From: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
To: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@sourceware.org>, libc-alpha@sourceware.org
Cc: eggert@cs.ucla.edu, fweimer@redhat.com,
Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] getcwd: Set errno to ERANGE for size == 1 (CVE-2021-3999)
Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2022 13:41:45 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aa7dc3d1-f09d-8985-46ee-f493787a8a40@linaro.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220120093252.1911498-4-siddhesh@sourceware.org>
On 20/01/2022 06:32, Siddhesh Poyarekar wrote:
> No valid path returned by getcwd would fit into 1 byte, so reject the
> size early and return NULL with errno set to ERANGE. This change is
> prompted by CVE-2021-3999, which describes a single byte buffer
> underflow and overflow when all of the following conditions are met:
>
> - The buffer size (i.e. the second argument of getcwd) is 1 byte
> - The current working directory is too long
> - '/' is also mounted on the current working directory
>
> Sequence of events:
>
> - In sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/getcwd.c, the syscall returns ENAMETOOLONG
> because the linux kernel checks for name length before it checks
> buffer size
>
> - The code falls back to the generic getcwd in sysdeps/posix
>
> - In the generic func, the buf[0] is set to '\0' on line 250
>
> - this while loop on line 262 is bypassed:
>
> while (!(thisdev == rootdev && thisino == rootino))
>
> since the rootfs (/) is bind mounted onto the directory and the flow
> goes on to line 449, where it puts a '/' in the byte before the
> buffer.
>
> - Finally on line 458, it moves 2 bytes (the underflowed byte and the
> '\0') to the buf[0] and buf[1], resulting in a 1 byte buffer overflow.
>
> - buf is returned on line 469 and errno is not set.
>
> This resolves BZ #28769.
>
> Signed-off-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
> Signed-off-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@sourceware.org>
Look good with just two fixed below for CMSG_DATA and a couple of comments.
Ok with the fixes, the comments would be good but it is a blocker.
Reviewed-by: Adhemerval Zanella <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
> ---
> NEWS | 6 +
> sysdeps/posix/getcwd.c | 7 +
> sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/Makefile | 7 +-
> .../unix/sysv/linux/tst-getcwd-smallbuff.c | 245 ++++++++++++++++++
> 4 files changed, 264 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> create mode 100644 sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-getcwd-smallbuff.c
>
> diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
> index 4c392a445e..07e9eac52d 100644
> --- a/NEWS
> +++ b/NEWS
> @@ -170,6 +170,12 @@ Security related changes:
> function could result in a memory leak and potential access of
> uninitialized memory. Reported by Qualys.
>
> + CVE-2021-3999: Passing a buffer of size exactly 1 byte to the getcwd
> + function may result in an off-by-one buffer underflow and overflow
> + when the current working directory is longer than PATH_MAX and also
> + corresponds to the / directory through an unprivileged mount
> + namespace. Reported by Qualys.
> +
> The following bugs are resolved with this release:
>
> [The release manager will add the list generated by
> diff --git a/sysdeps/posix/getcwd.c b/sysdeps/posix/getcwd.c
> index e147a31a81..9d5787b6f4 100644
> --- a/sysdeps/posix/getcwd.c
> +++ b/sysdeps/posix/getcwd.c
> @@ -187,6 +187,13 @@ __getcwd_generic (char *buf, size_t size)
> size_t allocated = size;
> size_t used;
>
> + /* A size of 1 byte is never useful. */
> + if (allocated == 1)
> + {
> + __set_errno (ERANGE);
> + return NULL;
> + }
> +
> #if HAVE_MINIMALLY_WORKING_GETCWD
> /* If AT_FDCWD is not defined, the algorithm below is O(N**2) and
> this is much slower than the system getcwd (at least on
> diff --git a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/Makefile b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/Makefile
> index 85fc8cbf75..7ca9350c99 100644
> --- a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/Makefile
> +++ b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/Makefile
> @@ -346,7 +346,12 @@ sysdep_routines += xstatconv internal_statvfs \
>
> sysdep_headers += bits/fcntl-linux.h
>
> -tests += tst-fallocate tst-fallocate64 tst-o_path-locks
> +tests += \
> + tst-fallocate \
> + tst-fallocate64 \
> + tst-getcwd-smallbuff \
> + tst-o_path-locks \
> +# tests
> endif
>
> ifeq ($(subdir),elf)
> diff --git a/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-getcwd-smallbuff.c b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-getcwd-smallbuff.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 0000000000..791dfe4d02
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tst-getcwd-smallbuff.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
> +/* Verify that getcwd returns ERANGE for size 1 byte and does not underflow
> + buffer when the CWD is too long and is also a mount target of /. See bug
> + #28769 or CVE-2021-3999 for more context.
> + Copyright The GNU Toolchain Authors.
> + This file is part of the GNU C Library.
> +
> + The GNU C Library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
> + modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public
> + License as published by the Free Software Foundation; either
> + version 2.1 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
> +
> + The GNU C Library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
> + but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
> + MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
> + Lesser General Public License for more details.
> +
> + You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
> + License along with the GNU C Library; if not, see
> + <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. */
> +
> +#include <errno.h>
> +#include <fcntl.h>
> +#include <limits.h>
> +#include <stdio.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +#include <string.h>
> +#include <sys/mount.h>
> +#include <sys/stat.h>
> +#include <sys/types.h>
> +#include <sys/wait.h>
> +
> +#include <sys/socket.h>
> +#include <sys/un.h>
> +#include <support/check.h>
> +#include <support/temp_file.h>
> +#include <support/xsched.h>
> +#include <support/xunistd.h>
> +
> +#ifndef PATH_MAX
> +# define PATH_MAX 1024
> +#endif
No need since it is a Linux only test and PATH_MAX is always defined.
> +
> +static char *base;
> +#define BASENAME "tst-getcwd-smallbuff"
> +#define MOUNT_NAME "mpoint"
> +static int sockfd[2];
> +
> +static void
> +do_cleanup (void)
> +{
> + support_chdir_toolong_temp_directory (base);
> + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (rmdir (MOUNT_NAME) == 0);
> + free (base);
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +send_fd (const int sock, const int fd)
> +{
> + struct msghdr msg;
> + union
> + {
> + struct cmsghdr hdr;
> + char buf[CMSG_SPACE (sizeof (int))];
> + } cmsgbuf;
Maybe zero-initialize both first to avoid the memset below?
> + struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
> + struct iovec vec;
> + char ch = 'A';
> + ssize_t n;
> +
> + memset (&msg, 0, sizeof (msg));
> + memset (&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof (cmsgbuf));
> + msg.msg_control = &cmsgbuf.buf;
> + msg.msg_controllen = sizeof (cmsgbuf.buf);
> +
> + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR (&msg);
> + cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN (sizeof (int));
> + cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
> + cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
> + *(int *) CMSG_DATA (cmsg) = fd;
I think CMSG_DATA does not guarantee the alignment, so I think it would be
safe to use memcpy here:
memcpy (CMSG_DATA (cmsg), &fd, sizeof (fd));
> +
> + vec.iov_base = &ch;
> + vec.iov_len = 1;
> + msg.msg_iov = &vec;
> + msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
> +
> + while ((n = sendmsg (sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
> +
> + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (n == 1);
> +}
> +
Ok.
> +static int
> +recv_fd (const int sock)
> +{
> + struct msghdr msg;
Maybe also zero-initialize here.
> + union
> + {
> + struct cmsghdr hdr;
> + char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
> + } cmsgbuf;
> + struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
> + struct iovec vec;
> + ssize_t n;
> + char ch = '\0';
> + int fd = -1;
> +
> + memset (&msg, 0, sizeof (msg));
> + vec.iov_base = &ch;
> + vec.iov_len = 1;
> + msg.msg_iov = &vec;
> + msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
> +
> + memset (&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof (cmsgbuf));
> + msg.msg_control = &cmsgbuf.buf;
> + msg.msg_controllen = sizeof (cmsgbuf.buf);
> +
> + while ((n = recvmsg (sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
> + if (n != 1 || ch != 'A')
> + return -1;
> +
> + cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR (&msg);
> + if (cmsg == NULL)
> + return -1;
> + if (cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS)
> + return -1;
> + fd = *(const int *) CMSG_DATA (cmsg);
Same as before, I think you will need to copy to a temporary using memcpy.
> + if (fd < 0)
> + return -1;
> + return fd;
> +}
> +
> +static int
> +child_func (void * const arg)
> +{
> + xclose (sockfd[0]);
> + const int sock = sockfd[1];
> + char ch;
> +
> + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (read (sock, &ch, 1) == 1);
> + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (ch == '1');
> +
> + if (mount ("/", MOUNT_NAME, NULL, MS_BIND | MS_REC, NULL))
> + FAIL_EXIT1 ("mount failed: %m\n");
> + const int fd = xopen ("mpoint",
> + O_RDONLY | O_PATH | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW, 0);
> +
> + send_fd (sock, fd);
> + xclose (fd);
> +
> + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (read (sock, &ch, 1) == 1);
> + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (ch == 'a');
> +
> + xclose (sock);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +update_map (char * const mapping, const char * const map_file)
> +{
> + const size_t map_len = strlen (mapping);
> +
> + const int fd = xopen (map_file, O_WRONLY, 0);
> + xwrite (fd, mapping, map_len);
> + xclose (fd);
> +}
> +
> +static void
> +proc_setgroups_write (const long child_pid, const char * const str)
> +{
> + const size_t str_len = strlen(str);
> +
> + char setgroups_path[64];
Maybe define the size as:
/* The path is the form /proc/%ld/setgroups. */
char map_path[sizeof("/proc/setgroups") + INT_STRLEN_BOUND (long int)];
> + snprintf (setgroups_path, sizeof (setgroups_path),
> + "/proc/%ld/setgroups", child_pid);
> +
> + const int fd = open (setgroups_path, O_WRONLY);
> +
> + if (fd < 0)
> + {
> + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (errno == ENOENT);
> + FAIL_UNSUPPORTED ("/proc/%ld/setgroups not found\n", child_pid);
> + }
> +
> + xwrite (fd, str, str_len);
> + xclose(fd);
> +}
> +
> +static char child_stack[1024 * 1024];
> +
> +int
> +do_test (void)
> +{
> + base = support_create_and_chdir_toolong_temp_directory (BASENAME);
> +
> + xmkdir (MOUNT_NAME, S_IRWXU);
> + atexit (do_cleanup);
> +
> + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (socketpair (AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sockfd) == 0);
> + pid_t child_pid = xclone (child_func, NULL, child_stack,
> + sizeof (child_stack),
> + CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS | SIGCHLD);
> +
> + xclose (sockfd[1]);
> + const int sock = sockfd[0];
> +
> + char map_path[64], map_buf[64];
Same comment as for setgroups_path.
> + snprintf (map_path, sizeof (map_path), ,
> + (long) child_pid);
> + snprintf (map_buf, sizeof (map_buf), "0 %ld 1", (long) getuid());
> + update_map (map_buf, map_path);
> +
> + proc_setgroups_write ((long) child_pid, "deny");
> + snprintf (map_path, sizeof (map_path), "/proc/%ld/gid_map",
> + (long) child_pid);
> + snprintf (map_buf, sizeof (map_buf), "0 %ld 1", (long) getgid());
> + update_map (map_buf, map_path);
> +
> + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (send (sock, "1", 1, MSG_NOSIGNAL) == 1);
> + const int fd = recv_fd (sock);
> + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (fd >= 0);
> + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (fchdir (fd) == 0);
> +
> + static char buf[2 * 10 + 1];
> + memset (buf, 'A', sizeof(buf));
Space before (.
> +
> + /* Finally, call getcwd and check if it resulted in a buffer underflow. */
> + char * cwd = getcwd (buf + sizeof(buf) / 2, 1);
> + TEST_VERIFY (cwd == NULL);
> + TEST_VERIFY (errno == ERANGE);
> +
> + for (int i = 0; i < sizeof (buf); i++)
> + if (buf[i] != 'A')
> + {
> + printf ("buf[%d] = %02x\n", i, (unsigned int) buf[i]);
> + support_record_failure ();
> + }
> +
> + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (send (sock, "a", 1, MSG_NOSIGNAL) == 1);
> + xclose (sock);
> + TEST_VERIFY_EXIT (xwaitpid (child_pid, NULL, 0) == child_pid);
> +
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +#define CLEANUP_HANDLER do_cleanup
> +#include <support/test-driver.c>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-01-21 16:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-01-19 8:21 [PATCH v2 0/3] Fixes for CVE-2021-3998 and CVE-2021-3999 Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-19 8:21 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] support: Add helpers to create paths longer than PATH_MAX Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-19 10:13 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-20 14:47 ` Cristian Rodríguez
2022-01-20 14:56 ` Florian Weimer
2022-01-20 15:17 ` Cristian Rodríguez
2022-01-20 14:57 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-19 8:21 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] realpath: Set errno to ENAMETOOLONG for result larger than PATH_MAX (CVE-2021-3998) Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-19 8:21 ` [PATCH v2 3/3] getcwd: Set errno to ERANGE for size == 1 (CVE-2021-3999) Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-20 9:32 ` [PATCH v3 0/3] Fixes for CVE-2021-3998 and CVE-2021-3999 Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-20 9:32 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] support: Add helpers to create paths longer than PATH_MAX Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-21 16:27 ` Adhemerval Zanella
2022-01-20 9:32 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] realpath: Set errno to ENAMETOOLONG for result larger than PATH_MAX [BZ #28770] Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-21 23:22 ` Joseph Myers
2022-01-22 3:47 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-22 14:45 ` [PATCH] tst-realpath-toolong: Fix hurd build Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-23 0:36 ` Samuel Thibault
2022-01-23 15:19 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-23 15:33 ` Samuel Thibault
2022-01-24 6:00 ` [committed v2] " Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-24 13:45 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] realpath: Set errno to ENAMETOOLONG for result larger than PATH_MAX [BZ #28770] Andreas Schwab
2022-01-24 14:25 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-24 14:48 ` Andreas Schwab
2022-01-24 14:59 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-24 15:28 ` Andreas Schwab
2022-01-24 16:08 ` [committed] realpath: Avoid overwriting preexisting error (CVE-2021-3998) Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-20 9:32 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] getcwd: Set errno to ERANGE for size == 1 (CVE-2021-3999) Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-20 13:32 ` Andreas Schwab
2022-01-21 16:41 ` Adhemerval Zanella [this message]
2022-01-21 17:26 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-21 17:31 ` Adhemerval Zanella
2022-01-21 17:38 ` [PATCH v4] " Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-21 17:59 ` Andreas Schwab
2022-01-21 18:02 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-21 18:04 ` [PATCH v5] " Siddhesh Poyarekar
2022-01-24 6:03 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
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