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From: "Fāng-ruì Sòng" <maskray@google.com>
To: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: libc-alpha@sourceware.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] elf: Remove __libc_enable_secure_decided
Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2022 16:49:50 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAFP8O3+6QVj9571OLEaC+pAM2hQag1dtum9S4Pz3=BT2-XREkQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8735iau2wj.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com>

On Mon, Apr 18, 2022 at 3:00 AM Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> * Fangrui Song:
>
> > No functional change. __libc_enable_secure_decided is always 0 since
> > 73fc4e28b9464f0e13edc719a5372839970e7ddb.
> > ---
> >  elf/enbl-secure.c | 7 ++-----
> >  include/unistd.h  | 1 -
> >  2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/elf/enbl-secure.c b/elf/enbl-secure.c
> > index aa2a0bd877..6a0a6d0f0f 100644
> > --- a/elf/enbl-secure.c
> > +++ b/elf/enbl-secure.c
> > @@ -26,15 +26,12 @@
> >  #include <startup.h>
> >  #include <libc-internal.h>
> >
> > -/* If nonzero __libc_enable_secure is already set.  */
> > -int __libc_enable_secure_decided;
> >  /* Safest assumption, if somehow the initializer isn't run.  */
> >  int __libc_enable_secure = 1;
> >
> >  void
> >  __libc_init_secure (void)
> >  {
> > -  if (__libc_enable_secure_decided == 0)
> > -    __libc_enable_secure = (startup_geteuid () != startup_getuid ()
> > -                         || startup_getegid () != startup_getgid ());
> > +  __libc_enable_secure = (startup_geteuid () != startup_getuid ()
> > +                       || startup_getegid () != startup_getgid ());
> >  }
>
> Thanks for catching this in time before a release, this would have
> turned into a minor security vulnerability.
>
> __libc_init_secure should not overwrite __libc_enable_secure on Linux
> because _dl_aux_init in dl-support.c already initializes it, and the
> real vs effective check does not always yield the right results (it
> exits AT_SECURE mode for a pure capabilities-based transition, for
> example).
>
> Hurd already overrides __libc_init_secure with an empty function.  I
> think we should remove it completely.  Then we can also simply
> <startup.h> a bit, I think.  Would you be able to write a patch along
> those lines, or should I work on this?
>
> Thanks,
> Florian
>

Thanks for the analysis! I debugged it a bit and understand it better now.
Sent https://sourceware.org/pipermail/libc-alpha/2022-April/137942.html
for clean-up.


-- 
宋方睿

      reply	other threads:[~2022-04-18 23:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-17 22:52 Fangrui Song
2022-04-18 10:00 ` Florian Weimer
2022-04-18 23:49   ` Fāng-ruì Sòng [this message]

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