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* Re: [PATCH v4] x86: Prevent SIGSEGV in memcmp-sse2 when data is concurrently modified [BZ #29863]
       [not found]   ` <CAMe9rOrgXxO-9aOoRtnO-onkcGd819QGqd2E1cc5JfPQWDseLQ@mail.gmail.com>
@ 2023-01-10 22:02     ` Sunil Pandey
  2023-01-10 23:02       ` Noah Goldstein
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Sunil Pandey @ 2023-01-10 22:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: H.J. Lu, Libc-stable Mailing List; +Cc: Noah Goldstein, libc-alpha, carlos

On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 1:36 PM H.J. Lu via Libc-alpha
<libc-alpha@sourceware.org> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 10:52 AM Noah Goldstein <goldstein.w.n@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > In the case of INCORRECT usage of `memcmp(a, b, N)` where `a` and `b`
> > are concurrently modified as `memcmp` runs, there can be a SIGSEGV
> > in `L(ret_nonzero_vec_end_0)` because the sequential logic
> > assumes that `(rdx - 32 + rax)` is a positive 32-bit integer.
> >
> > To be clear, this change does not mean the usage of `memcmp` is
> > supported.  The program behaviour is undefined (UB) in the
> > presence of data races, and `memcmp` is incorrect when the values
> > of `a` and/or `b` are modified concurrently (data race). This UB
> > may manifest itself as a SIGSEGV. That being said, if we can
> > allow the idiomatic use cases, like those in yottadb with
> > opportunistic concurrency control (OCC), to execute without a
> > SIGSEGV, at no cost to regular use cases, then we can aim to
> > minimize harm to those existing users.
> >
> > The fix replaces a 32-bit `addl %edx, %eax` with the 64-bit variant
> > `addq %rdx, %rax`. The 1-extra byte of code size from using the
> > 64-bit instruction doesn't contribute to overall code size as the
> > next target is aligned and has multiple bytes of `nop` padding
> > before it. As well all the logic between the add and `ret` still
> > fits in the same fetch block, so the cost of this change is
> > basically zero.
> >
> > The relevant sequential logic can be seen in the following
> > pseudo-code:
> > ```
> >     /*
> >      * rsi = a
> >      * rdi = b
> >      * rdx = len - 32
> >      */
> >     /* cmp a[0:15] and b[0:15]. Since length is known to be [17, 32]
> >     in this case, this check is also assumed to cover a[0:(31 - len)]
> >     and b[0:(31 - len)].  */
> >     movups  (%rsi), %xmm0
> >     movups  (%rdi), %xmm1
> >     PCMPEQ  %xmm0, %xmm1
> >     pmovmskb %xmm1, %eax
> >     subl    %ecx, %eax
> >     jnz L(END_NEQ)
> >
> >     /* cmp a[len-16:len-1] and b[len-16:len-1].  */
> >     movups  16(%rsi, %rdx), %xmm0
> >     movups  16(%rdi, %rdx), %xmm1
> >     PCMPEQ  %xmm0, %xmm1
> >     pmovmskb %xmm1, %eax
> >     subl    %ecx, %eax
> >     jnz L(END_NEQ2)
> >     ret
> >
> > L(END2):
> >     /* Position first mismatch.  */
> >     bsfl    %eax, %eax
> >
> >     /* The sequential version is able to assume this value is a
> >     positive 32-bit value because the first check included bytes in
> >     range a[0:(31 - len)] and b[0:(31 - len)] so `eax` must be
> >     greater than `31 - len` so the minimum value of `edx` + `eax` is
> >     `(len - 32) + (32 - len) >= 0`. In the concurrent case, however,
> >     `a` or `b` could have been changed so a mismatch in `eax` less or
> >     equal than `(31 - len)` is possible (the new low bound is `(16 -
> >     len)`. This can result in a negative 32-bit signed integer, which
> >     when zero extended to 64-bits is a random large value this out
> >     out of bounds. */
> >     addl %edx, %eax
> >
> >     /* Crash here because 32-bit negative number in `eax` zero
> >     extends to out of bounds 64-bit offset.  */
> >     movzbl  16(%rdi, %rax), %ecx
> >     movzbl  16(%rsi, %rax), %eax
> > ```
> >
> > This fix is quite simple, just make the `addl %edx, %eax` 64 bit (i.e
> > `addq %rdx, %rax`). This prevents the 32-bit zero extension
> > and since `eax` is still a low bound of `16 - len` the `rdx + rax`
> > is bound by `(len - 32) - (16 - len) >= -16`. Since we have a
> > fixed offset of `16` in the memory access this must be in bounds.
> > ---
> >  sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S | 12 +++++++++++-
> >  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S b/sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S
> > index afd450d020..51bc9344f0 100644
> > --- a/sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S
> > +++ b/sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S
> > @@ -308,7 +308,17 @@ L(ret_nonzero_vec_end_0):
> >         setg    %dl
> >         leal    -1(%rdx, %rdx), %eax
> >  #  else
> > -       addl    %edx, %eax
> > +       /* Use `addq` instead of `addl` here so that even if `rax` + `rdx`
> > +       is negative value of the sum will be usable as a 64-bit offset
> > +       (negative 32-bit numbers zero-extend to a large and often
> > +       out-of-bounds 64-bit offsets).  Note that `rax` + `rdx` >= 0 is
> > +       an invariant when `memcmp` is used correctly, but if the input
> > +       strings `rsi`/`rdi` are concurrently modified as the function
> > +       runs (there is a Data-Race) it is possible for `rax` + `rdx` to
> > +       be negative.  Given that there is virtually no extra to cost
> > +       using `addq` instead of `addl` we may as well protect the
> > +       data-race case.  */
> > +       addq    %rdx, %rax
> >         movzbl  (VEC_SIZE * -1 + SIZE_OFFSET)(%rsi, %rax), %ecx
> >         movzbl  (VEC_SIZE * -1 + SIZE_OFFSET)(%rdi, %rax), %eax
> >         subl    %ecx, %eax
> > --
> > 2.34.1
> >
>
> LGTM.
>
> Thanks.
>
> --
> H.J.

I would like to backport this patch to release branches.
Any comments or objections?

--Sunil

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v4] x86: Prevent SIGSEGV in memcmp-sse2 when data is concurrently modified [BZ #29863]
  2023-01-10 22:02     ` [PATCH v4] x86: Prevent SIGSEGV in memcmp-sse2 when data is concurrently modified [BZ #29863] Sunil Pandey
@ 2023-01-10 23:02       ` Noah Goldstein
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Noah Goldstein @ 2023-01-10 23:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Sunil Pandey; +Cc: H.J. Lu, Libc-stable Mailing List, libc-alpha, carlos

On Tue, Jan 10, 2023 at 2:03 PM Sunil Pandey <skpgkp2@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 1:36 PM H.J. Lu via Libc-alpha
> <libc-alpha@sourceware.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Wed, Dec 14, 2022 at 10:52 AM Noah Goldstein <goldstein.w.n@gmail.com> wrote:
> > >
> > > In the case of INCORRECT usage of `memcmp(a, b, N)` where `a` and `b`
> > > are concurrently modified as `memcmp` runs, there can be a SIGSEGV
> > > in `L(ret_nonzero_vec_end_0)` because the sequential logic
> > > assumes that `(rdx - 32 + rax)` is a positive 32-bit integer.
> > >
> > > To be clear, this change does not mean the usage of `memcmp` is
> > > supported.  The program behaviour is undefined (UB) in the
> > > presence of data races, and `memcmp` is incorrect when the values
> > > of `a` and/or `b` are modified concurrently (data race). This UB
> > > may manifest itself as a SIGSEGV. That being said, if we can
> > > allow the idiomatic use cases, like those in yottadb with
> > > opportunistic concurrency control (OCC), to execute without a
> > > SIGSEGV, at no cost to regular use cases, then we can aim to
> > > minimize harm to those existing users.
> > >
> > > The fix replaces a 32-bit `addl %edx, %eax` with the 64-bit variant
> > > `addq %rdx, %rax`. The 1-extra byte of code size from using the
> > > 64-bit instruction doesn't contribute to overall code size as the
> > > next target is aligned and has multiple bytes of `nop` padding
> > > before it. As well all the logic between the add and `ret` still
> > > fits in the same fetch block, so the cost of this change is
> > > basically zero.
> > >
> > > The relevant sequential logic can be seen in the following
> > > pseudo-code:
> > > ```
> > >     /*
> > >      * rsi = a
> > >      * rdi = b
> > >      * rdx = len - 32
> > >      */
> > >     /* cmp a[0:15] and b[0:15]. Since length is known to be [17, 32]
> > >     in this case, this check is also assumed to cover a[0:(31 - len)]
> > >     and b[0:(31 - len)].  */
> > >     movups  (%rsi), %xmm0
> > >     movups  (%rdi), %xmm1
> > >     PCMPEQ  %xmm0, %xmm1
> > >     pmovmskb %xmm1, %eax
> > >     subl    %ecx, %eax
> > >     jnz L(END_NEQ)
> > >
> > >     /* cmp a[len-16:len-1] and b[len-16:len-1].  */
> > >     movups  16(%rsi, %rdx), %xmm0
> > >     movups  16(%rdi, %rdx), %xmm1
> > >     PCMPEQ  %xmm0, %xmm1
> > >     pmovmskb %xmm1, %eax
> > >     subl    %ecx, %eax
> > >     jnz L(END_NEQ2)
> > >     ret
> > >
> > > L(END2):
> > >     /* Position first mismatch.  */
> > >     bsfl    %eax, %eax
> > >
> > >     /* The sequential version is able to assume this value is a
> > >     positive 32-bit value because the first check included bytes in
> > >     range a[0:(31 - len)] and b[0:(31 - len)] so `eax` must be
> > >     greater than `31 - len` so the minimum value of `edx` + `eax` is
> > >     `(len - 32) + (32 - len) >= 0`. In the concurrent case, however,
> > >     `a` or `b` could have been changed so a mismatch in `eax` less or
> > >     equal than `(31 - len)` is possible (the new low bound is `(16 -
> > >     len)`. This can result in a negative 32-bit signed integer, which
> > >     when zero extended to 64-bits is a random large value this out
> > >     out of bounds. */
> > >     addl %edx, %eax
> > >
> > >     /* Crash here because 32-bit negative number in `eax` zero
> > >     extends to out of bounds 64-bit offset.  */
> > >     movzbl  16(%rdi, %rax), %ecx
> > >     movzbl  16(%rsi, %rax), %eax
> > > ```
> > >
> > > This fix is quite simple, just make the `addl %edx, %eax` 64 bit (i.e
> > > `addq %rdx, %rax`). This prevents the 32-bit zero extension
> > > and since `eax` is still a low bound of `16 - len` the `rdx + rax`
> > > is bound by `(len - 32) - (16 - len) >= -16`. Since we have a
> > > fixed offset of `16` in the memory access this must be in bounds.
> > > ---
> > >  sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S | 12 +++++++++++-
> > >  1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> > >
> > > diff --git a/sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S b/sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S
> > > index afd450d020..51bc9344f0 100644
> > > --- a/sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S
> > > +++ b/sysdeps/x86_64/multiarch/memcmp-sse2.S
> > > @@ -308,7 +308,17 @@ L(ret_nonzero_vec_end_0):
> > >         setg    %dl
> > >         leal    -1(%rdx, %rdx), %eax
> > >  #  else
> > > -       addl    %edx, %eax
> > > +       /* Use `addq` instead of `addl` here so that even if `rax` + `rdx`
> > > +       is negative value of the sum will be usable as a 64-bit offset
> > > +       (negative 32-bit numbers zero-extend to a large and often
> > > +       out-of-bounds 64-bit offsets).  Note that `rax` + `rdx` >= 0 is
> > > +       an invariant when `memcmp` is used correctly, but if the input
> > > +       strings `rsi`/`rdi` are concurrently modified as the function
> > > +       runs (there is a Data-Race) it is possible for `rax` + `rdx` to
> > > +       be negative.  Given that there is virtually no extra to cost
> > > +       using `addq` instead of `addl` we may as well protect the
> > > +       data-race case.  */
> > > +       addq    %rdx, %rax
> > >         movzbl  (VEC_SIZE * -1 + SIZE_OFFSET)(%rsi, %rax), %ecx
> > >         movzbl  (VEC_SIZE * -1 + SIZE_OFFSET)(%rdi, %rax), %eax
> > >         subl    %ecx, %eax
> > > --
> > > 2.34.1
> > >
> >
> > LGTM.
> >
> > Thanks.
> >
> > --
> > H.J.
>
> I would like to backport this patch to release branches.
> Any comments or objections?

Fine by me.
>
> --Sunil

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2023-01-10 23:02 UTC | newest]

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     [not found]   ` <CAMe9rOrgXxO-9aOoRtnO-onkcGd819QGqd2E1cc5JfPQWDseLQ@mail.gmail.com>
2023-01-10 22:02     ` [PATCH v4] x86: Prevent SIGSEGV in memcmp-sse2 when data is concurrently modified [BZ #29863] Sunil Pandey
2023-01-10 23:02       ` Noah Goldstein

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