* [PATCH] i386: Default to -mcet-switch [PR104816]
@ 2024-01-18 7:12 Fangrui Song
0 siblings, 0 replies; only message in thread
From: Fangrui Song @ 2024-01-18 7:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jan Hubicka, Uros Bizjak, H.J. Lu, gcc-patches; +Cc: joao, Fangrui Song
When -fcf-protection=branch is used, with the current -mno-cet-switch
default, a NOTRACK indirect jump is generated for jump tables, which can
target a non-ENDBR instruction. However, the overwhelming opinion is to
avoid NOTRACK (PR104816) to improve safety. Projects such as Linux
kernel and Xen even specify -fno-jump-table to avoid NOTRACK. Therefore,
let's change the default.
Note, for `default: __builtin_unreachable()`, LLVM AArch64 even made a
decision (https://reviews.llvm.org/D155485) to keep the range check,
which can otherwise be optimized out. This reinforces the opinion that
people want protection for jump tables.
#define DO A(0) A(1) A(2) A(3) A(4) A(5) A(6) A(7) A(8) A(9) A(10) A(11) A(12) A(13)
#define A(i) void bar##i();
DO
#undef A
void ext();
void foo(int i) {
switch (i) {
#define A(i) case i: bar##i(); break;
DO
// -mbranch-protection=bti causes Clang AArch64 to keep the i <= 13 range check
default: __builtin_unreachable();
}
ext();
}
gcc/ChangeLog:
PR target/104816
* config/i386/i386.opt: Default to -mcet-switch.
* doc/invoke.texi: Update doc.
gcc/testsuite/ChangeLog:
* gcc.target/i386/cet-switch-1.c: Add -mno-cet-switch.
* gcc.target/i386/cet-switch-2.c: Remove -mcet-switch to check the
default.
---
gcc/config/i386/i386.opt | 2 +-
gcc/doc/invoke.texi | 19 +++++++++----------
gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/i386/cet-switch-1.c | 2 +-
gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/i386/cet-switch-2.c | 2 +-
4 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/gcc/config/i386/i386.opt b/gcc/config/i386/i386.opt
index 5b4f1bff25f..0e168f3c07a 100644
--- a/gcc/config/i386/i386.opt
+++ b/gcc/config/i386/i386.opt
@@ -1074,7 +1074,7 @@ Enable shadow stack built-in functions from Control-flow Enforcement
Technology (CET).
mcet-switch
-Target Var(flag_cet_switch) Init(0)
+Target Var(flag_cet_switch) Init(1)
Turn on CET instrumentation for switch statements that use a jump table and
an indirect jump.
diff --git a/gcc/doc/invoke.texi b/gcc/doc/invoke.texi
index 16e31a3c6db..720be71f8fa 100644
--- a/gcc/doc/invoke.texi
+++ b/gcc/doc/invoke.texi
@@ -1455,7 +1455,7 @@ See RS/6000 and PowerPC Options.
-msse4a -m3dnow -m3dnowa -mpopcnt -mabm -mbmi -mtbm -mfma4 -mxop
-madx -mlzcnt -mbmi2 -mfxsr -mxsave -mxsaveopt -mrtm -mhle -mlwp
-mmwaitx -mclzero -mpku -mthreads -mgfni -mvaes -mwaitpkg
--mshstk -mmanual-endbr -mcet-switch -mforce-indirect-call
+-mshstk -mmanual-endbr -mno-cet-switch -mforce-indirect-call
-mavx512vbmi2 -mavx512bf16 -menqcmd
-mvpclmulqdq -mavx512bitalg -mmovdiri -mmovdir64b -mavx512vpopcntdq
-mavx5124fmaps -mavx512vnni -mavx5124vnniw -mprfchw -mrdpid
@@ -34886,16 +34886,15 @@ function attribute. This is useful when used with the option
@option{-fcf-protection=branch} to control ENDBR insertion at the
function entry.
+@opindex mno-cet-switch
@opindex mcet-switch
-@item -mcet-switch
-By default, CET instrumentation is turned off on switch statements that
-use a jump table and indirect branch track is disabled. Since jump
-tables are stored in read-only memory, this does not result in a direct
-loss of hardening. But if the jump table index is attacker-controlled,
-the indirect jump may not be constrained by CET. This option turns on
-CET instrumentation to enable indirect branch track for switch statements
-with jump tables which leads to the jump targets reachable via any indirect
-jumps.
+@item -mno-cet-switch
+When @option{-fcf-protection=branch} is enabled, by default, switch statements
+that use a jump table are instrumented to use ENDBR instructions and constrain
+the indirect jump with CET to protect against an attacker-controlled jump table
+index. @option{-mno-cet-switch} generates a NOTRACK indirect jump and removes
+ENDBR instructions, which may make the jump table smaller at the cost of an
+unprotected indirect jump.
@opindex mcall-ms2sysv-xlogues
@opindex mno-call-ms2sysv-xlogues
diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/i386/cet-switch-1.c b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/i386/cet-switch-1.c
index afe5adc2f3d..4931c3ad1d2 100644
--- a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/i386/cet-switch-1.c
+++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/i386/cet-switch-1.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* Verify that CET works. */
/* { dg-do compile } */
-/* { dg-options "-O -fcf-protection" } */
+/* { dg-options "-O -fcf-protection -mno-cet-switch" } */
/* { dg-final { scan-assembler-times "endbr32" 1 { target ia32 } } } */
/* { dg-final { scan-assembler-times "endbr64" 1 { target { ! ia32 } } } } */
/* { dg-final { scan-assembler-times "notrack jmp\[ \t]+\[*]" 1 } } */
diff --git a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/i386/cet-switch-2.c b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/i386/cet-switch-2.c
index 69ddc6fd5b7..11578d1a30c 100644
--- a/gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/i386/cet-switch-2.c
+++ b/gcc/testsuite/gcc.target/i386/cet-switch-2.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/* Verify that CET works. */
/* { dg-do compile } */
-/* { dg-options "-O -fcf-protection -mcet-switch" } */
+/* { dg-options "-O -fcf-protection" } */
/* { dg-final { scan-assembler-times "endbr32" 12 { target ia32 } } } */
/* { dg-final { scan-assembler-times "endbr64" 12 { target { ! ia32 } } } } */
/* { dg-final { scan-assembler-times "\[ \t]+jmp\[ \t]+\[*]" 1 } } */
--
2.43.0.381.gb435a96ce8-goog
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