Mon, Jun 27, 2022 at 01:14:06PM +0200, Florian Weimer via Libc-alpha wrote:
>>>>> * Mark Wielaard:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Florian,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Sun, 2022-06-26 at 23:20 +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
>>>>>>> * Mark Wielaard:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> pidfd_getfd will fail with errno EPERM if the calling process did
>>>>>>>> not
>>>>>>>> have PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS permissions. Use FAIL_UNSUPPORTED
>>>>>>>> in that case.
>>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>> sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-pidfd.c | 6 ++++--
>>>>>>>> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>> diff --git a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-pidfd.c
>>>>>>>> b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-pidfd.c
>>>>>>>> index d93b6faa6f..28349b2f91 100644
>>>>>>>> --- a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-pidfd.c
>>>>>>>> +++ b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-pidfd.c
>>>>>>>> @@ -95,8 +95,10 @@ do_test (void)
>>>>>>>> kernel has pidfd support that we can test. */
>>>>>>>> int r = pidfd_getfd (0, 0, 1);
>>>>>>>> TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (r == -1);
>>>>>>>> - if (errno == ENOSYS)
>>>>>>>> - FAIL_UNSUPPORTED ("kernel does not support pidfd_getfd,
>>>>>>>> skipping test");
>>>>>>>> + if (errno == ENOSYS || errno == EPERM)
>>>>>>>> + FAIL_UNSUPPORTED ("kernel does not support pidfd_getfd,"
>>>>>>>> + " or we don't have
>>>>>>>> PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS"
>>>>>>>> + " permissions, skipping test");
>>>>>>>> }
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> This also hints towards a broken seccomp filter.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> pidfd_getfd is mentioned (and allowed) by the seccomp filter, but the
>>>>>> syscall also needs the process to have PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS
>>>>>> (which is really PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS). Which it
>>>>>> doesn't have. If the process doesn't then pidfd_getfd is defined as
>>>>>> failing and setting errno to EPERM.
>>>>>
>>>>> But what does it mean for a process to have PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS?
>>>>
>>>> #define PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH | PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS)
>>>>
>>>> PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS means
>>>> * PTRACE_MODE_REALCREDS which means cred->{g,u}id of the task are used
>>>> for permission checking:
>>>>
>>>> So it's a bit nasty here but roughly if the ptracer's real {g,u}id match
>>>> the target task's (ptracee's) effective, save, and real [g,u]id then
>>>> you'passed the first stage of permission checking.
>>>>
>>>> If ptracer's [g,u]id aren't matching the ptracee's effective, saved, and
>>>> real [g,u]id the ptracer needs CAP_SYS_PTRACE in the ptracee's userns.
>>>> That will also get you past the first state of permission checking.
>>>>
>>>> If both don't apply the request is denied with -EPERM.
>>>
>>> I think this doesn't apply to the
>>>
>>> pidfd_getfd (0, 0, 1)
>>
>> The init has PPID 0, which leads to the idea pid argument 0 is valid.
>> So fdget won’t fail and EPERM will be returned by pidfd_pid. Maybe
>> use pidfd_getfd (TYPE_MAXIMUM (pid_t), 0, 1) instead to trigger a
>> EBADF.
>
> No, I don't think that's the case.
> EPERM can only ever be returned from ptrace_may_access() in
> pidfd_getfd() or if there's something like seccomp in the mix.
>
> You should see EINVAL, I think.
Yeah, I forgot about the invalid flag argument. So it does seems a
seccomp issue and I am not sure sure if we should paper over it on glibc
test.
>
> SYSCALL_DEFINE3(pidfd_getfd, int, pidfd, int, fd, unsigned int, flags)
> 0 0 1
> {
> struct pid *pid;
> struct fd f;
> int ret;
>
> /* flags is currently unused - make sure it's unset */
> if (flags) // that's 1 so you should see -EINVAL
> return -EINVAL;
>
> f = fdget(pidfd); // That'll get you stdin most likely.
> if (!f.file)
> return -EBADF;
>
> pid = pidfd_pid(f.file); // That would give you -EBADF see [1]
> if (IS_ERR(pid))
> ret = PTR_ERR(pid);
> else
> ret = pidfd_getfd(pid, fd);
>
> fdput(f);
> return ret;
> }
>
> [1]:
>
> struct pid *pidfd_pid(const struct file *file)
> {
> if (file->f_op == &pidfd_fops) // stdin is no pidfd and thus doesn't have pidfd_fops
> return file->private_data;
>
> return ERR_PTR(-EBADF); // that's what you'd see for stdin
> }
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-06-27 15:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-06-26 20:59 Handle running make check in a restricted environment Mark Wielaard
2022-06-26 20:59 ` [PATCH 1/4] time/tst-clock2.c: clock_settime CLOCK_MONOTONIC might return EPERM Mark Wielaard
2022-06-26 21:15 ` Florian Weimer
2022-06-27 9:35 ` Mark Wielaard
2022-06-26 20:59 ` [PATCH 2/4] tst-pkey.c: Handle no permission to alloc memory protection keys Mark Wielaard
2022-06-26 21:17 ` Florian Weimer
2022-06-26 21:40 ` Florian Weimer
2022-06-27 9:50 ` Mark Wielaard
2022-06-27 11:39 ` Florian Weimer
2022-06-27 14:08 ` Mark Wielaard
2022-06-26 20:59 ` [PATCH 3/4] tst-pidfd.c: Test is UNSUPPORTED without PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH_REALCREDS Mark Wielaard
2022-06-26 21:20 ` Florian Weimer
2022-06-27 10:01 ` Mark Wielaard
2022-06-27 11:14 ` Florian Weimer
2022-06-27 11:51 ` Christian Brauner
2022-06-27 14:17 ` Mark Wielaard
2022-06-27 14:21 ` Adhemerval Zanella
2022-06-27 14:25 ` Christian Brauner
2022-06-27 14:42 ` Florian Weimer
2022-06-27 14:57 ` Adhemerval Zanella
2022-06-27 15:08 ` Christian Brauner
2022-06-27 15:14 ` Adhemerval Zanella [this message]
2022-06-27 16:48 ` Mark Wielaard
2022-06-27 17:03 ` Adhemerval Zanella
2022-07-01 10:38 ` Mark Wielaard
2022-06-27 15:03 ` Christian Brauner
2022-06-27 14:23 ` Adhemerval Zanella
2022-06-27 16:36 ` Mark Wielaard
2022-06-26 20:59 ` [PATCH 4/4] tst-personality.c: Handle personality failing with errno EPERM Mark Wielaard
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