From: Joe Simmons-Talbott <josimmon@redhat.com>
To: "Carlos O'Donell" <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: libc-alpha@sourceware.org,
Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>,
Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] Document CVE-2024-33599, CVE-2024-33600, CVE-2024-33601, CVE-2024-33602
Date: Thu, 2 May 2024 16:23:34 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAAQBMsM_RsxVG_M+Qk9XMzAL28FYsnUkET0cFVJqdQWPWM6s2Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240502201423.3413078-1-carlos@redhat.com>
On Thu, May 2, 2024 at 4:15 PM Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com> wrote:
>
A few typos below.
Thanks,
Joe
> This commit adds advisory data for the above CVE(s).
> ---
> advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0005 | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0006 | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0007 | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0008 | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 108 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0005
> create mode 100644 advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0006
> create mode 100644 advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0007
> create mode 100644 advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0008
>
> diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0005 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0005
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..9dc3ff8cf9
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0005
> @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
> +nscd: Stack-based buffer overflow in netgroup cache
> +
> +If the Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) fixed size cache is exhausted
> +by client requests then a subsequent client request for netgroup data
> +may result in a stack-based buffer overflow. This flaw was introduced
> +in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd.
> +
> +This vulnerability is only present the nscd binary.
in the
> +
> +CVE-Id: CVE-2024-33599
> +Public-Date: 2024-04-23
> +Vulnerable-Commit: 684ae515993269277448150a1ca70db3b94aa5bd (2.15)
> +Fix-Commit: 69c58d5ef9f584ea198bd00f7964d364d0e6b921 (2.31-155)
> +Fix-Commit: a77064893bfe8a701770e2f53a4d33805bc47a5a (2.32-141)
> +Fix-Commit: 5c75001a96abcd50cbdb74df24c3f013188d076e (2.33-264)
> +Fix-Commit: 52f73e5c4e29b14e79167272297977f360ae1e97 (2.34-460)
> +Fix-Commit: 7a95873543ce225376faf13bb71c43dea6d24f86 (2.35-316)
> +Fix-Commit: caa3151ca460bdd9330adeedd68c3112d97bffe4 (2.36-165)
> +Fix-Commit: f75c298e747b2b8b41b1c2f551c011a52c41bfd1 (2.37-91)
> +Fix-Commit: 5968aebb86164034b8f8421b4abab2f837a5bdaf (2.38-72)
> +Fix-Commit: 1263d583d2e28afb8be53f8d6922f0842036f35d (2.39-35)
> +Fix-Commit: 87801a8fd06db1d654eea3e4f7626ff476a9bdaa (2.40)
> diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0006 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0006
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..2f42ab876d
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0006
> @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
> +nscd: Avoid null pointer crashes after notfound response
> +
> +If the Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) cache fails to add a not-found
> +netgroup response to the cache, the client request can result in a null
> +pointer dereference. This flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the
> +cache was added to nscd.
> +
> +This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary.
> +
> +CVE-Id: CVE-2024-33600
> +Public-Date: 2024-04-24
> +Vulnerable-Commit: 684ae515993269277448150a1ca70db3b94aa5bd (2.15)
> +Fix-Commit: b048a482f088e53144d26a61c390bed0210f49f2 (2.40)
> +Fix-Commit: 7835b00dbce53c3c87bbbb1754a95fb5e58187aa (2.40)
> +Fix-Commit: c99f886de54446cd4447db6b44be93dabbdc2f8b (2.39-37)
> +Fix-Commit: 5a508e0b508c8ad53bd0d2fb48fd71b242626341 (2.39-36)
> +Fix-Commit: 2ae9446c1b7a3064743b4a51c0bbae668ee43e4c (2.38-74)
> +Fix-Commit: 541ea5172aa658c4bd5c6c6d6fd13903c3d5bb0a (2.38-73)
> +Fix-Commit: a8070b31043c7585c36ba68a74298c4f7af075c3 (2.37-93)
> +Fix-Commit: 5eea50c4402e39588de98aa1d4469a79774703d4 (2.37-92)
> +Fix-Commit: f205b3af56740e3b014915b1bd3b162afe3407ef (2.36-167)
> +Fix-Commit: c34f470a615b136170abd16142da5dd0c024f7d1 (2.36-166)
> +Fix-Commit: bafadc589fbe21ae330e8c2af74db9da44a17660 (2.35-318)
> +Fix-Commit: 4370bef52b0f3f3652c6aa13d7a9bb3ac079746d (2.35-317)
> +Fix-Commit: 1f94122289a9bf7dba573f5d60327aaa2b85cf2e (2.34-462)
> +Fix-Commit: 966d6ac9e40222b84bb21674cc4f83c8d72a5a26 (2.34-461)
> +Fix-Commit: e3eef1b8fbdd3a7917af466ca9c4b7477251ca79 (2.33-266)
> +Fix-Commit: f20a8d696b13c6261b52a6434899121f8b19d5a7 (2.33-265)
> +Fix-Commit: be602180146de37582a3da3a0caa4b719645de9c (2.32-143)
> +Fix-Commit: 394eae338199078b7961b051c191539870742d7b (2.32-142)
> +Fix-Commit: 8d7949183760170c61e55def723c1d8050187874 (2.31-157)
> +Fix-Commit: 304ce5fe466c4762b21b36c26926a4657b59b53e (2.31-156)
> diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0007 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0007
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..d4f5d4298c
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0007
> @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
> +nscd: netgroup cache may terminate daemon on memory allocation failure
> +
> +The Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) netgroup cache uses xmalloc or
> +xrealloc and these functions may terminate the process due to a memory
> +allocation failure resulting in a denial of service to the clients. The
> +flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd.
> +
> +This vulnerability is only present the nscd binary.
in the
> +
> +Subsequent refactoring of the netgroup cache only added more uses of
> +xmalloc and xrealloc. Uses of xmalloc and xrealloc in other parts of
> +nscd only occur during startup of the daemon and so are not affected by
> +client requests that could trigger an out of memory followed by
> +termination.
> +
> +CVE-Id: CVE-2024-33601
> +Public-Date: 2024-04-24
> +Vulnerable-Commit: 684ae515993269277448150a1ca70db3b94aa5bd (2.15)
> +Fix-Commit: c04a21e050d64a1193a6daab872bca2528bda44b (2.40)
> +Fix-Commit: a9a8d3eebb145779a18d90e3966009a1daa63cd8 (2.39-38)
> +Fix-Commit: 71af8ca864345d39b746d5cee84b94b430fad5db (2.38-75)
> +Fix-Commit: 6e106dc214d6a033a4e945d1c6cf58061f1c5f1f (2.37-94)
> +Fix-Commit: b6742463694b1dfdd5120b91ee21cf05d15ec2e2 (2.36-168)
> +Fix-Commit: 7a5864cac60e06000394128a5a2817b03542f5a3 (2.35-319)
> +Fix-Commit: 86f1d5f4129c373ac6fb6df5bcf38273838843cb (2.34-463)
> +Fix-Commit: 4d27d4b9a188786fc6a56745506cec2acfc51f83 (2.33-267)
> +Fix-Commit: 3ed195a8ec89da281e3c4bf887a13d281b72d8f4 (2.32-144)
> +Fix-Commit: bbf5a58ccb55679217f94de706164d15372fbbc0 (2.31-158)
> diff --git a/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0008 b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0008
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..60c0187b76
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0008
> @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
> +nscd: netgroup cache assumes NSS callback uses in-buffer strings
> +
> +The Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) netgroup cache can corrupt memory
> +when the NSS callback does not store all strings in the provided buffer.
> +The flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd.
> +
> +This vulnerability is only present the nscd binary.
in the
> +
> +There is no guarantee from the NSS callback API that the returned
> +strings are all within the buffer. However, the netgroup cache code
> +assumes that the NSS callback uses in-buffer strings and if it doesn't
> +the buffer resizing logic could lead to potential memory corruption.
> +
> +CVE-Id: CVE-2024-33602
> +Public-Date: 2024-04-24
> +Vulnerable-Commit: 684ae515993269277448150a1ca70db3b94aa5bd (2.15)
> +Fix-Commit: c04a21e050d64a1193a6daab872bca2528bda44b (2.40)
> +Fix-Commit: a9a8d3eebb145779a18d90e3966009a1daa63cd8 (2.39-38)
> +Fix-Commit: 71af8ca864345d39b746d5cee84b94b430fad5db (2.38-75)
> +Fix-Commit: 6e106dc214d6a033a4e945d1c6cf58061f1c5f1f (2.37-94)
> +Fix-Commit: b6742463694b1dfdd5120b91ee21cf05d15ec2e2 (2.36-168)
> +Fix-Commit: 7a5864cac60e06000394128a5a2817b03542f5a3 (2.35-319)
> +Fix-Commit: 86f1d5f4129c373ac6fb6df5bcf38273838843cb (2.34-463)
> +Fix-Commit: 4d27d4b9a188786fc6a56745506cec2acfc51f83 (2.33-267)
> +Fix-Commit: 3ed195a8ec89da281e3c4bf887a13d281b72d8f4 (2.32-144)
> +Fix-Commit: bbf5a58ccb55679217f94de706164d15372fbbc0 (2.31-158)
> --
> 2.44.0
>
--
Joe Simmons-Talbott
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-05-02 20:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-05-02 20:08 Carlos O'Donell
2024-05-02 20:08 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] NEWS: Add advisories Carlos O'Donell
2024-05-02 20:23 ` Joe Simmons-Talbott [this message]
2024-05-02 20:45 ` [PATCH v2 1/2] Document CVE-2024-33599, CVE-2024-33600, CVE-2024-33601, CVE-2024-33602 Carlos O'Donell
2024-05-03 14:51 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
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