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From: Andrea Corallo <andrea.corallo@arm.com>
To: Andrea Corallo via Gcc-patches <gcc-patches@gcc.gnu.org>
Cc: Richard Earnshaw <Richard.Earnshaw@arm.com>, nd <nd@arm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 3/15] arm: Add option -mbranch-protection
Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2022 17:21:00 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <gkr7d3dcwtf.fsf@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <gkrk07dczbq.fsf@arm.com> (Andrea Corallo via Gcc-patches's message of "Fri, 12 Aug 2022 16:26:49 +0200")

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Hi all,

this adds -mbranch-protection option.  This option enables the
code-generation of pointer signing and authentication instructions in
function prologues and epilogues.

gcc/ChangeLog:

	* config/arm/arm.c (arm_configure_build_target): Parse and validate
	-mbranch-protection option and initialize appropriate data structures.
	* config/arm/arm.opt (-mbranch-protection): New option.
	* doc/invoke.texi (Arm Options): Document it.

Co-Authored-By: Tejas Belagod  <tbelagod@arm.com>
Co-Authored-By: Richard Earnshaw <Richard.Earnshaw@arm.com>

Approved here <https://gcc.gnu.org/pipermail/gcc-patches/2022-July/597756.html>


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diff --git a/gcc/config/arm/arm.cc b/gcc/config/arm/arm.cc
index 60f3eae82a4..0068817b0f2 100644
--- a/gcc/config/arm/arm.cc
+++ b/gcc/config/arm/arm.cc
@@ -3263,6 +3263,17 @@ arm_configure_build_target (struct arm_build_target *target,
       tune_opts = strchr (opts->x_arm_tune_string, '+');
     }
 
+  if (opts->x_arm_branch_protection_string)
+    {
+      aarch_validate_mbranch_protection (opts->x_arm_branch_protection_string);
+
+      if (aarch_ra_sign_key != AARCH_KEY_A)
+	{
+	  warning (0, "invalid key type for %<-mbranch-protection=%>");
+	  aarch_ra_sign_key = AARCH_KEY_A;
+	}
+    }
+
   if (arm_selected_arch)
     {
       arm_initialize_isa (target->isa, arm_selected_arch->common.isa_bits);
diff --git a/gcc/config/arm/arm.opt b/gcc/config/arm/arm.opt
index f54ec8356c3..d292e23ea11 100644
--- a/gcc/config/arm/arm.opt
+++ b/gcc/config/arm/arm.opt
@@ -323,6 +323,10 @@ mbranch-cost=
 Target RejectNegative Joined UInteger Var(arm_branch_cost) Init(-1)
 Cost to assume for a branch insn.
 
+mbranch-protection=
+Target RejectNegative Joined Var(arm_branch_protection_string) Save
+Use branch-protection features.
+
 mgeneral-regs-only
 Target RejectNegative Mask(GENERAL_REGS_ONLY) Save
 Generate code which uses the core registers only (r0-r14).
diff --git a/gcc/doc/invoke.texi b/gcc/doc/invoke.texi
index 079e34ed98c..a2be3446594 100644
--- a/gcc/doc/invoke.texi
+++ b/gcc/doc/invoke.texi
@@ -825,7 +825,9 @@ Objective-C and Objective-C++ Dialects}.
 -mcmse @gol
 -mfix-cmse-cve-2021-35465 @gol
 -mstack-protector-guard=@var{guard} -mstack-protector-guard-offset=@var{offset} @gol
--mfdpic}
+-mfdpic @gol
+-mbranch-protection=@var{none}|@var{standard}|@var{pac-ret}[+@var{leaf}]
+[+@var{bti}]|@var{bti}[+@var{pac-ret}[+@var{leaf}]]}
 
 @emph{AVR Options}
 @gccoptlist{-mmcu=@var{mcu}  -mabsdata  -maccumulate-args @gol
@@ -21521,6 +21523,40 @@ The opposite @option{-mno-fdpic} option is useful (and required) to
 build the Linux kernel using the same (@code{arm-*-uclinuxfdpiceabi})
 toolchain as the one used to build the userland programs.
 
+@item
+-mbranch-protection=@var{none}|@var{standard}|@var{pac-ret}[+@var{leaf}][+@var{bti}]|@var{bti}[+@var{pac-ret}[+@var{leaf}]]
+@opindex mbranch-protection
+Enable branch protection features (armv8.1-m.main only).
+@samp{none} generate code without branch protection or return address
+signing.
+@samp{standard[+@var{leaf}]} generate code with all branch protection
+features enabled at their standard level.
+@samp{pac-ret[+@var{leaf}]} generate code with return address signing
+set to its standard level, which is to sign all functions that save
+the return address to memory.
+@samp{leaf} When return address signing is enabled, also sign leaf
+functions even if they do not write the return address to memory.
++@samp{bti} Add landing-pad instructions at the permitted targets of
+indirect branch instructions.
+
+If the @samp{+pacbti} architecture extension is not enabled, then all
+branch protection and return address signing operations are
+constrained to use only the instructions defined in the
+architectural-NOP space. The generated code will remain
+backwards-compatible with earlier versions of the architecture, but
+the additional security can be enabled at run time on processors that
+support the @samp{PACBTI} extension.
+
+Branch target enforcement using BTI can only be enabled at runtime if
+all code in the application has been compiled with at least
+@samp{-mbranch-protection=bti}.
+
+Any setting other than @samp{none} is supported only on armv8-m.main
+or later.
+
+The default is to generate code without branch protection or return
+address signing.
+
 @end table
 
 @node AVR Options

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-08-12 15:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-08-12 14:26 [PATCH 0/15] arm: Enables return address verification and branch target identification on Cortex-M Andrea Corallo
2022-08-12 15:14 ` [PATCH 1/15] arm: Make mbranch-protection opts parsing common to AArch32/64 Andrea Corallo
2022-12-22 17:04   ` [PATCH 1/15 V2] " Andrea Corallo
2023-01-11 10:48     ` Richard Earnshaw
2022-08-12 15:15 ` [PATCH 2/15] arm: Add Armv8.1-M Mainline target feature +pacbti Andrea Corallo
2022-08-12 15:21 ` Andrea Corallo [this message]
2022-08-12 15:22 ` [PATCH 4/15] arm: Add testsuite library support for PACBTI target Andrea Corallo
2022-08-12 15:26 ` [PATCH 5/15] arm: Implement target feature macros for PACBTI Andrea Corallo
2022-08-12 15:29 ` [PATCH 6/15] arm: Add pointer authentication for stack-unwinding runtime Andrea Corallo
2022-08-12 15:30 ` [PATCH 7/15] arm: Emit build attributes for PACBTI target feature Andrea Corallo
2022-09-05 16:53   ` Andrea Corallo
2022-10-20 14:47   ` Kyrylo Tkachov
2022-10-20 15:15     ` Richard Earnshaw
2022-10-21 12:19   ` Richard Earnshaw
2022-08-12 15:33 ` [PATCH 8/15] arm: Introduce multilibs " Andrea Corallo
2022-08-12 15:34 ` [PATCH 9/15] arm: Set again stack pointer as CFA reg when popping if necessary Andrea Corallo
2022-09-05 16:52   ` Andrea Corallo
2022-09-27  9:03   ` Kyrylo Tkachov
2022-09-27 10:05     ` Andrea Corallo
2022-09-27 15:24       ` Kyrylo Tkachov
2022-10-21 12:30         ` Richard Earnshaw
2022-10-26  8:49           ` Andrea Corallo
2022-11-08 14:57             ` Richard Earnshaw
2023-01-09 14:58             ` Andrea Corallo
2023-01-09 15:57               ` Richard Earnshaw
2023-01-09 16:48               ` Richard Earnshaw
2023-01-09 17:22                 ` Richard Earnshaw
2023-01-11  9:55                   ` Andrea Corallo
2022-08-12 15:36 ` [PATCH 10/15] arm: Implement cortex-M return signing address codegen Andrea Corallo
2022-09-05 16:55   ` Andrea Corallo
2022-09-14 14:20   ` [PATCH 10/15 V2] " Andrea Corallo
2022-10-21 12:58     ` Richard Earnshaw
2022-10-26 15:48       ` Andrea Corallo
2022-10-28 16:34         ` [PATCH 10/15 V3] " Andrea Corallo
2022-11-07  8:57           ` [PATCH 10/15 V4] " Andrea Corallo
2022-12-05 16:38             ` Richard Earnshaw
2022-12-09 14:16               ` [PATCH 10/15 V5] " Andrea Corallo
2022-12-12 10:53                 ` Richard Earnshaw
2022-12-14 16:35                   ` [PATCH 10/15 V6] " Andrea Corallo
2022-12-14 16:45                     ` Richard Earnshaw
2023-01-11  9:58                       ` [PATCH 10/15 V7] " Andrea Corallo
2023-01-11 10:39                         ` Richard Earnshaw
2022-08-12 15:40 ` [PATCH 11/15] aarch64: Make bti pass generic so it can be used by the arm backend Andrea Corallo
2022-09-05 16:56   ` Andrea Corallo
2022-09-27  9:10   ` Kyrylo Tkachov
2022-08-12 15:41 ` [PATCH 12/15] arm: implement bti injection Andrea Corallo
2022-09-05 16:56   ` Andrea Corallo
2022-09-27  9:18   ` Kyrylo Tkachov
2022-09-29 15:45     ` [PATCH 12/15 V2] " Andrea Corallo
2022-10-20 14:56       ` Kyrylo Tkachov
2022-10-28 16:40         ` [PATCH 12/15 V3] " Andrea Corallo
2022-12-05 17:02           ` Richard Earnshaw
2022-12-14 16:40             ` [PATCH 12/15 V4] " Andrea Corallo
2022-12-14 17:00               ` Richard Earnshaw
2022-12-14 17:03                 ` Richard Earnshaw
2022-12-22 17:13                   ` [PATCH 12/15 V5] " Andrea Corallo
2023-01-11 15:08                     ` Richard Earnshaw
2022-08-12 16:44 ` [PATCH 0/15] arm: Enables return address verification and branch target identification on Cortex-M Andrea Corallo
2022-08-12 17:10 ` [PATCH 13/15] arm: Add pacbti related multilib support for armv8.1-m.main Srinath Parvathaneni
2022-10-21 13:00   ` Richard Earnshaw
2022-09-21  8:07 ` [PING][PATCH 0/15] arm: Enables return address verification and branch target identification on Cortex-M Andrea Corallo
2022-10-21 13:01   ` Richard Earnshaw
2022-10-21 13:32     ` Andrea Corallo
2022-12-05 14:10   ` Andrea Corallo
2022-12-05 14:19     ` Kyrylo Tkachov
2023-01-23 10:50   ` [PATCH " Andrea Corallo

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