From: Zack Weinberg <zackw@panix.com>
To: Torvald Riegel <triegel@redhat.com>
Cc: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>, nd <nd@arm.com>,
GNU C Library <libc-alpha@sourceware.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7] getrandom system call wrapper [BZ #17252]
Date: Mon, 21 Nov 2016 17:12:00 -0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAKCAbMiDW4eyCmsCG-briE3LGU4o+NOxNt1Z2fhozNJ5QvsA1g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1479747467.7146.1263.camel@localhost.localdomain>
On Mon, Nov 21, 2016 at 11:57 AM, Torvald Riegel <triegel@redhat.com> wrote:
> On Fri, 2016-11-18 at 13:50 -0500, Zack Weinberg wrote:
>> I don't want to derail this into a general debate over adding new
>> cancellation points, and I especially don't want to hold up work on a
>> user-space CSPRNG on something unrelated, because arc4random() is the
>> top item on _my_ todo list after explicit_bzero(). So here is a
>> counterproposal. Most of my concerns about getrandom() being a
>> cancellation point go away if it is only a cancellation point when it
>> is actually going to block
>
> Is there a way for the caller to ensure that a subsequent call to
> getrandom is not going to block? If there isn't, then the caller has to
> conservatively assume that the call may be a cancellation point.
The whole reason I can live with my proposal is that most code should
be able to assume getrandom *never* blocks. Specifically, if
getrandom ever blocks once we're past a fairly early stage of boot-up,
that's a bug in either the kernel or the setup procedure. (I'd *like*
to get to where the kernel wouldn't even start process 1 until it
could guarantee that the RNG would not block, but that's a long way
off.) So the only code that has to worry about it is early-stage boot
code that has to be written hyper-defensively anyway.
zw
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-11-21 17:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-06-10 21:03 [PATCH] Add getrandom implementation " Florian Weimer
2016-06-10 21:31 ` Joseph Myers
2016-06-10 21:36 ` Joseph Myers
2016-06-10 22:00 ` Paul Eggert
2016-06-10 22:06 ` Joseph Myers
2016-06-11 11:13 ` Florian Weimer
2016-06-11 20:10 ` Paul Eggert
2016-06-10 22:15 ` Roland McGrath
2016-06-10 22:40 ` Joseph Myers
2016-06-10 22:45 ` Roland McGrath
2016-06-23 17:21 ` Florian Weimer
2016-06-25 21:58 ` Paul Eggert
2016-09-02 22:23 ` Roland McGrath
2016-06-27 15:07 ` [PATCH v2] " Florian Weimer
2016-06-30 9:33 ` Rical Jasan
2016-09-08 9:53 ` Florian Weimer
2016-09-08 10:13 ` Andreas Schwab
2016-09-08 10:28 ` Florian Weimer
2016-09-08 11:58 ` Rical Jasan
2016-09-08 12:36 ` Florian Weimer
2016-06-30 12:03 ` Zack Weinberg
2016-07-13 13:10 ` Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
2016-11-14 17:45 ` [PATCH v7] getrandom system call wrapper " Florian Weimer
2016-11-14 18:29 ` Zack Weinberg
2016-11-15 20:57 ` Richard Henderson
2016-11-16 15:11 ` Florian Weimer
2016-11-16 15:20 ` Zack Weinberg
2016-11-16 15:52 ` Florian Weimer
2016-11-16 16:41 ` Zack Weinberg
2016-11-17 13:02 ` Florian Weimer
2016-11-17 13:46 ` Zack Weinberg
2016-11-17 13:50 ` Florian Weimer
2016-11-17 13:56 ` Zack Weinberg
2016-11-17 15:24 ` Florian Weimer
2016-11-17 17:16 ` Zack Weinberg
2016-11-18 10:27 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2016-11-18 15:46 ` Torvald Riegel
2016-11-18 18:50 ` Zack Weinberg
2016-11-21 16:57 ` Torvald Riegel
2016-11-21 17:12 ` Zack Weinberg [this message]
2016-11-21 17:30 ` Torvald Riegel
2016-11-21 17:34 ` Florian Weimer
2016-11-29 8:24 ` Florian Weimer
2016-11-16 18:02 ` Torvald Riegel
2016-11-16 19:53 ` Adhemerval Zanella
2016-11-17 12:52 ` Torvald Riegel
2016-11-18 8:28 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2016-11-18 14:21 ` Torvald Riegel
2016-11-18 15:13 ` Florian Weimer
2016-11-18 16:04 ` Torvald Riegel
2016-11-29 8:16 ` Florian Weimer
2016-11-29 13:56 ` Torvald Riegel
2016-11-29 14:40 ` Florian Weimer
2016-11-29 15:23 ` Torvald Riegel
2016-11-29 15:32 ` Florian Weimer
2016-11-29 15:54 ` Zack Weinberg
2016-11-29 17:53 ` Paul Eggert
2016-11-29 18:11 ` Florian Weimer
2016-11-29 19:37 ` Paul Eggert
2016-11-30 6:09 ` Florian Weimer
2016-11-17 6:21 ` Mike Frysinger
2016-11-18 13:21 ` Florian Weimer
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