From: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@gotplt.org>
To: "Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"Volker Weißmann" <volker.weissmann@gmx.de>
Cc: libc-alpha@sourceware.org, Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] Fix FORTIFY_SOURCE false positive
Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2023 13:45:25 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fa195c7b-c77f-8806-972b-16c0b7ee4377@gotplt.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87bkdeb88r.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com>
On 2023-10-04 13:36, Florian Weimer wrote:
> This whole thing is rather questionable.
>
> First of all, the compiler should detect the fact that a format argument
> to printf is a string literal and record that in the flags argument
> (which already exists for __printf_chk). Then we wouldn't have to do
> any %n security checks for most uses of %n. (The flags argument cannot
> be spoofed just by altering the string.)
>
> Siddhesh, is that something you could be working on?
Hmm, I thought the compiler already did this. I can take a look.
> Even without that, if we are willing to trust the ld.so data structures,
> we can do the permission check in userspace for strings that come from
> .rodata. We an find the ELF object that contains them and check if the
> loadable segment has the right permissions (or we are in the RELRO
> area).
>
> After these changes, I think we can fail hard on /proc-related errors
> because they are very unlikely to happen.
We'd have to figure out a way for static binaries too.
Sid
prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-04 17:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-03 17:18 Volker Weißmann
2023-10-03 17:25 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-03 18:13 ` [PATCH] debug: Add regression tests for BZ 30932 Adhemerval Zanella
2023-10-03 18:48 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-04 14:43 ` [PATCH v3] Fix FORTIFY_SOURCE false positive Volker Weißmann
2023-10-04 16:57 ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2023-10-04 17:08 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-04 14:51 ` Andreas Schwab
2023-10-04 15:44 ` Volker Weißmann
2023-10-04 17:36 ` Florian Weimer
2023-10-04 17:45 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar [this message]
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