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From: "Theo de Raadt" <deraadt@openbsd.org>
To: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: "Damien Miller" <djm@mindrot.org>,
	libc-alpha@sourceware.org, "Alejandro Colomar" <alx@kernel.org>,
	"Theo de Raadt" <deraadt@theos.com>,
	"Todd C . Miller" <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	"Cristian Rodríguez" <crrodriguez@opensuse.org>,
	"Adhemerval Zanella" <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>,
	"Yann Droneaud" <ydroneaud@opteya.com>,
	"Joseph Myers" <joseph@codesourcery.com>,
	otto@cvs.openbsd.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Give a useful meaning to arc4random_uniform(0);
Date: Sun, 01 Jan 2023 01:34:26 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <96735.1672562066@cvs.openbsd.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <55ecb133-a9c4-e36e-7202-69fceaaf49b4@gmail.com>

Alejandro,

Your arguments are childishly wrong.

Your API will not be incorporated, and the existing API will
not be changed.

Please stop.

Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com> wrote:

> Hello Damien,
> 
> On 1/1/23 00:07, Damien Miller wrote:
> > On Sat, 31 Dec 2022, Theo de Raadt wrote:
> > 
> >> Also, right now an (incorrect?) call of arc4random_uniform(0)
> >> will return 0, but with your proposal it will return a non-zero
> >> number.  Have you audited the entire universe of software to
> >> ensure that your change doesn't introduce a bug in some other
> >> piece of software?  I doubt you did that.  Very unprofessional
> >> of you to not study the impact and just wave the issue away.
> >>
> >> I think Special-casing the value of 0 to mean something new
> >> and undocumented behaviour makes no sense.  It is even potentially
> >> undocumentable.
> > I agree - specifying a zero upper-bound is numerically nonsensical,
> > and could often be the result of a bug in the caller.
> > Changing it is likely to break code like this in a plausibly
> > exploitable
> > way:
> > elem_t *random_elem(elem_t **elems, size_t nelems) {
> > 	return elems[arc4random_uniform(nelems)];
> > }
> 
> The above code is already broken.  In case nelems is 0, the array has
> exactly 0 elements, so the pointer &elems[0] is a pointer to
> one-past-the-last element. It is legal to hold such a pointer, but not
> to dereference it (I guess I don't need to quote the standard here).
> 
> Such a pointer dereference *is dangerous*, and *is very-likely exploitable*.
> 
> Having a random 32-bit number instead is likely to be a pointer
> addressing an invalid memory address, and result in a crash.  And
> crashes are good, right?
> 
> 
> Changing the behavior of arc4random_uniform() wouldn't make this code
> more broken, but rather uncover the bug in it.
> 
> > Therefore IMO the only safe return from arc4random_uniform(0) is 0.
> 
> I'd argue it's the opposite.  0 is the most unsafe value it can return
> in such a case, since it's the least likely to result in a crash.  The
> Undefined Behavior is invoked, and in a way that is likely to modify
> memory that is available to the process.
> 
> 42 would be a better value.
> An even better value would be UINT32_MAX, which would almost-certainly
> guarantee a crash everywhere.
> However, it makes more sense to just let it be an unbounded random
> value, which will likely result in the same crashes as with
> UINT32_MAX, but would be more useful for other purposes.
> 
> > That changing make it fractionally simpler to implement one
> > particular
> > wrapper doesn't IMO justify it.
> > -d
> 
> Cheers,
> 
> Alex
> 
> -- 
> <http://www.alejandro-colomar.es/>

  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-01-01  8:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-12-31  2:36 Alejandro Colomar
2022-12-31  2:48 ` Alejandro Colomar
2022-12-31  2:57 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-12-31 13:39   ` Alejandro Colomar
2022-12-31  8:50 ` Theo de Raadt
2022-12-31  8:51   ` Theo de Raadt
2022-12-31 14:56     ` Alejandro Colomar
2022-12-31 15:13       ` Alejandro Colomar
2022-12-31 15:17         ` Alejandro Colomar
2022-12-31 15:59         ` Alejandro Colomar
2022-12-31 16:03           ` Alejandro Colomar
2023-01-01  8:41           ` Theo de Raadt
2022-12-31 23:07   ` Damien Miller
2022-12-31 23:58     ` Alejandro Colomar
2023-01-01  7:48       ` Ariadne Conill
2023-01-01  9:21         ` Otto Moerbeek
2023-01-01 14:05         ` Alejandro Colomar
2023-01-01  8:34       ` Theo de Raadt [this message]
2023-01-01 21:37 ` Arsen Arsenović
2023-01-01 23:50   ` Alejandro Colomar
2023-01-02  0:02     ` Arsen Arsenović
2023-01-02 11:24       ` Alejandro Colomar

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