public inbox for libc-alpha@sourceware.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Yann Droneaud <ydroneaud@opteya.com>
To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>, libc-alpha@sourceware.org
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4] arc4random: simplify design for better safety
Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2022 17:21:19 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <9f280b52-995e-559c-3ecf-d4b9119c7af7@opteya.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220726133049.1145913-1-Jason@zx2c4.com>

Hi,

Le 26/07/2022 à 15:30, Jason A. Donenfeld via Libc-alpha a écrit :
> Rather than buffering 16 MiB of entropy in userspace (by way of
> chacha20), simply call getrandom() every time.


I dislike the wording because

1) the current buffer is only 512 bytes, not 16MiBytes;
2) implementation reads only 48 bytes of "fresh" entropy from 
getrandom() each 16MiBytes generated.

I'm thinking "stirring" or "streaming" would better describe what's 
happening:

"Rather than stirring 16MiB of random data in userspace before reseeding"


> This approach is doubtlessly slower, for now, but trying to prematurely
> optimize arc4random appears to be leading toward all sorts of nasty
> properties and gotchas. Instead, this patch takes a much more
> conservative approach. The interface is added as a basic loop wrapper
> around getrandom(), and then later, the kernel and libc together can
> work together on optimizing that.
>
> This prevents numerous issues in which userspace is unaware of when it
> really must throw away its buffer, since we avoid buffering all
> together.


I believe the cloned virtual machine issue should be explicitly 
described as a major blocker in the commit message.


> Future improvements may include userspace learning more from
> the kernel about when to do that, which might make these sorts of
> chacha20-based optimizations more possible. The current heuristic of 16
> MiB is meaningless garbage that doesn't correspond to anything the
> kernel might know about. So for now, let's just do something
> conservative that we know is correct and won't lead to cryptographic
> issues for users of this function.
>
> This patch might be considered along the lines of, "optimization is the
> root of all evil," in that the much more complex implementation it
> replaces moves too fast without considering security implications,
> whereas the incremental approach done here is a much safer way of going
> about things. Once this lands, we can take our time in optimizing this
> properly using new interplay between the kernel and userspace.
>
> getrandom(0) is used, since that's the one that ensures the bytes
> returned are cryptographically secure. But on systems without it, we
> fallback to using /dev/urandom. This is unfortunate because it means
> opening a file descriptor, but there's not much of a choice. Secondly,
> as part of the fallback, in order to get more or less the same
> properties of getrandom(0), we poll on /dev/random, and if the poll
> succeeds at least once, then we assume the RNG is initialized. This is a
> rough approximation, as the ancient "non-blocking pool" initialized
> after the "blocking pool", not before, and it may not port back to all
> ancient kernels, but it does to a decent swath of them, so generally
> it's the best approximation we can do.
>
> The motivation for including arc4random, in the first place, is to have
> source-level compatibility with existing code. That means this patch
> doesn't attempt to litigate the interface itself. It does, however,
> choose a conservative approach for implementing it.


Sure arc4random() interface is inherited from *BSD, thus we're not free 
to improve it. But arc4random() is already here in glibc git, thus I 
think the paragraph is of dubious value in the commit message and can be 
removed.


> Cc: Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>
> Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
> Cc: Cristian Rodríguez <crrodriguez@opensuse.org>
> Cc: Paul Eggert <eggert@cs.ucla.edu>
> Cc: Mark Harris <mark.hsj@gmail.com>
> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
> Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
> ---
>   LICENSES                                      |  23 -
>   NEWS                                          |   4 +-
>   include/stdlib.h                              |   3 -
>   manual/math.texi                              |  13 +-
>   stdlib/Makefile                               |   2 -
>   stdlib/arc4random.c                           | 205 ++-----
>   stdlib/arc4random.h                           |  48 --
>   stdlib/chacha20.c                             | 191 ------
>   stdlib/tst-arc4random-chacha20.c              | 167 -----
>   sysdeps/aarch64/Makefile                      |   4 -
>   sysdeps/aarch64/chacha20-aarch64.S            | 314 ----------
>   sysdeps/aarch64/chacha20_arch.h               |  40 --
>   sysdeps/generic/tls-internal-struct.h         |   1 -
>   sysdeps/generic/tls-internal.c                |  10 -
>   sysdeps/mach/hurd/_Fork.c                     |   2 -
>   sysdeps/mach/hurd/kernel-features.h           |   1 +
>   sysdeps/nptl/_Fork.c                          |   2 -
>   .../powerpc/powerpc64/be/multiarch/Makefile   |   4 -
>   .../powerpc64/be/multiarch/chacha20-ppc.c     |   1 -
>   .../powerpc64/be/multiarch/chacha20_arch.h    |  42 --
>   sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc64/power8/Makefile     |   5 -
>   .../powerpc/powerpc64/power8/chacha20-ppc.c   | 256 --------
>   .../powerpc/powerpc64/power8/chacha20_arch.h  |  37 --
>   sysdeps/s390/s390-64/Makefile                 |   6 -
>   sysdeps/s390/s390-64/chacha20-s390x.S         | 573 ------------------
>   sysdeps/s390/s390-64/chacha20_arch.h          |  45 --
>   sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/Makefile              |   3 +-
>   sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/Versions              |   1 +
>   sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/kernel-features.h     |   7 +
>   sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/not-cancel.h          |   6 +
>   .../sysv/linux/ppoll_nocancel.c}              |  19 +-
>   sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tls-internal.c        |  10 -
>   sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/tls-internal.h        |   1 -
>   sysdeps/x86_64/Makefile                       |   7 -
>   sysdeps/x86_64/chacha20-amd64-avx2.S          | 328 ----------
>   sysdeps/x86_64/chacha20-amd64-sse2.S          | 311 ----------
>   sysdeps/x86_64/chacha20_arch.h                |  55 --
>   37 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 2658 deletions(-)
>   delete mode 100644 stdlib/arc4random.h
>   delete mode 100644 stdlib/chacha20.c
>   delete mode 100644 stdlib/tst-arc4random-chacha20.c
>   delete mode 100644 sysdeps/aarch64/chacha20-aarch64.S
>   delete mode 100644 sysdeps/aarch64/chacha20_arch.h
>   delete mode 100644 sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc64/be/multiarch/Makefile
>   delete mode 100644 sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc64/be/multiarch/chacha20-ppc.c
>   delete mode 100644 sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc64/be/multiarch/chacha20_arch.h
>   delete mode 100644 sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc64/power8/chacha20-ppc.c
>   delete mode 100644 sysdeps/powerpc/powerpc64/power8/chacha20_arch.h
>   delete mode 100644 sysdeps/s390/s390-64/chacha20-s390x.S
>   delete mode 100644 sysdeps/s390/s390-64/chacha20_arch.h
>   rename sysdeps/{generic/chacha20_arch.h => unix/sysv/linux/ppoll_nocancel.c} (62%)
>   delete mode 100644 sysdeps/x86_64/chacha20-amd64-avx2.S
>   delete mode 100644 sysdeps/x86_64/chacha20-amd64-sse2.S
>   delete mode 100644 sysdeps/x86_64/chacha20_arch.h
>
> diff --git a/manual/math.texi b/manual/math.texi
> index 141695cc30..6d69bbff66 100644
> --- a/manual/math.texi
> +++ b/manual/math.texi
> @@ -1993,17 +1993,10 @@ This section describes the random number functions provided as a GNU
>   extension, based on OpenBSD interfaces.
>   
>   @Theglibc{} uses kernel entropy obtained either through @code{getrandom}
> -or by reading @file{/dev/urandom} to seed and periodically re-seed the
> -internal state.  A per-thread data pool is used, which allows fast output
> -generation.
> +or by reading @file{/dev/urandom} to seed.
>   
> -Although these functions provide higher random quality than ISO, BSD, and
> -SVID functions, these still use a Pseudo-Random generator and should not
> -be used in cryptographic contexts.
> -
> -The internal state is cleared and reseeded with kernel entropy on @code{fork}
> -and @code{_Fork}.  It is not cleared on either a direct @code{clone} syscall
> -or when using @theglibc{} @code{syscall} function.
> +These functions provide higher random quality than ISO, BSD, and SVID
> +functions, and may be used in cryptographic contexts.

+ "provided getrandom() and /dev/urandom() could be used in such 
context." ;)


Thanks for the improvements, can't wait for a vDSO getrandom() optimized 
for reading 1,2,4,8 bytes :)


Regards.


-- 

Yann Droneaud

OPTEYA



  reply	other threads:[~2022-07-26 15:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 81+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <YtwgTySJyky0OcgG@zx2c4.com>
2022-07-23 16:25 ` arc4random - are you sure we want these? Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-23 17:18   ` Paul Eggert
2022-07-24 23:55     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 20:31       ` Paul Eggert
2022-07-23 17:39   ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-23 22:54     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 15:33     ` Rich Felker
2022-07-25 15:59       ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-25 17:41         ` Rich Felker
2022-07-25 16:18       ` Sandy Harris
2022-07-25 16:40       ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-25 16:49         ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-25 16:51         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 17:44         ` Rich Felker
2022-07-25 18:33           ` Cristian Rodríguez
2022-07-25 18:49             ` Rich Felker
2022-07-27  1:54               ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-07-27  2:16                 ` Rich Felker
2022-07-27  2:45                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-07-27 11:34                 ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-27 12:32                   ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-07-27 12:49                     ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-27 20:15                       ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-07-27 21:59                         ` Rich Felker
2022-07-28  0:30                           ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-07-28  0:39                         ` Cristian Rodríguez
2022-07-27 15:39                   ` Rich Felker
2022-07-23 19:04   ` Cristian Rodríguez
2022-07-23 22:59     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-24 16:23       ` Cristian Rodríguez
2022-07-24 21:57         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 10:14     ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-25 10:11   ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-25 11:04     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 12:39       ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-25 13:43         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 13:58           ` Cristian Rodríguez
2022-07-25 16:06           ` Rich Felker
2022-07-25 16:43             ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-26 14:27         ` Overwrittting AT_RANDOM after use (was Re: arc4random - are you sure we want these?) Yann Droneaud
2022-07-26 14:35         ` arc4random - are you sure we want these? Yann Droneaud
2022-07-25 13:25       ` Jeffrey Walton
2022-07-25 13:48         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 14:56     ` Rich Felker
2022-07-25 22:57   ` [PATCH] arc4random: simplify design for better safety Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 23:11     ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 23:28     ` [PATCH v2] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-25 23:59       ` Eric Biggers
2022-07-26 10:26         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26  1:10       ` Mark Harris
2022-07-26 10:41         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 11:06           ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-26 16:51           ` Mark Harris
2022-07-26 18:42             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 19:18               ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 19:24               ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26  9:55       ` Florian Weimer
2022-07-26 11:04         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 11:07           ` [PATCH v3] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 11:11             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 11:12           ` [PATCH v2] " Florian Weimer
2022-07-26 11:20             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 11:35               ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 11:33       ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 11:54         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 12:08           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 12:20           ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 12:34           ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 12:47             ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 13:11               ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 13:30     ` [PATCH v4] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 15:21       ` Yann Droneaud [this message]
2022-07-26 16:20       ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 18:36         ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 19:08       ` [PATCH v5] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 19:58         ` [PATCH v6] " Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-07-26 20:17           ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-26 20:56             ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2022-07-28 10:29           ` Szabolcs Nagy
2022-07-28 10:36             ` Szabolcs Nagy
2022-07-28 11:01               ` Adhemerval Zanella

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=9f280b52-995e-559c-3ecf-d4b9119c7af7@opteya.com \
    --to=ydroneaud@opteya.com \
    --cc=Jason@zx2c4.com \
    --cc=ebiggers@kernel.org \
    --cc=fweimer@redhat.com \
    --cc=libc-alpha@sourceware.org \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for read-only IMAP folder(s) and NNTP newsgroup(s).