From: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@sourceware.org>
To: libc-alpha@sourceware.org
Cc: adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org, fweimer@redhat.com, carlos@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH 0/2] make all tunables SXID_ERASE
Date: Tue, 3 Oct 2023 16:11:49 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231003201151.1406279-1-siddhesh@sourceware.org> (raw)
The tunable privilege levels were a retrofit to try and keep the malloc
tunable envvar behaviour unchanged. In retrospect, especially in the
light of CVE-2023-4911, I wonder if this feature of carrying allocator
tuning knobs (and more generally, tunables in general) has much value.
This patchset takes the first step by proposing to make all existing
tunables SXID_ERASE. This will have the effect of deactivating tunables
parsing in the at_secure context for all current tunables, making it
trivial to drop GLIBC_TUNABLES form unsecvars.h in future, hopefully
soon.
Further, this paves the way for future cleanups to tunables parsing,
where we could simply skip over tunables parsing for
__libc_enable_secure instead of the complicated dance we're doing today.
Tested on x86_64.
Siddhesh Poyarekar (2):
Make all malloc tunables SXID_ERASE
aarch64: Make glibc.mem.tagging SXID_ERASE
elf/dl-tunables.list | 13 +++----------
elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c | 25 ++-----------------------
elf/tst-env-setuid.c | 4 ++--
sysdeps/generic/unsecvars.h | 7 +++++++
4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
--
2.41.0
next reply other threads:[~2023-10-03 20:12 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-03 20:11 Siddhesh Poyarekar [this message]
2023-10-03 20:11 ` [PATCH 1/2] Make all malloc " Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-03 20:11 ` [PATCH 2/2] aarch64: Make glibc.mem.tagging SXID_ERASE Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-04 7:29 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-10-04 11:59 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-04 14:04 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-10-04 14:23 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-04 14:51 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-10-04 14:53 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-04 15:05 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-04 17:01 ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2023-10-05 8:19 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-10-05 12:55 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-05 13:59 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-10-05 14:05 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-05 18:31 ` Zack Weinberg
2023-10-05 19:11 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-06 12:25 ` Zack Weinberg
2023-10-06 12:41 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-06 17:10 ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2023-10-06 18:04 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-08 19:51 ` Michael Hudson-Doyle
2023-10-31 19:58 ` Zack Weinberg
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20231003201151.1406279-1-siddhesh@sourceware.org \
--to=siddhesh@sourceware.org \
--cc=adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org \
--cc=carlos@redhat.com \
--cc=fweimer@redhat.com \
--cc=libc-alpha@sourceware.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for read-only IMAP folder(s) and NNTP newsgroup(s).