From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (qmail 42520 invoked by alias); 29 Sep 2016 08:08:43 -0000 Mailing-List: contact libc-alpha-help@sourceware.org; run by ezmlm Precedence: bulk List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: , Sender: libc-alpha-owner@sourceware.org Received: (qmail 42503 invoked by uid 89); 29 Sep 2016 08:08:42 -0000 Authentication-Results: sourceware.org; auth=none X-Virus-Found: No X-Spam-SWARE-Status: No, score=-3.8 required=5.0 tests=AWL,BAYES_00,KAM_LAZY_DOMAIN_SECURITY,RP_MATCHES_RCVD autolearn=ham version=3.3.2 spammy=tracker X-HELO: albireo.enyo.de From: Florian Weimer To: Yuri Gribov Cc: Maxim Ostapenko , GNU C Library , Kostya Serebryany Subject: Re: [PATCH BZ#20422] Do not allow asan/msan/tsan and fortify at the same time. References: <57CDAB08.8060601@samsung.com> <8d2403c8-466d-8f1a-e563-8b729deef9ce@redhat.com> Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2016 08:08:00 -0000 In-Reply-To: (Yuri Gribov's message of "Sat, 17 Sep 2016 10:00:29 +0100") Message-ID: <87lgyb9lhf.fsf@mid.deneb.enyo.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-SW-Source: 2016-09/txt/msg00577.txt.bz2 * Yuri Gribov: > Would the above approach be accepted for trunk? The reason for me > pushing this is because FORTIFY_SOURCE is now enabled by default in > major distros and this start to be a detrimental factor for ASan > efficiency (there are already 3 open bugs related to this in tracker > and they keep coming). We have received a related feature request: Do the sanitizers depend on direct calls to the interceptors from application code, or can we add an indirection which has been compiled *without* sanitizer support? If the indirection is acceptable, we could perhaps provided a DSO which maps back the fortify wrappers to the unfortified versions. libasan could link against that, for valgrind, it could be preloaded. memstop could use this as well: The advantage of the unfortify library is that it keeps the knowledge about fortify wrappers in glibc.