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From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
To: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org>,
	Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>,
	libc-alpha@sourceware.org, Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>,
	jann@thejh.net, Michael@phoronix.com,
	Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: arc4random - are you sure we want these?
Date: Mon, 25 Jul 2022 18:51:36 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Yt7KGOgV7JfPUtol@zx2c4.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <878rohp2ll.fsf@oldenburg.str.redhat.com>

Hi Florian,

On Mon, Jul 25, 2022 at 06:40:54PM +0200, Florian Weimer wrote:
> The core issue is that on some kernels/architectures, reading from
> /dev/urandom can degrade to GRND_INSECURE (approximately), and while the
> result is likely still unpredictable, not everyone would label that as a
> CSPRNG.

On some old kernels (though I think not all?), you can poll on
/dev/random. This isn't perfect, as the ancient "non blocking pool"
initialized after the "blocking pool", but it's not too imperfect
either. Take a look at the previously linked random-util.c.

> If we document arc4random as a CSPRNG, this means that we would have to
> ditch the fallback code and abort the process if the getrandom system
> call is not available: when reading from /dev/urandom as a fallback, we
> have no way of knowing if we are in any of the impacted execution
> environments.  Based on your other comments, it seems that you are
> interested in such fallbacks, too, but I don't think you can actually
> have both (CSPRNG + fallback).
> 
> And then there is the certification issue.  We really want applications
> that already use OpenSSL for other cryptography to use RAND_bytes
> instead of arc4random.  Likewise for GNUTLS and gnutls_rnd.  What should
> authors of those cryptographic libraries?  That's less clear, and really
> depends on the constraints they operate in (e.g., they may target only a
> subset of architectures and kernel versions).

I think all of this is yet another indication that there are some major
things to work out -- should we block or not? is buffering safe? is the
interface correct? -- and so we should just back out the arc4random
commit until this has been explored a bit more. We're not gaining
anything from rushing this, especially as a "source code compatibility"
thing, if there's not even agreement between OSes on what the function
does inside.

Jason

PS: please try to keep linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org CC'd. I've been
bouncing these manually when not, but it's hard to keep up with that.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-07-25 16:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <YtwgTySJyky0OcgG@zx2c4.com>
2022-07-23 16:25 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-23 17:18   ` Paul Eggert
2022-07-24 23:55     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 20:31       ` Paul Eggert
2022-07-23 17:39   ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-23 22:54     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 15:33     ` Rich Felker
2022-07-25 15:59       ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-25 17:41         ` Rich Felker
2022-07-25 16:18       ` Sandy Harris
2022-07-25 16:40       ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-25 16:49         ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-25 16:51         ` Jason A. Donenfeld [this message]
2022-07-25 17:44         ` Rich Felker
2022-07-25 18:33           ` Cristian Rodríguez
2022-07-25 18:49             ` Rich Felker
2022-07-27  1:54               ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-07-27  2:16                 ` Rich Felker
2022-07-27  2:45                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-07-27 11:34                 ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-27 12:32                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-07-27 12:49                     ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-27 20:15                       ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-07-27 21:59                         ` Rich Felker
2022-07-28  0:30                           ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-07-28  0:39                         ` Cristian Rodríguez
2022-07-27 15:39                   ` Rich Felker
2022-07-23 19:04   ` Cristian Rodríguez
2022-07-23 22:59     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-24 16:23       ` Cristian Rodríguez
2022-07-24 21:57         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 10:14     ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-25 10:11   ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-25 11:04     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 12:39       ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-25 13:43         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 13:58           ` Cristian Rodríguez
2022-07-25 16:06           ` Rich Felker
2022-07-25 16:43             ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-26 14:27         ` Overwrittting AT_RANDOM after use (was Re: arc4random - are you sure we want these?) Yann Droneaud
2022-07-26 14:35         ` arc4random - are you sure we want these? Yann Droneaud
2022-07-25 13:25       ` Jeffrey Walton
2022-07-25 13:48         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 14:56     ` Rich Felker
2022-07-25 22:57   ` [PATCH] arc4random: simplify design for better safety Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 23:11     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 23:28     ` [PATCH v2] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 23:59       ` Eric Biggers
2022-07-26 10:26         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26  1:10       ` Mark Harris
2022-07-26 10:41         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 11:06           ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-26 16:51           ` Mark Harris
2022-07-26 18:42             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 19:18               ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 19:24               ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26  9:55       ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-26 11:04         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 11:07           ` [PATCH v3] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 11:11             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 11:12           ` [PATCH v2] " Florian Weimer
2022-07-26 11:20             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 11:35               ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 11:33       ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 11:54         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 12:08           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 12:20           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 12:34           ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 12:47             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 13:11               ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 13:30     ` [PATCH v4] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 15:21       ` Yann Droneaud
2022-07-26 16:20       ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 18:36         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 19:08       ` [PATCH v5] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 19:58         ` [PATCH v6] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 20:17           ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 20:56             ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-28 10:29           ` Szabolcs Nagy
2022-07-28 10:36             ` Szabolcs Nagy
2022-07-28 11:01               ` Adhemerval Zanella

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