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From: Sunil Pandey <skpgkp2@gmail.com>
To: "H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>,
	 Libc-stable Mailing List <libc-stable@sourceware.org>
Cc: Noah Goldstein <goldstein.w.n@gmail.com>,
	libc-alpha@sourceware.org,  carlos@systemhalted.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] x86: Prevent SIGSEGV in memcmp-sse2 when data is concurrently modified [BZ #29863]
Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 14:02:23 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAMAf5_eQKHkBL-1LCGm=NUQtq95PYAMN8ytnLut8je_8ifmi_Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAMe9rOrgXxO-9aOoRtnO-onkcGd819QGqd2E1cc5JfPQWDseLQ@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 1:36 PM H.J. Lu via Libc-alpha
<libc-alpha@sourceware.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 10:52 AM Noah Goldstein <goldstein.w.n@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > In the case of INCORRECT usage of `memcmp(a, b, N)` where `a` and `b`
> > are concurrently modified as `memcmp` runs, there can be a SIGSEGV
> > in `L(ret_nonzero_vec_end_0)` because the sequential logic
> > assumes that `(rdx - 32 + rax)` is a positive 32-bit integer.
> >
> > To be clear, this change does not mean the usage of `memcmp` is
> > supported.  The program behaviour is undefined (UB) in the
> > presence of data races, and `memcmp` is incorrect when the values
> > of `a` and/or `b` are modified concurrently (data race). This UB
> > may manifest itself as a SIGSEGV. That being said, if we can
> > allow the idiomatic use cases, like those in yottadb with
> > opportunistic concurrency control (OCC), to execute without a
> > SIGSEGV, at no cost to regular use cases, then we can aim to
> > minimize harm to those existing users.
> >
> > The fix replaces a 32-bit `addl %edx, %eax` with the 64-bit variant
> > `addq %rdx, %rax`. The 1-extra byte of code size from using the
> > 64-bit instruction doesn't contribute to overall code size as the
> > next target is aligned and has multiple bytes of `nop` padding
> > before it. As well all the logic between the add and `ret` still
> > fits in the same fetch block, so the cost of this change is
> > basically zero.
> >
> > The relevant sequential logic can be seen in the following
> > pseudo-code:
> > ```
> >     /*
> >      * rsi = a
> >      * rdi = b
> >      * rdx = len - 32
> >      */
> >     /* cmp a[0:15] and b[0:15]. Since length is known to be [17, 32]
> >     in this case, this check is also assumed to cover a[0:(31 - len)]
> >     and b[0:(31 - len)].  */
> >     movups  (%rsi), %xmm0
> >     movups  (%rdi), %xmm1
> >     PCMPEQ  %xmm0, %xmm1
> >     pmovmskb %xmm1, %eax
> >     subl    %ecx, %eax
> >     jnz L(END_NEQ)
> >
> >     /* cmp a[len-16:len-1] and b[len-16:len-1].  */
> >     movups  16(%rsi, %rdx), %xmm0
> >     movups  16(%rdi, %rdx), %xmm1
> >     PCMPEQ  %xmm0, %xmm1
> >     pmovmskb %xmm1, %eax
> >     subl    %ecx, %eax
> >     jnz L(END_NEQ2)
> >     ret
> >
> > L(END2):
> >     /* Position first mismatch.  */
> >     bsfl    %eax, %eax
> >
> >     /* The sequential version is able to assume this value is a
> >     positive 32-bit value because the first check included bytes in
> >     range a[0:(31 - len)] and b[0:(31 - len)] so `eax` must be
> >     greater than `31 - len` so the minimum value of `edx` + `eax` is
> >     `(len - 32) + (32 - len) >= 0`. In the concurrent case, however,
> >     `a` or `b` could have been changed so a mismatch in `eax` less or
> >     equal than `(31 - len)` is possible (the new low bound is `(16 -
> >     len)`. This can result in a negative 32-bit signed integer, which
> >     when zero extended to 64-bits is a random large value this out
> >     out of bounds. */
> >     addl %edx, %eax
> >
> >     /* Crash here because 32-bit negative number in `eax` zero
> >     extends to out of bounds 64-bit offset.  */
> >     movzbl  16(%rdi, %rax), %ecx
> >     movzbl  16(%rsi, %rax), %eax
> > ```
> >
> > This fix is quite simple, just make the `addl %edx, %eax` 64 bit (i.e
> > `addq %rdx, %rax`). This prevents the 32-bit zero extension
> > and since `eax` is still a low bound of `16 - len` the `rdx + rax`
> > is bound by `(len - 32) - (16 - len) >= -16`. Since we have a
> > fixed offset of `16` in the memory access this must be in bounds.
> > ---
> >  sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S | 12 +++++++++++-
> >  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S b/sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S
> > index afd450d020..51bc9344f0 100644
> > --- a/sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S
> > +++ b/sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S
> > @@ -308,7 +308,17 @@ L(ret_nonzero_vec_end_0):
> >         setg    %dl
> >         leal    -1(%rdx, %rdx), %eax
> >  #  else
> > -       addl    %edx, %eax
> > +       /* Use `addq` instead of `addl` here so that even if `rax` + `rdx`
> > +       is negative value of the sum will be usable as a 64-bit offset
> > +       (negative 32-bit numbers zero-extend to a large and often
> > +       out-of-bounds 64-bit offsets).  Note that `rax` + `rdx` >= 0 is
> > +       an invariant when `memcmp` is used correctly, but if the input
> > +       strings `rsi`/`rdi` are concurrently modified as the function
> > +       runs (there is a Data-Race) it is possible for `rax` + `rdx` to
> > +       be negative.  Given that there is virtually no extra to cost
> > +       using `addq` instead of `addl` we may as well protect the
> > +       data-race case.  */
> > +       addq    %rdx, %rax
> >         movzbl  (VEC_SIZE * -1 + SIZE_OFFSET)(%rsi, %rax), %ecx
> >         movzbl  (VEC_SIZE * -1 + SIZE_OFFSET)(%rdi, %rax), %eax
> >         subl    %ecx, %eax
> > --
> > 2.34.1
> >
>
> LGTM.
>
> Thanks.
>
> --
> H.J.

I would like to backport this patch to release branches.
Any comments or objections?

--Sunil

       reply	other threads:[~2023-01-10 22:03 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20221214001147.2814047-1-goldstein.w.n@gmail.com>
     [not found] ` <20221214185210.2930992-1-goldstein.w.n@gmail.com>
     [not found]   ` <CAMe9rOrgXxO-9aOoRtnO-onkcGd819QGqd2E1cc5JfPQWDseLQ@mail.gmail.com>
2023-01-10 22:02     ` Sunil Pandey [this message]
2023-01-10 23:02       ` Noah Goldstein

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