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From: "tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz" <sourceware-bugzilla@sourceware.org> To: gdb-prs@sourceware.org Subject: [Bug gdb/28549] ARM/Cortex-M: improper stack unwinding when the target is in lockup state Date: Fri, 10 Dec 2021 12:30:35 +0000 [thread overview] Message-ID: <bug-28549-4717-enUCVkbnKa@http.sourceware.org/bugzilla/> (raw) In-Reply-To: <bug-28549-4717@http.sourceware.org/bugzilla/> https://sourceware.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=28549 tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CC| |tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz --- Comment #14 from tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz --- Fredrik, I'm afraid that simply adding lockup addresses to the list of magic address is not correct. The Cortex-M lockup differs from an exception! The lockup does not stack anything, it just sets PC (and other special regs). So there is no point in trying to unwind lockup frame. It does not seem possible, the previous PC is lost. Unwinding lockup state as it was an exception may result again in peeking not existing memory (arm_m_exception_cache() reads word @ unwound_sp + 28) So I would recommend splitting arm_m_addr_is_magic() to arm_m_addr_is_exc_return() and arm_m_addr_is_lockup(). Then introduce another Cortex-M specific unwinder "arm m lockup" with a trivial implementation: arm_m_lockup_this_id() will always return outer_frame_id and arm_m_lockup_unwind_sniffer() will check PC for arm_m_addr_is_lockup() Tom -- You are receiving this mail because: You are on the CC list for the bug.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-12-10 12:30 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2021-11-05 9:51 [Bug gdb/28549] New: " tarek.bouchkati at gmail dot com 2021-11-05 10:34 ` [Bug gdb/28549] " tarek.bouchkati at gmail dot com 2021-11-05 10:59 ` tarek.bouchkati at gmail dot com 2021-11-05 12:26 ` tarek.bouchkati at gmail dot com 2021-11-05 12:36 ` tarek.bouchkati at gmail dot com 2021-11-05 13:16 ` alahay01 at gcc dot gnu.org 2021-11-05 13:22 ` luis.machado at linaro dot org 2021-11-05 14:02 ` luis.machado at linaro dot org 2021-11-05 14:02 ` luis.machado at linaro dot org 2021-11-05 15:43 ` fredrik.hederstierna@securitas-direct.com 2021-11-05 15:51 ` tarek.bouchkati at gmail dot com 2021-11-05 23:14 ` fredrik.hederstierna@securitas-direct.com 2021-11-05 23:25 ` fredrik.hederstierna@securitas-direct.com 2021-11-06 0:20 ` fredrik.hederstierna@securitas-direct.com 2021-11-15 12:04 ` tarek.bouchkati at gmail dot com 2021-11-15 12:52 ` luis.machado at linaro dot org 2021-11-15 13:15 ` tarek.bouchkati at gmail dot com 2021-11-15 18:09 ` fredrik.hederstierna@securitas-direct.com 2021-11-15 18:46 ` luis.machado at linaro dot org 2021-11-18 11:18 ` tarek.bouchkati at gmail dot com 2021-12-10 12:30 ` tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz [this message] 2021-12-13 8:30 ` luis.machado at linaro dot org 2021-12-13 9:55 ` tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz 2021-12-13 10:07 ` clyon at gcc dot gnu.org 2021-12-13 10:35 ` luis.machado at linaro dot org 2021-12-13 10:37 ` luis.machado at linaro dot org 2021-12-13 20:22 ` tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz 2021-12-13 21:48 ` fredrik.hederstierna@securitas-direct.com 2021-12-13 22:00 ` fredrik.hederstierna@securitas-direct.com 2021-12-14 0:09 ` tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz 2021-12-14 0:33 ` tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz 2021-12-14 10:27 ` tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz 2021-12-14 14:42 ` tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz 2021-12-14 14:45 ` tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz 2021-12-14 14:50 ` tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz 2021-12-15 16:44 ` luis.machado at linaro dot org 2021-12-15 16:56 ` fredrik.hederstierna@securitas-direct.com 2021-12-15 17:42 ` tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz 2022-01-19 11:34 ` tarek.bouchkati at gmail dot com 2022-01-19 11:35 ` luis.machado at linaro dot org 2022-01-19 11:36 ` luis.machado at linaro dot org 2022-01-19 11:40 ` clyon at gcc dot gnu.org 2022-01-19 12:18 ` tarekbouchkati at gmail dot com 2022-09-09 8:25 ` luis.machado at arm dot com 2022-09-09 23:35 ` fredrik.hederstierna@securitas-direct.com 2022-09-10 7:27 ` luis.machado at arm dot com 2022-09-11 13:59 ` tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz 2022-09-12 9:32 ` luis.machado at arm dot com 2022-09-14 9:07 ` tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz 2022-09-14 12:10 ` luis.machado at arm dot com 2022-10-02 7:13 ` torbjorn.svensson at st dot com 2022-10-02 7:18 ` tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz 2022-10-06 13:07 ` luis.machado at arm dot com 2022-10-11 8:08 ` torbjorn.svensson at st dot com 2022-10-14 14:07 ` torbjorn.svensson at st dot com 2022-10-16 12:24 ` tomas.vanek at fbl dot cz 2022-10-21 10:01 ` luis.machado at arm dot com 2022-10-29 18:40 ` brobecker at gnat dot com 2022-10-31 10:18 ` luis.machado at arm dot com
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