From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from dragonfly.birch.relay.mailchannels.net (dragonfly.birch.relay.mailchannels.net [23.83.209.51]) by sourceware.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 16E243858D3C for ; Mon, 24 Jan 2022 06:03:11 +0000 (GMT) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.4.1 sourceware.org 16E243858D3C X-Sender-Id: dreamhost|x-authsender|siddhesh@gotplt.org Received: from relay.mailchannels.net (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by relay.mailchannels.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 39125821556; Mon, 24 Jan 2022 06:03:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from pdx1-sub0-mail-a305.dreamhost.com (unknown [127.0.0.6]) (Authenticated sender: dreamhost) by relay.mailchannels.net (Postfix) with ESMTPA id 431EF82059F; Mon, 24 Jan 2022 06:03:09 +0000 (UTC) X-Sender-Id: dreamhost|x-authsender|siddhesh@gotplt.org Received: from pdx1-sub0-mail-a305.dreamhost.com (pop.dreamhost.com [64.90.62.162]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) by 100.126.0.25 (trex/6.4.3); Mon, 24 Jan 2022 06:03:09 +0000 X-MC-Relay: Neutral X-MailChannels-SenderId: dreamhost|x-authsender|siddhesh@gotplt.org X-MailChannels-Auth-Id: dreamhost X-Language-Tank: 07a4f3933f866f6b_1643004189754_1646508022 X-MC-Loop-Signature: 1643004189754:2510876205 X-MC-Ingress-Time: 1643004189753 Received: from [192.168.1.174] (unknown [1.186.122.50]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (128/128 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: siddhesh@gotplt.org) by pdx1-sub0-mail-a305.dreamhost.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4JhztM54v5z1Nl; Sun, 23 Jan 2022 22:03:07 -0800 (PST) Message-ID: Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 11:33:03 +0530 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/91.4.0 Subject: Re: [PATCH v5] getcwd: Set errno to ERANGE for size == 1 (CVE-2021-3999) Content-Language: en-US To: libc-alpha@sourceware.org Cc: Qualys Security Advisory , Andreas Schwab References: <20220121180420.2190229-1-siddhesh@sourceware.org> From: Siddhesh Poyarekar In-Reply-To: <20220121180420.2190229-1-siddhesh@sourceware.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Spam-Status: No, score=-3494.2 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00, GIT_PATCH_0, JMQ_SPF_NEUTRAL, KAM_DMARC_NONE, KAM_DMARC_STATUS, KAM_SHORT, NICE_REPLY_A, RCVD_IN_BARRACUDACENTRAL, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE, RCVD_IN_SBL, SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_NEUTRAL, TXREP autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.4 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.4 (2020-01-24) on server2.sourceware.org X-BeenThere: libc-alpha@sourceware.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Libc-alpha mailing list List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 24 Jan 2022 06:03:14 -0000 On 21/01/2022 23:34, Siddhesh Poyarekar via Libc-alpha wrote: > No valid path returned by getcwd would fit into 1 byte, so reject the > size early and return NULL with errno set to ERANGE. This change is > prompted by CVE-2021-3999, which describes a single byte buffer > underflow and overflow when all of the following conditions are met: > > - The buffer size (i.e. the second argument of getcwd) is 1 byte > - The current working directory is too long > - '/' is also mounted on the current working directory > > Sequence of events: > > - In sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/getcwd.c, the syscall returns ENAMETOOLONG > because the linux kernel checks for name length before it checks > buffer size > > - The code falls back to the generic getcwd in sysdeps/posix > > - In the generic func, the buf[0] is set to '\0' on line 250 > > - this while loop on line 262 is bypassed: > > while (!(thisdev == rootdev && thisino == rootino)) > > since the rootfs (/) is bind mounted onto the directory and the flow > goes on to line 449, where it puts a '/' in the byte before the > buffer. > > - Finally on line 458, it moves 2 bytes (the underflowed byte and the > '\0') to the buf[0] and buf[1], resulting in a 1 byte buffer overflow. > > - buf is returned on line 469 and errno is not set. > > This resolves BZ #28769. > > Reviewed-by: Andreas Schwab > Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella > Signed-off-by: Qualys Security Advisory > Signed-off-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar Pushed now since updates were trivial and Adhemerval and Andreas had already acked the rest. Thanks, Siddhesh > --- > NEWS | 6 + > sysdeps/posix/getcwd.c | 7 + > sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/Makefile | 7 +- > .../unix/sysv/linux/tst-getcwd-smallbuff.c | 241 ++++++++++++++++++ > 4 files changed, 260 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > create mode 100644 sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-getcwd-smallbuff.c > > diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS > index 4c392a445e..07e9eac52d 100644 > --- a/NEWS > +++ b/NEWS > @@ -170,6 +170,12 @@ Security related changes: > function could result in a memory leak and potential access of > uninitialized memory. Reported by Qualys. > > + CVE-2021-3999: Passing a buffer of size exactly 1 byte to the getcwd > + function may result in an off-by-one buffer underflow and overflow > + when the current working directory is longer than PATH_MAX and also > + corresponds to the / directory through an unprivileged mount > + namespace. Reported by Qualys. > + > The following bugs are resolved with this release: > > [The release manager will add the list generated by > diff --git a/sysdeps/posix/getcwd.c b/sysdeps/posix/getcwd.c > index e147a31a81..9d5787b6f4 100644 > --- a/sysdeps/posix/getcwd.c > +++ b/sysdeps/posix/getcwd.c > @@ -187,6 +187,13 @@ __getcwd_generic (char *buf, size_t size) > size_t allocated = size; > size_t used; > > + /* A size of 1 byte is never useful. */ > + if (allocated == 1) > + { > + __set_errno (ERANGE); > + return NULL; > + } > + > #if HAVE_MINIMALLY_WORKING_GETCWD > /* If AT_FDCWD is not defined, the algorithm below is O(N**2) and > this is much slower than the system getcwd (at least on > diff --git a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/Makefile b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/Makefile > index 85fc8cbf75..7ca9350c99 100644 > --- a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/Makefile > +++ b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/Makefile > @@ -346,7 +346,12 @@ sysdep_routines += xstatconv internal_statvfs \ > > sysdep_headers += bits/fcntl-linux.h > > -tests += tst-fallocate tst-fallocate64 tst-o_path-locks > +tests += \ > + tst-fallocate \ > + tst-fallocate64 \ > + tst-getcwd-smallbuff \ > + tst-o_path-locks \ > +# tests > endif > > ifeq ($(subdir),elf) > diff --git a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-getcwd-smallbuff.c b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-getcwd-smallbuff.c > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..d460d6e766 > --- /dev/null > +++ b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-getcwd-smallbuff.c > @@ -0,0 +1,241 @@ > +/* Verify that getcwd returns ERANGE for size 1 byte and does not underflow > + buffer when the CWD is too long and is also a mount target of /. See bug > + #28769 or CVE-2021-3999 for more context. > + Copyright The GNU Toolchain Authors. > + This file is part of the GNU C Library. > + > + The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or > + modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public > + License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either > + version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. > + > + The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, > + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of > + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU > + Lesser General Public License for more details. > + > + You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public > + License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see > + . */ > + > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > + > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include > + > +static char *base; > +#define BASENAME "tst-getcwd-smallbuff" > +#define MOUNT_NAME "mpoint" > +static int sockfd[2]; > + > +static void > +do_cleanup (void) > +{ > + support_chdir_toolong_temp_directory (base); > + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (rmdir (MOUNT_NAME) == 0); > + free (base); > +} > + > +static void > +send_fd (const int sock, const int fd) > +{ > + struct msghdr msg = {0}; > + union > + { > + struct cmsghdr hdr; > + char buf[CMSG_SPACE (sizeof (int))]; > + } cmsgbuf = {0}; > + struct cmsghdr *cmsg; > + struct iovec vec; > + char ch = 'A'; > + ssize_t n; > + > + msg.msg_control = &cmsgbuf.buf; > + msg.msg_controllen = sizeof (cmsgbuf.buf); > + > + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR (&msg); > + cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN (sizeof (int)); > + cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET; > + cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS; > + memcpy (CMSG_DATA (cmsg), &fd, sizeof (fd)); > + > + vec.iov_base = &ch; > + vec.iov_len = 1; > + msg.msg_iov = &vec; > + msg.msg_iovlen = 1; > + > + while ((n = sendmsg (sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 && errno == EINTR); > + > + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (n == 1); > +} > + > +static int > +recv_fd (const int sock) > +{ > + struct msghdr msg = {0}; > + union > + { > + struct cmsghdr hdr; > + char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]; > + } cmsgbuf = {0}; > + struct cmsghdr *cmsg; > + struct iovec vec; > + ssize_t n; > + char ch = '\0'; > + int fd = -1; > + > + vec.iov_base = &ch; > + vec.iov_len = 1; > + msg.msg_iov = &vec; > + msg.msg_iovlen = 1; > + > + msg.msg_control = &cmsgbuf.buf; > + msg.msg_controllen = sizeof (cmsgbuf.buf); > + > + while ((n = recvmsg (sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 && errno == EINTR); > + if (n != 1 || ch != 'A') > + return -1; > + > + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR (&msg); > + if (cmsg == NULL) > + return -1; > + if (cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS) > + return -1; > + memcpy (&fd, CMSG_DATA (cmsg), sizeof (fd)); > + if (fd < 0) > + return -1; > + return fd; > +} > + > +static int > +child_func (void * const arg) > +{ > + xclose (sockfd[0]); > + const int sock = sockfd[1]; > + char ch; > + > + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (read (sock, &ch, 1) == 1); > + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (ch == '1'); > + > + if (mount ("/", MOUNT_NAME, NULL, MS_BIND | MS_REC, NULL)) > + FAIL_EXIT1 ("mount failed: %m\n"); > + const int fd = xopen ("mpoint", > + O_RDONLY | O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW, 0); > + > + send_fd (sock, fd); > + xclose (fd); > + > + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (read (sock, &ch, 1) == 1); > + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (ch == 'a'); > + > + xclose (sock); > + return 0; > +} > + > +static void > +update_map (char * const mapping, const char * const map_file) > +{ > + const size_t map_len = strlen (mapping); > + > + const int fd = xopen (map_file, O_WRONLY, 0); > + xwrite (fd, mapping, map_len); > + xclose (fd); > +} > + > +static void > +proc_setgroups_write (const long child_pid, const char * const str) > +{ > + const size_t str_len = strlen(str); > + > + char setgroups_path[sizeof ("/proc//setgroups") + INT_STRLEN_BOUND (long)]; > + > + snprintf (setgroups_path, sizeof (setgroups_path), > + "/proc/%ld/setgroups", child_pid); > + > + const int fd = open (setgroups_path, O_WRONLY); > + > + if (fd < 0) > + { > + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (errno == ENOENT); > + FAIL_UNSUPPORTED ("/proc/%ld/setgroups not found\n", child_pid); > + } > + > + xwrite (fd, str, str_len); > + xclose(fd); > +} > + > +static char child_stack[1024 * 1024]; > + > +int > +do_test (void) > +{ > + base = support_create_and_chdir_toolong_temp_directory (BASENAME); > + > + xmkdir (MOUNT_NAME, S_IRWXU); > + atexit (do_cleanup); > + > + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (socketpair (AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sockfd) == 0); > + pid_t child_pid = xclone (child_func, NULL, child_stack, > + sizeof (child_stack), > + CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS | SIGCHLD); > + > + xclose (sockfd[1]); > + const int sock = sockfd[0]; > + > + char map_path[sizeof ("/proc//uid_map") + INT_STRLEN_BOUND (long)]; > + char map_buf[sizeof ("0 1") + INT_STRLEN_BOUND (long)]; > + > + snprintf (map_path, sizeof (map_path), "/proc/%ld/uid_map", > + (long) child_pid); > + snprintf (map_buf, sizeof (map_buf), "0 %ld 1", (long) getuid()); > + update_map (map_buf, map_path); > + > + proc_setgroups_write ((long) child_pid, "deny"); > + snprintf (map_path, sizeof (map_path), "/proc/%ld/gid_map", > + (long) child_pid); > + snprintf (map_buf, sizeof (map_buf), "0 %ld 1", (long) getgid()); > + update_map (map_buf, map_path); > + > + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (send (sock, "1", 1, MSG_NOSIGNAL) == 1); > + const int fd = recv_fd (sock); > + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (fd >= 0); > + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (fchdir (fd) == 0); > + > + static char buf[2 * 10 + 1]; > + memset (buf, 'A', sizeof (buf)); > + > + /* Finally, call getcwd and check if it resulted in a buffer underflow. */ > + char * cwd = getcwd (buf + sizeof (buf) / 2, 1); > + TEST_VERIFY (cwd == NULL); > + TEST_VERIFY (errno == ERANGE); > + > + for (int i = 0; i < sizeof (buf); i++) > + if (buf[i] != 'A') > + { > + printf ("buf[%d] = %02x\n", i, (unsigned int) buf[i]); > + support_record_failure (); > + } > + > + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (send (sock, "a", 1, MSG_NOSIGNAL) == 1); > + xclose (sock); > + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (xwaitpid (child_pid, NULL, 0) == child_pid); > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +#define CLEANUP_HANDLER do_cleanup > +#include