Fwd: insight connect window launching issues

Fwd: insight connect window launching issues

[Niraj Gupta]

thx for the quick response, also there was a typo in my email address

here is the additional info

src/tcl/unix/tclUnixPipe.c:188: the use of `tmpnam' is dangerous, better use 
`mkstemp'

i guess this is with the use of function tmpnam, which creates tmp filename, 
mkstemp doc suugests that is guarantee's unique file name
grep show this functions is used in other places too

regards
niraj

Re: Fwd: insight connect window launching issues

[Keith Seitz]

On Thu, 5 Jul 2001, Niraj Gupta wrote:

> here is the additional info
>
> src/tcl/unix/tclUnixPipe.c:188: the use of `tmpnam' is dangerous, better use
> `mkstemp'

Linux manpage on tmpnam says "Never use this function. Use mkstemp(3)
instead."

The Solaris page says nothing (other than the multi-threaded app warning).

The OpenBSD manpage, though, says:

     tmpnam() and tempnam() are provided for System V and ANSI compatibility
     only.  These interfaces are typically not used in safe ways.  The mk-
     stemp(3) interface is strongly preferred.

     There are four important problems with these interfaces (as well as with
     the historic mktemp(3) interface).  First, there is an obvious race be-
     tween file name selection and file creation and deletion: the program is
     typically written to call tmpnam(), tmpname(), or mktemp(3).  Subsequent-
     ly, the program calls open(2) or fopen(3) and erroneously opens a file
     (or symbolic link, or fifo or other device) that the attacker has placed
     in the expected file location.  Hence mkstemp(3) is recommended, since it
     atomically creates the file.

     Second, most historic implementations provide only a limited number of
     possible temporary file names (usually 26) before file names will start
     being recycled.  Third, the System V implementations of these functions
     (and of mktemp)  use the access(2) function to determine whether or not
     the temporary file may be created.  This has obvious ramifications for
     daemons or setuid/setgid programs, complicating the portable use of these
     interfaces in such programs.  Finally, there is no specification of the
     permissions with which the temporary files are created.

     This implementation does not have these flaws, but portable software can-
     not depend on that.

     For these reasons, ld(8) will output a warning message whenever it links
     code that uses the functions tmpnam() or tempnam().

I don't think it's too big a deal, but in the interests of all, I will
send a note out to some of the maintainers/contributors and see what they
say. If they choose to act is up to them.

Thanks for the pointer.
Keith