From: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@sourceware.org>
To: Szabolcs Nagy <szabolcs.nagy@arm.com>,
Adhemerval Zanella Netto <adhemerval.zanella@linaro.org>,
libc-alpha@sourceware.org
Cc: fweimer@redhat.com, carlos@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] aarch64: Make glibc.mem.tagging SXID_ERASE
Date: Thu, 5 Oct 2023 10:05:58 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c217d791-2103-4386-c7a3-947698e1ac69@sourceware.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZR7BTSxFlrQIHFht@arm.com>
On 2023-10-05 09:59, Szabolcs Nagy wrote:
> The 10/05/2023 08:55, Siddhesh Poyarekar wrote:
>> On 2023-10-05 04:19, Szabolcs Nagy wrote:
>>> i'd fix this in one place that makes the behaviour easy
>>> to reason about: _dl_next_ld_env_entry in rtld should
>>> just return empty in secure mode and same for getenv,
>>> internally it should return empty.
>>>
>>> then we know that nothing in libc can depend on the env.
>>> (if something parses env directly that should be fixed)
>>>
>>> if anything, there should be a whitelist, not blacklist
>>> of env vars.
>>
>> That won't work because it would require knowledge of (or a mechanism to
>> specify) safety of environment variables used by the application and its
>> children. The current unsecvars approach is probably the best option.
>
> why would you need a whitelist of application envvars?
>
> if there is any env var usage *in libc* that is valid to
> affect setuid binaries then those should be whitelisted.
> (black list works too, but more error prone in imo)
So do you mean (1) maintain a full list of envvars recognized by glibc
and then (2) designate specific ones as safe? That would be a good idea.
Sid
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-10-05 14:06 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-10-03 20:11 [PATCH 0/2] make all tunables SXID_ERASE Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-03 20:11 ` [PATCH 1/2] Make all malloc " Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-03 20:11 ` [PATCH 2/2] aarch64: Make glibc.mem.tagging SXID_ERASE Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-04 7:29 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-10-04 11:59 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-04 14:04 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-10-04 14:23 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-04 14:51 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-10-04 14:53 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-04 15:05 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-04 17:01 ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2023-10-05 8:19 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-10-05 12:55 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-05 13:59 ` Szabolcs Nagy
2023-10-05 14:05 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar [this message]
2023-10-05 18:31 ` Zack Weinberg
2023-10-05 19:11 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-06 12:25 ` Zack Weinberg
2023-10-06 12:41 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-06 17:10 ` Adhemerval Zanella Netto
2023-10-06 18:04 ` Siddhesh Poyarekar
2023-10-08 19:51 ` Michael Hudson-Doyle
2023-10-31 19:58 ` Zack Weinberg
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