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From: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@sourceware.org>
To: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>,
	libc-alpha@sourceware.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 19/19] elf: Refactor process_envvars
Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2023 18:09:37 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4f6da9ac-880e-40da-970a-1cf3dfe0baf6@sourceware.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231106202552.3404059-20-adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>



On 2023-11-06 15:25, Adhemerval Zanella wrote:
> It splits between process_envvars_secure and process_envvars_default,
> with the former used to process arguments for __libc_enable_secure.
> It does not have any semantic change, just simplify the code so there
> is no need to handle __libc_enable_secure on each len switch.
> 
> Checked on x86_64-linux-gnu and aarch64-linux-gnu.
> ---
>   elf/rtld.c | 132 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
>   1 file changed, 84 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/elf/rtld.c b/elf/rtld.c
> index cfba30eba0..95dcd32185 100644
> --- a/elf/rtld.c
> +++ b/elf/rtld.c
> @@ -2527,7 +2527,67 @@ a filename can be specified using the LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT environment variable.\n");
>   }
>   \f
>   static void
> -process_envvars (struct dl_main_state *state)
> +process_envvars_secure (struct dl_main_state *state)
> +{
> +  char **runp = _environ;
> +  char *envline;
> +
> +  while ((envline = _dl_next_ld_env_entry (&runp)) != NULL)
> +    {
> +      size_t len = 0;
> +
> +      while (envline[len] != '\0' && envline[len] != '=')
> +	++len;
> +
> +      if (envline[len] != '=')
> +	/* This is a "LD_" variable at the end of the string without
> +	   a '=' character.  Ignore it since otherwise we will access
> +	   invalid memory below.  */
> +	continue;
> +
> +      switch (len)
> +	{
> +	case 5:
> +	  /* For __libc_enable_secure mode, audit pathnames containing slashes
> +	     are ignored.  Also, shared audit objects are only loaded only from
> +	     the standard search directories and only if they have set-user-ID
> +	     mode bit enabled.  */
> +	  if (memcmp (envline, "AUDIT", 5) == 0)
> +	    audit_list_add_string (&state->audit_list, &envline[6]);
> +	  break;
> +
> +	case 7:
> +	  /* For __libc_enable_secure mode, preload pathnames containing slashes
> +	     are ignored.  Also, shared objects are only preloaded from the
> +	     standard search directories and only if they have set-user-ID mode
> +	     bit enabled.  */
> +	  if (memcmp (envline, "PRELOAD", 7) == 0)
> +	    state->preloadlist = &envline[8];
> +	  break;
> +	}
> +    }

We need to talk about whether we should get rid of these too in the 
context of setuid programs, but that's a separate discussion.  LGTM.

Reviewed-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@sourceware.org>

> +
> +  /* Extra security for SUID binaries.  Remove all dangerous environment
> +     variables.  */
> +  const char *nextp = UNSECURE_ENVVARS;
> +  do
> +    {
> +      unsetenv (nextp);
> +      nextp = strchr (nextp, '\0') + 1;
> +    }
> +  while (*nextp != '\0');
> +
> +  if (GLRO(dl_debug_mask) != 0
> +      || GLRO(dl_verbose) != 0
> +      || GLRO(dl_lazy) != 1
> +      || GLRO(dl_bind_not) != 0
> +      || state->mode != rtld_mode_normal
> +      || state->version_info)
> +    _exit (5);
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +process_envvars_default (struct dl_main_state *state)
>   {
>     char **runp = _environ;
>     char *envline;

I wondered if we should add an assert here on __libc_enable_secure ==0, 
but there is only one caller, so maybe we can get away without it.

> @@ -2550,15 +2610,13 @@ process_envvars (struct dl_main_state *state)
>   	{
>   	case 4:
>   	  /* Warning level, verbose or not.  */
> -	  if (!__libc_enable_secure
> -	      && memcmp (envline, "WARN", 4) == 0)
> +	  if (memcmp (envline, "WARN", 4) == 0)
>   	    GLRO(dl_verbose) = envline[5] != '\0';
>   	  break;
>   
>   	case 5:
>   	  /* Debugging of the dynamic linker?  */
> -	  if (!__libc_enable_secure
> -	      && memcmp (envline, "DEBUG", 5) == 0)
> +	  if (memcmp (envline, "DEBUG", 5) == 0)
>   	    {
>   	      process_dl_debug (state, &envline[6]);
>   	      break;
> @@ -2573,8 +2631,7 @@ process_envvars (struct dl_main_state *state)
>   
>   	case 7:
>   	  /* Print information about versions.  */
> -	  if (!__libc_enable_secure
> -	      && memcmp (envline, "VERBOSE", 7) == 0)
> +	  if (memcmp (envline, "VERBOSE", 7) == 0)
>   	    {
>   	      state->version_info = envline[8] != '\0';
>   	      break;
> @@ -2591,43 +2648,37 @@ process_envvars (struct dl_main_state *state)
>   	    }
>   
>   	  /* Which shared object shall be profiled.  */
> -	  if (!__libc_enable_secure
> -	      && memcmp (envline, "PROFILE", 7) == 0 && envline[8] != '\0')
> +	  if (memcmp (envline, "PROFILE", 7) == 0 && envline[8] != '\0')
>   	    GLRO(dl_profile) = &envline[8];
>   	  break;
>   
>   	case 8:
>   	  /* Do we bind early?  */
> -	  if (!__libc_enable_secure
> -	      && memcmp (envline, "BIND_NOW", 8) == 0)
> +	  if (memcmp (envline, "BIND_NOW", 8) == 0)
>   	    {
>   	      GLRO(dl_lazy) = envline[9] == '\0';
>   	      break;
>   	    }
> -	  if (! __libc_enable_secure
> -	      && memcmp (envline, "BIND_NOT", 8) == 0)
> +	  if (memcmp (envline, "BIND_NOT", 8) == 0)
>   	    GLRO(dl_bind_not) = envline[9] != '\0';
>   	  break;
>   
>   	case 9:
>   	  /* Test whether we want to see the content of the auxiliary
>   	     array passed up from the kernel.  */
> -	  if (!__libc_enable_secure
> -	      && memcmp (envline, "SHOW_AUXV", 9) == 0)
> +	  if (memcmp (envline, "SHOW_AUXV", 9) == 0)
>   	    _dl_show_auxv ();
>   	  break;
>   
>   	case 11:
>   	  /* Path where the binary is found.  */
> -	  if (!__libc_enable_secure
> -	      && memcmp (envline, "ORIGIN_PATH", 11) == 0)
> +	  if (memcmp (envline, "ORIGIN_PATH", 11) == 0)
>   	    GLRO(dl_origin_path) = &envline[12];
>   	  break;
>   
>   	case 12:
>   	  /* The library search path.  */
> -	  if (!__libc_enable_secure
> -	      && memcmp (envline, "LIBRARY_PATH", 12) == 0)
> +	  if (memcmp (envline, "LIBRARY_PATH", 12) == 0)
>   	    {
>   	      state->library_path = &envline[13];
>   	      state->library_path_source = "LD_LIBRARY_PATH";
> @@ -2635,30 +2686,26 @@ process_envvars (struct dl_main_state *state)
>   	    }
>   
>   	  /* Where to place the profiling data file.  */
> -	  if (!__libc_enable_secure
> -	      && memcmp (envline, "DEBUG_OUTPUT", 12) == 0)
> +	  if (memcmp (envline, "DEBUG_OUTPUT", 12) == 0)
>   	    {
>   	      debug_output = &envline[13];
>   	      break;
>   	    }
>   
> -	  if (!__libc_enable_secure
> -	      && memcmp (envline, "DYNAMIC_WEAK", 12) == 0)
> +	  if (memcmp (envline, "DYNAMIC_WEAK", 12) == 0)
>   	    GLRO(dl_dynamic_weak) = 1;
>   	  break;
>   
>   	case 14:
>   	  /* Where to place the profiling data file.  */
> -	  if (!__libc_enable_secure
> -	      && memcmp (envline, "PROFILE_OUTPUT", 14) == 0
> +	  if (memcmp (envline, "PROFILE_OUTPUT", 14) == 0
>   	      && envline[15] != '\0')
>   	    GLRO(dl_profile_output) = &envline[15];
>   	  break;
>   
>   	case 20:
>   	  /* The mode of the dynamic linker can be set.  */
> -	  if (!__libc_enable_secure
> -	      && memcmp (envline, "TRACE_LOADED_OBJECTS", 20) == 0)
> +	  if (memcmp (envline, "TRACE_LOADED_OBJECTS", 20) == 0)
>   	    {
>   	      state->mode = rtld_mode_trace;
>   	      state->mode_trace_program
> @@ -2668,30 +2715,10 @@ process_envvars (struct dl_main_state *state)
>   	}
>       }
>   
> -  /* Extra security for SUID binaries.  Remove all dangerous environment
> -     variables.  */
> -  if (__glibc_unlikely (__libc_enable_secure))
> -    {
> -      const char *nextp = UNSECURE_ENVVARS;
> -      do
> -	{
> -	  unsetenv (nextp);
> -	  nextp = strchr (nextp, '\0') + 1;
> -	}
> -      while (*nextp != '\0');
> -
> -      if (GLRO(dl_debug_mask) != 0
> -	  || GLRO(dl_verbose) != 0
> -	  || GLRO(dl_lazy) != 1
> -	  || GLRO(dl_bind_not) != 0
> -	  || state->mode != rtld_mode_normal
> -	  || state->version_info)
> -	_exit (5);
> -    }
>     /* If we have to run the dynamic linker in debugging mode and the
>        LD_DEBUG_OUTPUT environment variable is given, we write the debug
>        messages to this file.  */
> -  else if (GLRO(dl_debug_mask) != 0 && debug_output != NULL)
> +  if (GLRO(dl_debug_mask) != 0 && debug_output != NULL)
>       {
>         const int flags = O_WRONLY | O_APPEND | O_CREAT | O_NOFOLLOW;
>         size_t name_len = strlen (debug_output);
> @@ -2710,6 +2737,15 @@ process_envvars (struct dl_main_state *state)
>       }
>   }
>   
> +static void
> +process_envvars (struct dl_main_state *state)
> +{
> +  if (__glibc_unlikely (__libc_enable_secure))
> +    process_envvars_secure (state);
> +  else
> +    process_envvars_default (state);
> +}
> +
>   #if HP_TIMING_INLINE
>   static void
>   print_statistics_item (const char *title, hp_timing_t time,

  reply	other threads:[~2023-11-20 23:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-06 20:25 [PATCH v3 00/19] Improve loader environment variable handling Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 01/19] elf: Remove /etc/suid-debug support Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 02/19] elf: Add GLIBC_TUNABLES to unsecvars Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 03/19] elf: Ignore GLIBC_TUNABLES for setuid/setgid binaries Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 04/19] elf: Add all malloc tunable to unsecvars Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 05/19] elf: Do not process invalid tunable format Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 06/19] elf: Do not parse ill-formatted strings Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-20 21:48   ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 07/19] elf: Fix _dl_debug_vdprintf to work before self-relocation Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 08/19] elf: Emit warning if tunable is ill-formatted Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-20 21:50   ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 09/19] x86: Use dl-symbol-redir-ifunc.h on cpu-tunables Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 10/19] s390: " Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 11/19] elf: Do not duplicate the GLIBC_TUNABLES string Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-20 22:44   ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-11-21 18:12     ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2023-11-22 11:39       ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2023-11-22 12:23       ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-11-22 13:03         ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2023-11-22 13:24           ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-11-22 14:13             ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 12/19] elf: Ignore LD_PROFILE for setuid binaries Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-20 22:47   ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 13/19] elf: Remove LD_PROFILE for static binaries Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-20 22:55   ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 14/19] elf: Ignore loader debug env vars for setuid Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-20 22:57   ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-11-21 18:24     ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 15/19] elf: Remove any_debug from dl_main_state Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-20 22:58   ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 16/19] elf: Ignore LD_LIBRARY_PATH and debug env var for setuid for static Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-20 22:59   ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 17/19] elf: Add comments on how LD_AUDIT and LD_PRELOAD handle __libc_enable_secure Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 18/19] elf: Ignore LD_BIND_NOW and LD_BIND_NOT for setuid binaries Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-20 23:02   ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-11-06 20:25 ` [PATCH v3 19/19] elf: Refactor process_envvars Adhemerval Zanella
2023-11-20 23:09   ` Siddhesh Poyarekar [this message]
2023-11-21 19:00     ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2023-11-20 23:12 ` [PATCH v3 00/19] Improve loader environment variable handling Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-11-21 19:37   ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto

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