From: "Theo de Raadt" <deraadt@openbsd.org>
To: Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: "Damien Miller" <djm@mindrot.org>,
libc-alpha@sourceware.org, "Alejandro Colomar" <alx@kernel.org>,
"Theo de Raadt" <deraadt@theos.com>,
"Todd C . Miller" <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
"Cristian Rodríguez" <crrodriguez@opensuse.org>,
"Adhemerval Zanella" <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>,
"Yann Droneaud" <ydroneaud@opteya.com>,
"Joseph Myers" <joseph@codesourcery.com>,
otto@cvs.openbsd.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] Give a useful meaning to arc4random_uniform(0);
Date: Sun, 01 Jan 2023 01:34:26 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <96735.1672562066@cvs.openbsd.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <55ecb133-a9c4-e36e-7202-69fceaaf49b4@gmail.com>
Alejandro,
Your arguments are childishly wrong.
Your API will not be incorporated, and the existing API will
not be changed.
Please stop.
Alejandro Colomar <alx.manpages@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hello Damien,
>
> On 1/1/23 00:07, Damien Miller wrote:
> > On Sat, 31 Dec 2022, Theo de Raadt wrote:
> >
> >> Also, right now an (incorrect?) call of arc4random_uniform(0)
> >> will return 0, but with your proposal it will return a non-zero
> >> number. Have you audited the entire universe of software to
> >> ensure that your change doesn't introduce a bug in some other
> >> piece of software? I doubt you did that. Very unprofessional
> >> of you to not study the impact and just wave the issue away.
> >>
> >> I think Special-casing the value of 0 to mean something new
> >> and undocumented behaviour makes no sense. It is even potentially
> >> undocumentable.
> > I agree - specifying a zero upper-bound is numerically nonsensical,
> > and could often be the result of a bug in the caller.
> > Changing it is likely to break code like this in a plausibly
> > exploitable
> > way:
> > elem_t *random_elem(elem_t **elems, size_t nelems) {
> > return elems[arc4random_uniform(nelems)];
> > }
>
> The above code is already broken. In case nelems is 0, the array has
> exactly 0 elements, so the pointer &elems[0] is a pointer to
> one-past-the-last element. It is legal to hold such a pointer, but not
> to dereference it (I guess I don't need to quote the standard here).
>
> Such a pointer dereference *is dangerous*, and *is very-likely exploitable*.
>
> Having a random 32-bit number instead is likely to be a pointer
> addressing an invalid memory address, and result in a crash. And
> crashes are good, right?
>
>
> Changing the behavior of arc4random_uniform() wouldn't make this code
> more broken, but rather uncover the bug in it.
>
> > Therefore IMO the only safe return from arc4random_uniform(0) is 0.
>
> I'd argue it's the opposite. 0 is the most unsafe value it can return
> in such a case, since it's the least likely to result in a crash. The
> Undefined Behavior is invoked, and in a way that is likely to modify
> memory that is available to the process.
>
> 42 would be a better value.
> An even better value would be UINT32_MAX, which would almost-certainly
> guarantee a crash everywhere.
> However, it makes more sense to just let it be an unbounded random
> value, which will likely result in the same crashes as with
> UINT32_MAX, but would be more useful for other purposes.
>
> > That changing make it fractionally simpler to implement one
> > particular
> > wrapper doesn't IMO justify it.
> > -d
>
> Cheers,
>
> Alex
>
> --
> <http://www.alejandro-colomar.es/>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-01 8:34 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-12-31 2:36 Alejandro Colomar
2022-12-31 2:48 ` Alejandro Colomar
2022-12-31 2:57 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-12-31 13:39 ` Alejandro Colomar
2022-12-31 8:50 ` Theo de Raadt
2022-12-31 8:51 ` Theo de Raadt
2022-12-31 14:56 ` Alejandro Colomar
2022-12-31 15:13 ` Alejandro Colomar
2022-12-31 15:17 ` Alejandro Colomar
2022-12-31 15:59 ` Alejandro Colomar
2022-12-31 16:03 ` Alejandro Colomar
2023-01-01 8:41 ` Theo de Raadt
2022-12-31 23:07 ` Damien Miller
2022-12-31 23:58 ` Alejandro Colomar
2023-01-01 7:48 ` Ariadne Conill
2023-01-01 9:21 ` Otto Moerbeek
2023-01-01 14:05 ` Alejandro Colomar
2023-01-01 8:34 ` Theo de Raadt [this message]
2023-01-01 21:37 ` Arsen Arsenović
2023-01-01 23:50 ` Alejandro Colomar
2023-01-02 0:02 ` Arsen Arsenović
2023-01-02 11:24 ` Alejandro Colomar
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