[Bug debuginfod/28204] extend webapi / verification with forthcoming signed-contents archives

["rgoldber at redhat dot com" <sourceware-bugzilla@sourceware.org>]

https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=28204

--- Comment #21 from Ryan Goldberg <rgoldber at redhat dot com> ---
(In reply to Mark Wielaard from comment #20)
> But isn't the idea of checking the IMA signatures that you don't have to
> trust the server providing the debuginfo files as the distro intended them?
But this will allow for the case of a trusted server which only has some of
it's RPMs per-file signed. Take for instance a server which has the RPMs for
f36,37,38. The f36 files don't have signatures so using enforcing here is too
strict since we are ok just letting a client know that these ones are
unverifiable, but we still want to be able to reject any of the invalid ones
for f38

> So both are bad in some way. Which imho means that if we support some kind
> of permissive mode, then it should explicitly warn for both kind of baddness.
In the permissive mode you'll get:
* "the signature is valid" for valid sigs
* "ALERT: this download is being rejected since the IMA signature could not be
verified" for invalid sigs
* "the signature could not be verified" otherwise

So we do warn for both kinds of bad, we just don't reject the 'unknown' bad

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