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From: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>
To: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>,
	"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
	libc-alpha@sourceware.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel,
	Michael@phoronix.com, jann@thejh.net
Subject: Re: arc4random - are you sure we want these?
Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2022 22:16:19 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220727021618.GK7074@brightrain.aerifal.cx> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <YuCa1lDqoxdnZut/@mit.edu>

On Tue, Jul 26, 2022 at 09:54:30PM -0400, Theodore Ts'o via Libc-alpha wrote:
> On Mon, Jul 25, 2022 at 02:49:30PM -0400, Rich Felker wrote:
> > 
> > You can at least try the sysctl and possibly also /dev approaches and
> > only treat this as fatal as a last resort. If you can inspect
> > entropy_avail or poll /dev/random to determine that the pool is
> > initialized this is very safe, I think. And some research on distro
> > practices might uncover whether this should be believed to be
> > complete.
> 
> I think people are *way* too worried about what happens if /dev/random
> is symlinked to /dev/urandom, and/or other bits of insanitry.
> 
> The getrandom(3) system call has been around since v3.17.  That's
> 2014.

Last year I helped someone get musl up and running with EABI userspace
(all we support) on a pre-EABI kernel (2.6.18 or so?) on embedded
hardware in use in the field that could not be upgraded for hardware
support reasons. Assuming post-2014 kernel may be okay for
desktop/server distros but from my perspective it's pretty
unthinkable.

> Even an ancient, obsolete enterprise distro like RHEL 7
> backported the getrandom system call in 2017 --- a full 5 years ago.
> If someone is still using a pre-2017, or $DEITY help them, pre-2014
> kernel, that kernel will be so riddled with zero-day vulnerabilities
> that some fallback to a /dev/urandom at boot time will be the
> ***least*** of their worries from a security perspective.  And that's
> assuming someone who is so hide-bound as to be using a badly obsolete
> kernel would be interested in going to a bleeding edge libc in the
> first place!

There's a huge difference in zero-day vulnerabilities which might
exist nowhere but on a box that's not exposed to the outside world,
and possibly creating compromised key material from said boxes. And
weird embedded stuff that can't be upgraded is *also* the same setting
where you have a complete lack of early boot entropy.

I'm fine with folks who need this stuff coming to musl instead of
glibc, but I think folks on the glibc side are doing right to at least
*consider* whether/how it matters rather than writing anything older
than a few years off as irrelevant.

Rich

  reply	other threads:[~2022-07-27  2:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <YtwgTySJyky0OcgG@zx2c4.com>
2022-07-23 16:25 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-23 17:18   ` Paul Eggert
2022-07-24 23:55     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 20:31       ` Paul Eggert
2022-07-23 17:39   ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-23 22:54     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 15:33     ` Rich Felker
2022-07-25 15:59       ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-25 17:41         ` Rich Felker
2022-07-25 16:18       ` Sandy Harris
2022-07-25 16:40       ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-25 16:49         ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-25 16:51         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 17:44         ` Rich Felker
2022-07-25 18:33           ` Cristian Rodríguez
2022-07-25 18:49             ` Rich Felker
2022-07-27  1:54               ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-07-27  2:16                 ` Rich Felker [this message]
2022-07-27  2:45                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-07-27 11:34                 ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-27 12:32                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-07-27 12:49                     ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-27 20:15                       ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-07-27 21:59                         ` Rich Felker
2022-07-28  0:30                           ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-07-28  0:39                         ` Cristian Rodríguez
2022-07-27 15:39                   ` Rich Felker
2022-07-23 19:04   ` Cristian Rodríguez
2022-07-23 22:59     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-24 16:23       ` Cristian Rodríguez
2022-07-24 21:57         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 10:14     ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-25 10:11   ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-25 11:04     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 12:39       ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-25 13:43         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 13:58           ` Cristian Rodríguez
2022-07-25 16:06           ` Rich Felker
2022-07-25 16:43             ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-26 14:27         ` Overwrittting AT_RANDOM after use (was Re: arc4random - are you sure we want these?) Yann Droneaud
2022-07-26 14:35         ` arc4random - are you sure we want these? Yann Droneaud
2022-07-25 13:25       ` Jeffrey Walton
2022-07-25 13:48         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 14:56     ` Rich Felker
2022-07-25 22:57   ` [PATCH] arc4random: simplify design for better safety Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 23:11     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 23:28     ` [PATCH v2] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 23:59       ` Eric Biggers
2022-07-26 10:26         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26  1:10       ` Mark Harris
2022-07-26 10:41         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 11:06           ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-26 16:51           ` Mark Harris
2022-07-26 18:42             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 19:18               ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 19:24               ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26  9:55       ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-26 11:04         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 11:07           ` [PATCH v3] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 11:11             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 11:12           ` [PATCH v2] " Florian Weimer
2022-07-26 11:20             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 11:35               ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 11:33       ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 11:54         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 12:08           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 12:20           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 12:34           ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 12:47             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 13:11               ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 13:30     ` [PATCH v4] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 15:21       ` Yann Droneaud
2022-07-26 16:20       ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 18:36         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 19:08       ` [PATCH v5] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 19:58         ` [PATCH v6] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 20:17           ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 20:56             ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-28 10:29           ` Szabolcs Nagy
2022-07-28 10:36             ` Szabolcs Nagy
2022-07-28 11:01               ` Adhemerval Zanella

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