From: "Zack Weinberg" <zack@owlfolio.org>
To: "Siddhesh Poyarekar" <siddhesh@sourceware.org>,
"Szabolcs Nagy" <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>,
"Adhemerval Zanella" <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>,
"GNU libc development" <libc-alpha@sourceware.org>
Cc: "Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
"Carlos O'Donell" <carlos@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] aarch64: Make glibc.mem.tagging SXID_ERASE
Date: Fri, 06 Oct 2023 08:25:42 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ff27f292-af1f-4718-836a-df8690eaa57d@app.fastmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ae819935-92fe-d4d8-8186-82be639ac0b5@sourceware.org>
On Thu, Oct 5, 2023, at 3:11 PM, Siddhesh Poyarekar wrote:
> On 2023-10-05 14:31, Zack Weinberg wrote:
>> On Thu, Oct 5, 2023, at 9:59 AM, Szabolcs Nagy wrote:
>>> i think it is broken to rewrite env[] that is passed by the
>>> kernel. but since glibc always did this i guess it's fine.
>>
>> I think the CVE that prompted this discussion demonstrates that
>> it's *insecure* to allow children of setxid processes to inherit
>> any environment variable that is considered insecure to consult in
>> the setxid process itself.
>
> I don't completely disagree with the conclusion below, but the CVE
> that prompted this discussion doesn't say anything about environment
> inheritance because the vulnerability had nothing to do with
> environment processing and inheritance.
I may have misunderstood the CVE or mixed it up with another one.
I thought there was a recent CVE in which a SXID_IGNORE environment
variable was inherited by a child process, and that child process was
rendered vulnerable to further exploitation because it honored that
variable.
> The issue there is limited to complex parsing of a particular
> environment variable in a setxid context and the main lesson there
> IMO is to keep any kind of processing to a bare minimum in a setxid
> context.
Agreed.
> Processing for environment inheritance (specifically, cleaning out
> unsecvars) is fairly stable code that has stood the test of time.
> It makes sense like you suggest below, to make it an inclusion list
> rather than an exclusion list, but IMO that's a separate hardening
> exercise from ripping tunables out of the setxid context.
Also agreed.
zw
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-06 12:26 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-03 20:11 [PATCH 0/2] make all tunables SXID_ERASE Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-03 20:11 ` [PATCH 1/2] Make all malloc " Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-03 20:11 ` [PATCH 2/2] aarch64: Make glibc.mem.tagging SXID_ERASE Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-04 7:29 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-10-04 11:59 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-04 14:04 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-10-04 14:23 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-04 14:51 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-10-04 14:53 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-04 15:05 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-04 17:01 ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2023-10-05 8:19 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-10-05 12:55 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-05 13:59 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-10-05 14:05 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-05 18:31 ` Zack Weinberg
2023-10-05 19:11 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-06 12:25 ` Zack Weinberg [this message]
2023-10-06 12:41 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-06 17:10 ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2023-10-06 18:04 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-08 19:51 ` Michael Hudson-Doyle
2023-10-31 19:58 ` Zack Weinberg
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