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* The GNU C Library security advisories update for 2024-05-06
@ 2024-05-06 19:30 Carlos O'Donell
  2024-05-07  5:49 ` Jiazi Yu
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Carlos O'Donell @ 2024-05-06 19:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: libc-announce, oss-security

The following security advisories have been published:

GLIBC-SA-2024-0005:
===================
nscd: Stack-based buffer overflow in netgroup cache

If the Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) fixed size cache is exhausted
by client requests then a subsequent client request for netgroup data
may result in a stack-based buffer overflow.  This flaw was introduced
in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd.

This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary.

GLIBC-SA-2024-0006:
===================
nscd: Null pointer crash after notfound response

If the Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) cache fails to add a not-found
netgroup response to the cache, the client request can result in a null
pointer dereference.  This flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the
cache was added to nscd.

This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary.

GLIBC-SA-2024-0007:
===================
nscd: netgroup cache may terminate daemon on memory allocation failure

The Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) netgroup cache uses xmalloc or
xrealloc and these functions may terminate the process due to a memory
allocation failure resulting in a denial of service to the clients.  The
flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd.

This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary.

Subsequent refactoring of the netgroup cache only added more uses of
xmalloc and xrealloc. Uses of xmalloc and xrealloc in other parts of
nscd only occur during startup of the daemon and so are not affected by
client requests that could trigger an out of memory followed by
termination.

GLIBC-SA-2024-0008:
===================
nscd: netgroup cache assumes NSS callback uses in-buffer strings

The Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) netgroup cache can corrupt memory
when the NSS callback does not store all strings in the provided buffer.
The flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd.

This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary.

There is no guarantee from the NSS callback API that the returned
strings are all within the buffer. However, the netgroup cache code
assumes that the NSS callback uses in-buffer strings and if it doesn't
the buffer resizing logic could lead to potential memory corruption.

Published advisories are available directly in the project git repository:
https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=tree;f=advisories;hb=HEAD


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: The GNU C Library security advisories update for 2024-05-06
  2024-05-06 19:30 The GNU C Library security advisories update for 2024-05-06 Carlos O'Donell
@ 2024-05-07  5:49 ` Jiazi Yu
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Jiazi Yu @ 2024-05-07  5:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
  Cc: libc-announce, oss-security

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2681 bytes --]

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Carlos O'Donell via Libc-announce <libc-announce@sourceware.org>
于2024年5月7日周二 03:33写道:

> The following security advisories have been published:
>
> GLIBC-SA-2024-0005:
> ===================
> nscd: Stack-based buffer overflow in netgroup cache
>
> If the Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) fixed size cache is exhausted
> by client requests then a subsequent client request for netgroup data
> may result in a stack-based buffer overflow.  This flaw was introduced
> in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd.
>
> This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary.
>
> GLIBC-SA-2024-0006:
> ===================
> nscd: Null pointer crash after notfound response
>
> If the Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) cache fails to add a not-found
> netgroup response to the cache, the client request can result in a null
> pointer dereference.  This flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the
> cache was added to nscd.
>
> This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary.
>
> GLIBC-SA-2024-0007:
> ===================
> nscd: netgroup cache may terminate daemon on memory allocation failure
>
> The Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) netgroup cache uses xmalloc or
> xrealloc and these functions may terminate the process due to a memory
> allocation failure resulting in a denial of service to the clients.  The
> flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd.
>
> This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary.
>
> Subsequent refactoring of the netgroup cache only added more uses of
> xmalloc and xrealloc. Uses of xmalloc and xrealloc in other parts of
> nscd only occur during startup of the daemon and so are not affected by
> client requests that could trigger an out of memory followed by
> termination.
>
> GLIBC-SA-2024-0008:
> ===================
> nscd: netgroup cache assumes NSS callback uses in-buffer strings
>
> The Name Service Cache Daemon's (nscd) netgroup cache can corrupt memory
> when the NSS callback does not store all strings in the provided buffer.
> The flaw was introduced in glibc 2.15 when the cache was added to nscd.
>
> This vulnerability is only present in the nscd binary.
>
> There is no guarantee from the NSS callback API that the returned
> strings are all within the buffer. However, the netgroup cache code
> assumes that the NSS callback uses in-buffer strings and if it doesn't
> the buffer resizing logic could lead to potential memory corruption.
>
> Published advisories are available directly in the project git repository:
> https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=tree;f=advisories;hb=HEAD
>
>

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